Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2024

Mar 10, 2024 - ISW Press
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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 10, 2024

Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and George Barros

March 10, 2024, 7:00pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30 pm ET on March 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

A Ukrainian military official confirmed that Russian forces are conducting strikes in Ukraine with improved glide bombs. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi reported on March 10 that Russian forces struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast, with three universal interspecific glide munition (UMPB) D-30SN guided glide bombs that Ukrainian forces initially originally assessed were S-300 missiles.[1] Lykhovyi stated that improved UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs essentially convert Soviet-era FAB unguided gravity bombs to guided glide bombs. Russian forces had previously used unguided glide bombs as recently as January 2024.[2] ISW recently observed Russian milbloggers claim that Russian forces began conducting strikes with FAB UMPB guided glide bombs, as opposed to using unguided glide bombs with unified planning and correction modules (UMPC), in unspecified areas in Ukraine.[3] A Russian milblogger claimed that UMPB guided glide bombs have a guidance system that includes a noise-resistant GLONASS/GPS “Comet” signal receiver and folding wings similar to a Kh-101 cruise missile.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces can launch UMPB guided glide bombs from aircraft and ground-based multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS) such as Tornado-S and Smerch MLRS.[5] A Russian outlet claimed that Russian aviation is currently launching UMPBs without jet engines, but that Russia anticipates employing UMPBs with jet engines in the future.[6] Russian milbloggers claimed that UMPB guided glide bombs with a jet engine and fuel tank, currently absent from aerial glide bombs with UMPC, will allow Russian aviation to drop guided glide bombs from a lower altitude “similar to air-to-surface cruise missiles” and increase the maximum strike range to 80-90 kilometers.[7] Russian milbloggers claimed that the increased range of UMPB guided glide bombs will allow Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to increase the depth of strikes on Ukrainian positions without risk from Ukrainian air forces detecting or destroying Russian fixed-wing aircraft.[8] Russian milbloggers claimed that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is attempting to mass-produce UMPB guided glide bombs.[9] Russian forces will likely attempt to serialize production of UMPB guided glide bombs and increase their use across the frontline.

Russian sources reported that Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev has replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. St. Petersburg news outlet Fontanka reported on March 10 that Moiseev was appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, and former Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Commander retired Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov later stated that Moiseev is the new Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy in an interview with Ural Regional State newswire URA.ru.[10] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Moiseev was appointed to command the Russian Navy and that recent command changes in the Russian Navy are occurring amid a “complete paralysis” of fleet leadership about new threats, likely referring to recent Ukrainian strikes against BSF assets in and near occupied Crimea.[11] Russian sources recently claimed that the Russian military officially removed BSF Commander Admiral Viktor Sokolov and replaced him with BSF Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Sergei Pinchuk.[12] ISW cannot confirm either Pinchuk’s or Moiseev’s reported appointments. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is in the process of depriving the Northern Fleet of its status as an “interservice strategic territorial organization” (a joint headquarters in Western military parlance) to restore the Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts (MMD and LMD), and Moiseev may have been appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy to retain a high-ranking command role.[13]

Russian occupation authorities opened early voting in occupied Ukraine for Russia’s presidential election on March 10 that will last until March 14. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on March 10 that early voting started in occupied Donetsk Oblast, but noted that early voting in areas close to the frontline has been ongoing since February 25.[14] TASS stated that stationary polling stations will open in occupied Ukraine on March 15-17. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration Head Artem Lysohor stated that 2,600 Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) election commission officials have been conducting door-to-door campaigning for the past 20 days.[15] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian occupation officials intend to claim a 94 percent voter turnout in occupied Ukraine.[16] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin and Russian occupation officials intend to falsify votes in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin and fabricate a large voter turnout in an attempt to legitimize Russia’s occupation of Ukraine to the international community.[17]

Chechen officials organized a march in Grozny, Chechnya, on March 10 in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s candidacy in the upcoming March presidential election. Russian state media outlet TASS reported that more than 150,000 Chechens attended the march in Grozny and that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s eldest child, Chechen Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Khadizhat Kadyrova, organized the march.[18] Russian opposition outlet SOTA amplified a claim on March 9 that the Chechen State University and Grozny State Petroleum Technical University instructed its employees and students to attend the election march on March 10.[19] Kadyrov praised the rally on March 10, emphasizing the importance of the election for the Russian state and praising Putin by name.[20] Kadyrov claimed that many prominent Chechen politicians and voices attended the march but did not mention Kadyrova by name.[21] Chechen National Policy Minister Akhmed Dudayev stated that the march “reflects that we [Chechnya] are one united team of our first President, Hero of Russia Akhmat-Khadzhi Kadyrov.”[22] This election march likely supports Kadyrov’s ongoing effort to balance appealing to his Chechen constituency while courting Putin’s favor.[23]

