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Africa File Special Edition: Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict—Friend to All, Enemy to None
Apr 30, 2025 - ISW Press
Africa File Special Edition: Uganda in the DRC’s M23 Conflict—Friend to All, Enemy to None
Authors: Yale Ford and Liam Karr
Contributors: Nick Markiewicz and Nicholas Carl
Data Cutoff: April 30, 2025, at 10 a.m.
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Read a one-page Executive Summary of the Report Here
Editor's Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.
The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.
Key Takeaway: Uganda is working with actors on multiple sides of the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to hedge and strengthen its sphere of influence. Uganda has developed a security partnership with the DRC in recent years. However, Uganda also maintains ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement and has activated its own rebel proxies in the eastern DRC. Uganda is using these relationships to counterbalance Rwandan influence in the eastern DRC and unilaterally influence Congolese affairs. Ugandan meddling perpetuates conflict in the eastern DRC by proliferating the number of armed actors, injecting regional competition into local conflicts, and complicating peace efforts.
Assessment:
Uganda is using its partnership with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to target anti-Ugandan rebel groups and strengthen its sphere of influence in the eastern DRC. Uganda and the DRC have conducted combined operations against the Islamic State Central Africa Province, which was originally a Ugandan rebel group that is known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), as part of Operation Shujaa since 2021.[1] Uganda increased its counterterrorism cooperation with the DRC in response to ADF attacks into Uganda that year.[2] The Ugandan army (UPDF) and Congolese army (FARDC) expanded their operations to new parts of North Kivu Province and neighboring Ituri province in 2024 and 2025, respectively.[3]
Uganda supported the expansion of Operation Shujaa to Ituri province in 2025, likely to fight Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO)—another rebel group—in addition to ADF. CODECO is a loose coalition of ethnic Lendu militias that operate primarily in the Djugu and Mahagi districts of Ituri province.[4] The UPDF and the FARDC agreed to target “all armed groups” in northeastern Ituri province when they agreed to expand Operation Shujaa in late March.[5] ADF and CODECO are the two most lethal armed groups for civilians in the eastern DRC.[6]
Uganda has signaled that it partially views CODECO as part of its fight against ADF, which continues to be Uganda’s main target, and is open to co-opting CODECO. The UPDF spokesperson claimed on March 21 that CODECO fighters “struck a pact” with ADF, but the spokesperson did not provide evidence.[7] UPDF Commander Muhoozi Kainerugaba (Muhoozi) and several senior UPDF officials met with a delegation of leaders from one CODECO faction in late April for negotiations.[8] The UPDF readout of the meeting claimed that the CODECO leaders said they had been “misled by some negative forces,” which could be a reference to ADF.[9] There is no independent evidence that ADF and CODECO are coordinating their activity, however. Muhoozi highlighted the historical cooperation between the UPDF and locals against Ugandan rebels, including ADF, and urged CODECO to ally with the UPDF during the meeting.[10] The French magazine Jeune Afrique cited a “military source” on April 23 who said that the UPDF is likely using developing relations with CODECO to signal to ADF rebels that Uganda is open to negotiations.[11]
Uganda co-opts its partnership with the DRC to advance its own interests in the eastern DRC. UPDF counterterrorism deployments allow Uganda to maintain a buffer zone on the DRC-Uganda border and limit the ability of ADF and other armed groups to conduct cross-border attacks into Uganda.[12] The UN and Armed Conflict Location and Event Data report that Operation Shujaa has degraded ADF and pushed the group from the border but has failed to decrease the intensity of ADF attacks on Congolese civilians.[13] Muhoozi said in February 2025 that the UPDF will continue to develop its own “sphere of influence” and “capture the entire DRC border with Uganda.”[14]
Figure 1. Uganda Deploys to Eastern DRC to Counter CODECO
Source: Yale Ford, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.