Over 1,000 civilian ships have transited Ukraine’s “grain corridor” in the Black Sea despite persistent Russian efforts to undermine international confidence in the corridor. US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated on March 9 that 1,005 civilian ships have traveled from Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea through the “grain corridor” and have delivered roughly 30 million tons of cargo, including grain, to world markets.[24] A civilian ship used the Ukrainian corridor to leave a Ukrainian port for the first time in August 2023 and to reach a Ukrainian port for the first time in September 2023.[25] Russian forces began heavily targeting Ukrainian grain and port infrastructure in summer 2023 in an effort to exact concessions on the renewal of the defunct Black Sea grain deal and have continued those strikes in part to discourage civilian maritime traffic through the corridor.[26]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) awarded a state honor to a prominent Russian ultranationalist — who is an active supporter of imprisoned former officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin — likely as part of ongoing Kremlin campaign to coopt the critical milblogger community. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed a decree awarding Russian military volunteer and milblogger Vladimir Grubnik with the “For Military Cooperation” medal on January 24, 2024.[27] Grubnik routinely publishes and amplifies posts in support of Girkin (also known under the alias Strelkov) - who is a prominent critic of the Russian MoD, the Russian military command, and the Kremlin.[28] Grubnik is also a member of the Russian Strelkov Movement, which advocates for Girkin‘s release from prison, and the Russian Angry Patriots Club, which Girkin founded and briefly headed in 2023.[29] Grubnik had also previously amplified posts that criticized the Russian MoD and the military command, some of which directly accused Shoigu of military failures in Ukraine.[30] Grubnik notably defended Shoigu from accusations posed by deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin during his mutiny in June 2023, however.[31] ISW had previously observed that the Kremlin began to coopt Russian milbloggers critical of the Russian war effort’s poor performance by offering them state awards or government positions starting November 2022 in an effort to regain control over the Russian information space.[32] Grubnik’s award may indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to secure control over the group of ultranationalists who support Girkin’s extremist views, are actively providing military and humanitarian help to Russian forces on the frontline, and have participated in the Russian invasion of Donbas and Crimea in 2014. Grubnik’s award, however, is different than the Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class medals that the Kremlin previously awarded to two other milbloggers explicitly for their milblogger activities, but the reason for Grubnik’s award is likely related to his volunteer efforts on the frontline.[33]

Key Takeaways:

  • A Ukrainian military official confirmed that Russian forces are conducting strikes in Ukraine with improved guided glide bombs.
  • Russian sources reported that the Russian military command has replaced Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov with Northern Fleet Commander Admiral Alexander Moiseev as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy.
  • Russian occupation authorities opened early voting in occupied Ukraine for Russia’s presidential election on March 10 that will last until March 14.
  • Chechen officials organized a march in Grozny, Chechnya, on March 10 in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s candidacy in the upcoming March presidential election.
  • Over 1,000 civilian ships have transited Ukraine’s “grain corridor” in the Black Sea despite persistent Russian efforts to undermine international confidence in the corridor.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) awarded a state honor to a prominent Russian ultranationalist — who is an active supporter of imprisoned former officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin — likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin campaign to coopt the critical milblogger community.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Avdiivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire frontline on March 10.
  • Prominent Russian ultranationalists praised Russian volunteers and mobilized personnel on March 10, likely to assuage continued concerns among these personnel in spite of their improper and inequal treatment in the Russian military.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk and near Kreminna on March 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka, west of Kreminna near Yampolivka and Terny, and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[34]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Positional engagements continued northeast of Bakhmut in the Siversk direction on March 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters in depth towards Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[35] Russian forces reportedly attacked southwest of Siversk near Rozdolivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske and Spirne.[36] Elements of the Russian “GORB” detachment (2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] Army Corps [AC]) are operating near Spirne.[37]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ivanivske (west of Bakhmut).[38] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control 80 percent of Ivanivske and made marginal advances near Druzhba (southwest of Bakhmut) and within Bohdanivka (northwest of Bakhmut), but ISW had not observed confirmation for these claims.[39] Positional battles continued near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and east of Chasiv Yar; and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka, Andriivka, Kurdyumivka, Druzhba, and Shumy.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 11th Separate Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and 68th Tank Regiment and 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both part of 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Guards Combined Arms Army [CAA] Southern Military District [SMD]) are fighting in Ivanivske.[41] Elements of the Russian “Sever-V” Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly supporting Russian assaults on Bohdanivka; elements of the Russian 98th Guards VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Bakhmut direction; and elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC) are operating near Toretsk (southwest of Bakhmut).[42]