Ugandan operations in the eastern DRC support Ugandan economic interests as well, some of which are mutually beneficial for the DRC. Uganda began repairing roadways on key cross-border trade routes in late 2021 in order to export more to the DRC, which is already Uganda’s second most important export market.[15] Improved road infrastructure also helps boost the local economy. UPDF soldiers have deployed under Operation Shujaa to protect the construction of these roadways as well as Ugandan oil sites on Lake Albert in western Uganda from CODECO and other rebel attacks.[16]
The UPDF likely increased its military involvement against CODECO in 2025 because CODECO attacks have significantly disrupted regional economic activity and affected the Hema people, with whom Uganda has ethnic kinship ties and has historically supported.[17] The UPDF had already escalated operations against CODECO in mid-March 2025 in response to CODECO attacks that killed at least 80 civilians in Djugu district several weeks prior.[18] Uganda previously had up to 7,000 troops in the eastern DRC and began deploying at least 3,000-4,000 additional troops to Ituri province in late January.[19] UPDF officials, including Muhoozi, claim that CODECO has explicitly targeted Hema people in the eastern DRC.[20]
Uganda co-opts Operation Shujaa to gain access to Congolese resources, such as gold and timber. Gold is among Uganda’s most lucrative exports and comprised almost 45 percent of Uganda’s total export earnings in 2023.[21] Uganda acquires a significant portion of this gold from the DRC via smugglers, according to the United Nations.[22] Similarly, almost 80 percent of timber smuggled from the DRC goes to Uganda.[23]Operation Shujaa offers Uganda a pretext to operate around and secure the smuggling routes in order to ensure continued Ugandan access to Congolese resources.[24]
Uganda separately maintains ties to the Rwandan-backed M23 rebel movement, which has captured significant portions of the eastern DRC and threatens to topple the Congolese government. M23 is an armed rebellion that emerged in 2012 following the failed integration of predominantly Tutsi ex-Rwandan-backed rebels into FARDC.[25] The M23 rebels reemerged in November 2021—after several years of dormancy—when negotiations between M23 and the DRC collapsed.[26] Rwanda has deployed thousands of troops in the eastern DRC that “de facto control” M23 operations and provide M23 with advanced military hardware.[27] The group controls the North and South Kivu provincial capitals—Goma and Bukavu, respectively—plus half of the district capitals across the two provinces after a major offensive in early 2025.
Figure 2. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC
Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.
The United Nations has reported repeatedly on the close relationship that M23 also has with Uganda.[28] Uganda has allowed M23 to use Uganda’s territory for multiple purposes since M23’s resurgence in late 2021.[29] Corneille Nangaa—the head of Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), which is M23’s political branch—frequently travels to Uganda.[30] Uganda has denied its links with M23 and reiterated its commitment to its security partnership with the Congolese government.[31] The DRC has yet to openly criticize Uganda for its links to M23, likely because of the DRC’s heavy reliance on the UPDF and Operation Shujaa to weaken ADF.[32] M23 has also reached out to several armed groups in Ituri, including the dominant faction of CODECO, to join the AFC coalition, which includes Ugandan-linked groups.[33]
Uganda has likely cultivated ties with M23 to counterbalance Rwandan domination of the group as part of its complex rivalry with Rwanda for influence in the DRC. Rwandan and Ugandan elites have deep personal ties dating back to their rebel origins.[34] Rwandan President Paul Kagame grew up in exile in Uganda and was part of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army rebel group during the Ugandan Bush War in the 1980s, which ended with Museveni becoming president and appointing Kagame as Uganda’s head of military intelligence.[35] Museveni then allowed Kagame and his Rwandan Patriotic Front to use Uganda as a staging and training ground to launch an insurgency against the Hutu-led Rwandan government in the early 1990s and end the Rwandan genocide in 1994.[36] The two partners then were the key backers of the victorious Congolese rebels in the First Congo War in the mid-1990s.[37]
Rwanda and Uganda have developed a “frenemy” relationship since the First Congo War, as the ruling elites consolidated power domestically and became competitors for influence in the eastern DRC.[38] Rwanda’s and Uganda’s relationship reached a relative low point between 2019 and 2021 but has improved since 2022.[39] Belgium sought Uganda as an interlocutor to repair its relationship with Rwanda in April 2025, highlighting that Uganda continues to be a key Rwandan partner as well as rival.[40]
Ugandan support for M23 partly reflects divisions within the Ugandan ruling family concerning Rwanda. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, on one hand, has prioritized regional economic integration and refrained from openly aligning with M23. Museveni’s son, UPDF Commander Muhoozi, on the other hand, regularly touts Uganda’s military muscle in the eastern DRC and posts pro-M23 and pro-Rwandan statements on social media, such as calling Rwandan President Paul Kagame “uncle.”[41] Muhoozi’s social media posts have caused tension within the ruling presidential family on several occasions.[42] Muhoozi also posted positive comments about the DRC president on April 25 and April 26, however, highlighting Muhoozi’s often-erratic public diplomacy.[43]