 

Russian forces recently marginally advanced northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and west of Avdiivka in Orlivka. Geolocated footage published on March 9 and March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Berdychi and in western Orlivka.[43] Positional battles continued near Berdychi; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka and Tonenke; and southwest of Avdiikka near Pervomaiske, Sieverne, and Nevelske.[44] Elements of the Russian 24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade (General Staff’s Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Berdychi.[45] Elements of the 1st “Slavic” Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC) are reportedly operating in the Avdiivka direction.[46]

 

Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in positional battles west of Donetsk City near Krasnohorivka and Heorhiivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Su-34 fighter jet pilots of the Russian 11th Air and Air Defense Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] of the Eastern Military District [EMD]) continue to launch air strikes in the southern Donetsk direction using FAB-500 unguided glide bombs.[48] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue operating near Krasnohorivka, and elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka.[49]

 

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on March 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Shevchenko (southwest of Vuhledar).[50] Elements of the Russian 29th CAA (EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vuhledar direction.[51]

Positional battles occurred southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Levadne in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 10.[52]

 


Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional fighting continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 10, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Positional fighting continued near Robotyne and Verbove (east of Robotyne).[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing for tactical counterattacks near Robotyne.[54] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Dmytro Lykhovyi stated on March 9 that Russian forces are increasingly relying on off-road “buggies” and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to transport Russian infantry near Robotyne because Ukrainian forces are destroying standard Russian military vehicles.[55] Russian forces may be experimenting with using such light unarmored vehicles due to their availability over Russian military vehicles that Ukrainian forces can readily destroy, and/or because such light vehicles are smaller than and have greater speed and mobility over standard military vehicles, making them more difficult for Ukrainian forces to target. Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 1st Battalion of the 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating in the Zaporizhia direction, and elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Robotyne.[56]

 

Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near Krynky as of March 10.[57] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces did not conduct combat operations for the second consecutive day on March 10 and instead focused on conducting aerial reconnaissance, artillery fire, and drone operations.[58]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on March 9-10. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched four S-300 missiles at Kharkiv and Donetsk oblasts and 39 Shahed-136/131 drones from occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[59] Ukrainian forces destroyed 35 Shaheds over Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Odesa, Kherson, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenerho reported that the Russian forces struck two electrical substations in southern and central Ukraine but did not disrupt energy supplies.[60] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that a drone struck an industrial facility in Odesa Oblast.[61]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Prominent Russian ultranationalists praised Russian volunteers and mobilized personnel on March 10, likely to assuage continued concerns among these personnel in spite of their improper and inequal treatment in the Russian military. Deputy Head of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Main Directorate of Rosgvardia, Commander of its special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR), and prominent Russian milblogger Alexander Khodakovsky praised Russian volunteers as “sacred” for suffering higher casualty rates in Ukraine and commended mobilized personnel for fighting in Ukraine despite not choosing to do so voluntarily.[62] Another Russian ultranationalist milblogger characterized Russian military volunteers as Russia’s “backbone” and asserted that Russian volunteers in Ukraine are far more valuable than Soviet volunteers during the war in Afghanistan or Russian volunteers during the first and second Chechen wars.[63]

Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit claimed on March 10 that 3,500 volunteers are serving in the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia.[64] Starovoit claimed that Kursk Oblast People’s Militia volunteers patrol public areas, bridges, and industrial facilities and assist unspecified Russian security forces.[65] Starovoit announced the creation of the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia in late 2022 under the premise that potential Ukrainian ground assaults could threaten Russia’s oblasts on the border with Ukraine.[66] Elements of a similar People’s Militia in Belgorod Oblast have previously responded to pro-Ukrainian Russian volunteer force raids in Belgorod Oblast, but the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia appears to conduct simple auxiliary patrol functions.[67]

A Russian milblogger observed that Russian forces continue to face some issues with newly deployed personnel and drone capabilities in the Avdiivka direction.[68] The milblogger claimed that a significant number of newly deployed Russian contract servicemen (kontrakniki) have unrealistically optimistic preconceptions about fighting in Ukraine and arrive to eastern Ukraine in full confidence that Russian forces are easily winning in battle. The milblogger added that many of the newly arrived personnel do not want to learn to fight because they think that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) will provide air support and that prisoner recruits will defeat Ukrainian forces based on Russian state propaganda claims. The milblogger observed that Donetsk Peoples Republic (DNR) elements prefer to operate locally-produced first-person vision (FPV) drones over those produced and procured by the Russian “Sudoplatov” volunteer group because “Sudoplatov” drones operate on wavelengths known to Ukrainian forces. The milblogger claimed that Central Military District (CMD) drone operators had all of their “Sudoplatov” drones disrupted after Russian drone malfunctioned and alerted Ukrainian forces to activate electronic warfare (EW) systems during the battles for the Avdiivka industrial area. The miblogger claimed on March 9 that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st DNR AC), which is operating in the Avdiivka direction, has several separate air defense groups.[69]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia continues efforts to scale up its production of guided glide bombs for use in Ukraine. Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated in an interview with CNN published on March 10 that Russia is focusing on producing FAB-1500 guided glide bombs because they are far cheaper to produce than missiles.[70] Ihnat noted that Russia will not be able to quickly increase its production of the FAB-1500 guided glide bombs, however, and that producing the bombs will still be costly.[71] German outlet BILD reported on March 7 that Russia has begun mass producing its FAB-1500-M54 guided glide bomb.[72] CNN interviewed Ukrainian soldiers operating near Krasnohorivka (west of Donetsk City) who stated that Russian previously only shelled Ukrainian positions in the area but are now conducting heavy airstrikes with FAB-1500 bombs.[73] Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Senior Research Fellow Justin Bronk told CNN that Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) has bottlenecks for “glide kits” (likely referring to universal planning and correction modules [UMPCs] that Russia attaches to unguided FAB and guided KAB bombs, including FAB-1500 variants, to turn them into glide bombs) but that Russia has a significant amount of materiel for the basic explosive package in the FAB-1500 guided glide bombs.[74]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

Note: ISW will be publishing its coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts on a weekly basis in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track developments in Ukrainian defense industrial efforts daily and will refer to these efforts in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Note: ISW will be publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas twice a week in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will continue to track activities in Russian-occupied areas daily and will refer to these activities in assessments within the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment and other ISW products when necessary.

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger attempted to portray the recent Moldovan-French defense cooperation agreement and announcement that the French Ministry of Defense (MoD) will open an office in Chisinau as evidence that France intends to deploy military personnel to Moldova and possibly to the pro-Russian Moldovan breakaway republic of Transnistria.[75] The milblogger is attempting to further the Kremlin information operations supporting potential hybrid operations aimed at sabotaging Moldova’s European Union (EU) accession process.[76]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/10/rosiyany-zavdaly-udaru-po-myrnogradu-novymy-aviabombamy/

[2] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/11/russia-doubles-down-on-fast-cheap-unguided-bombs-to-strike-ukraine

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2024 ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/11/russia-doubles-down-on-fast-cheap-unguided-bombs-to-strike-ukraine

[4] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8132

[5] https://t.me/sashakots/45443 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115922 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/7454

[6] https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2024/03/09/vragi-ocenili-rossiyskaya-armiya-primenila-na-ukraine-novuyu-chudobombu.html

[7] https://t.me/sashakots/45443 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8132

[8] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8132 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/9619

[9] https://t.me/sashakots/45443 ; https://t.me/rybar/58014 ;

[10] https://ura dot news/news/1052741735 ; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2024/03/10/73317530/

[11] https://t.me/wargonzo/18657 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/118008 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36271

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar021524

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-ukraine-war; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2024

[14] https://tass dot ru/politika/20194213

[15] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17505

[16] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17505 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/5303

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2024 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2024

[18] https://tass dot ru/politika/20195133; https://t.me/tass_agency/235707

[19] https://t.me/sotaproject/76424

[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4580

[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4580

[22] https://tass dot ru/politika/20195133

[23] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Oct%2025%20Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%20PDF.pdf

[24] https://twitter.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1766476595118653949

[25] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081623

[26] https://isw.pub/UkrWar071923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar110923 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar102623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081823 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081623

[27] https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/21079; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115966

[28] https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/21066; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/21001; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/20836; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/20077

[29] https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/293; https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/536; https://t.me/RDS_Official_channel/145 ; https://t.me/KRPRus/83

[30] https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/7353; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/7361; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/7362; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/10187; https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/13241

[31] https://t.me/ghost_of_novorossia/13193

[32] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20; https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=006703778745328820552:rmncc-_xykg&q=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwje0KLyxuqEAxWZF1kFHds1BlkQFnoECAUQAg&usg=AOvVaw3IuF8HXRmV_UYlcQYVGi2U; https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=006703778745328820552:rmncc-_xykg&q=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2023&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwje0KLyxuqEAxWZF1kFHds1BlkQFnoECAQQAg&usg=AOvVaw15OpyzyMD-KOLA7DCK27kb; https://www.google.com/url?client=internal-element-cse&cx=006703778745328820552:rmncc-_xykg&q=https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27&sa=U&ved=2ahUKEwje0KLyxuqEAxWZF1kFHds1BlkQFnoECAkQAg&usg=AOvVaw13m8Hgn8nymAR_Pap6IUHc

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Offensive%20Campaign%20Assessment%2C%20March%204%2C%202024%20PDF.pdf; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2023

[34] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36478 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/36474 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/18648 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8127

[35] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63403

[36] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36478

[37] https://t.me/sons_fatherland/13177

[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4712; https://t.me/brigada92_war/1361

[39] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63403; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8110; https://t.me/wargonzo/18648

[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/36476; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36478; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63406 ; . https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63403;https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033

[41] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63403

[42] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63406 (Bohdanivka); https://t.me/rusich_army/13553 (Bakhmut direction); . https://t.me/nm_dnr/11946 (Toretsk)

[43] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4710; https://t.me/lumieregroup/89; https://t.me/BUAR110ombr/274 ; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1766863167898935490?s=20 ; https://x.com/EjShahid/status/1766842368873898365?s=20; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1766544702826844373 ; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1766546264110387403 ; https://t.me/lumieregroup/89

[44] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://t.me/mod_russia/36478; https://t.me/mod_russia/36476; https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033; https://t.me/wargonzo/18648; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8125;

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63433; https://t.me/grey_zone/22310 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115968 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8134

[46] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115934

[47] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033; https://t.me/wargonzo/18648

[48] https://t.me/voin_dv/7447

[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/7453 (Novomykhailivka); https://t.me/RVvoenkor/63428 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11945 (Krasnohorivka)

[50] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4715; https://t.me/br58ua/338

[51] https://t.me/voin_dv/7459 (Vuhledar)

[52] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl

[53] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl

[54] https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033; https://t.me/wargonzo/18648

[55] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/09/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-chomu-rosiyany-shturmuyut-robotyne-na-bagi-ta-golf-karah/

[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/36469; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8129; https://t.me/dva_majors/36257 (Zaporizhia direction); https://t.me/boris_rozhin/115931 (Robotyne)

[57] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0sYjmgzSDYaZ47ViGoDHA45YGLfAtzHGP8yRhdjiwZPbQui4T9qXSxbnwMKsHQrrgl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0cvcTPqXMz5AuaLt6MuN1davS8GYep98VudrEeuZ8NRvU7g2xtMqKesiuoLqRNyNsl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0BoRQde6WkUxgyXeecuHxQqhAvcozPHD54gJNsZEM8DvZR4HYhGpFYJNuEoUJu5tzl; https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/2457; https://t.me/dva_majors/36235 ; https://t.me/rybar/58033

[58] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7018 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7023 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7020

[59] https://t.me/kpszsu/11672; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02TBfegDP46fSX6deSPUsphbNbrKKG8fRoVUhJAYenLyVdaTmEumz2ETgKSrvBggb6l; https://t.me/MykolaOleshchuk/223

[60] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/2684

[61] https://t.me/odeskaODA/4394

[62] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/3117

[63] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/9975

[64] https://t.me/gubernator_46/5082 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/76428

[65] https://t.me/gubernator_46/5082 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/76428

[66] https://isw.pub/UkrWar120622

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-23-2023

[68] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1766510079673524649/photo/2; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1766510079673524649/photo/1

[69] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1766510079673524649/photo/1

[70] https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/europe/russian-guided-bomb-ukraine-frontline-intl/index.html

[71] https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/europe/russian-guided-bomb-ukraine-frontline-intl/index.html

[72] /https://www.bild dot de/politik/ausland/politik-ausland/sie-ist-schwer-wie-ein-auto-putins-monster-bombe-kann-jetzt-fliegen-87436140.bild

[73] https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/europe/russian-guided-bomb-ukraine-frontline-intl/index.html

[74] https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/10/europe/russian-guided-bomb-ukraine-frontline-intl/index.html

[75] https://t.me/rybar/58038 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldova-signs-defence-pact-with-france-amid-russia-fears-2024-03-07/

[76] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2024