Uganda has established proxy groups in the eastern DRC as well. Thomas Lubanga—a convicted war criminal and former leader of the Ugandan-linked Union des patriotes congolais (UPC) during the Second Congo War—formed a new rebel group known as the Convention pour la Révolution Populaire (CRP) in March 2025.[44] The United Nations reported in December 2024 that Lubanga had been based in Uganda since July 2024.[45]Jeune Afrique reported on April 3 that the rebel group had occupied several villages on Lake Albert and plans to operate across Ituri province.[46] Lubanga’s CRP has faced resistance from FARDC forces, however, which have conducted operations against CRP militants north of Tchomia—a military and cross-border trading hub with Uganda on Lake Albert about 35 miles southeast of Bunia, which is the Ituri provincial capital.[47]
Another former UPC figure—Innocent Kaina—formed a separate rebel group, called the Coalition Nationale pour la Libération du Congo (CNLC), in southeastern Ituri in March 2025.[48] Kaina is a sanctioned war criminal and has close ties to Uganda and Lubanga.[49] The CRP and CNLC join Zaïre/Auto-défense des communautés victimes de l’Ituri (ADCVI)—commonly called Zaïre—as Ugandan-linked armed groups operating in northeast Ituri. Zaïre has fought CODECO for years and has thousands of fighters and ties to former UPC members, Uganda, Rwanda, and ethnic Hema communities.[50]
Figure 3. Uganda Plays All Sides in the Eastern DRC
Source: Yale Ford; Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
Uganda likely uses these proxies as another counterweight to Rwandan influence in the eastern DRC, which embeds the Ugandan-Rwandan competition deeper into the eastern DRC. The UN reported that Ugandan officials played a key role in forming M23’s AFC coalition, which includes CNLC, CRP, and Zaïre.[51] Uganda likely supported the launch of AFC in December 2023 in response to M23’s territorial expansion in 2022 and 2023 in order to dilute Rwandan domination of the strengthening rebellion.[52] CRP leader Lubanga and CNLC leader Kaina have personal ties to M23 leaders and helped increase collaboration between M23 and Zaïre in recent years.[53]
Rwanda’s and Uganda’s proxy competition in the eastern DRC contributes to the perpetual violence in the eastern DRC. This rivalry has led to common conflict between Rwandan and Ugandan proxies since the Second Congo War and even between Rwandan and Ugandan forces in rare instances.[54] American and Congolese experts believe Rwanda relaunched M23 initially to protect its sphere of influence in the eastern DRC at least partially in response to tensions with Uganda.[55] Uganda’s countermobilization of its proxies is the latest iteration of this cycle. This proxy competition proliferates armed actors in the eastern DRC and adds regional interests to already complex local conflicts.
Uganda additionally likely aims to use its proxies to unilaterally advance Ugandan interests in Congolese affairs. This tactic further complicates conflicts and peace efforts in the eastern DRC. Uganda has historically advanced its interests in Ituri by simultaneously arming militia groups and supporting peace frameworks involving these proxies.[56] Uganda mediated peace talks in Kampala in 2012–13 between the DRC and M23 and frequently advocates direct dialogue.[57] Uganda has been a key actor in an African Union-sponsored peace framework for the Great Lakes region since 2013.[58]
Uganda may use its proxy groups to promote Ugandan interests in inter-Congolese dialogues, which risks complicating these peace efforts. Lubanga met with a coalition of religious leaders on March 4, who have met with major actors in the DRC to negotiate restructured power-sharing arrangements.[59] Kahwa Panga Mandro—another sanctioned Congolese warlord in Ituri with links to Hema communities and historical ties to Lubanga—claimed in mid-April 2025 that Lubanga formed the CRP to “glean his share of the pie” in negotiations.[60]
Uganda may have mobilized its proxy networks to establish local military partners in the eastern DRC separate from FARDC. FARDC-UPDF collaboration has been turbulent at times because the UPDF has conducted unilateral operations in the eastern DRC, refused to share information and intelligence with FARDC, and failed to respect FARDC checkpoints.[61] The UN said in December 2024 that the FARDC “hesitated to expand” Operation Shujaa’s area of operations, “fearing a hidden agenda from Uganda tied to its historical interests in Ituri.”[62] The proliferation of Ugandan proxies and the expansion of Operation Shujaa have expanded the pro-Ugandan military presence in Ituri province. The CRP and Zaïre both operate in areas of Djugu district that are outside of Operation Shujaa’s zone of operations.[63]
[1] https://actualite dot cd/2021/12/09/la-rdc-signe-un-accord-de-cooperation-militaire-avec-louganda; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-says-troops-stay-congo-long-needed-defeat-adf-2021-12-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/explosion-uganda-capital-kills-least-two-local-tv-2021-11-16
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59337953
[3] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/25/actualite/securite/le-general-ychaligonza-annonce-une-prochaine-operation-conjointe-fardc; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-149026_coalition_fardc_updf_en_ituri_les_operations_sujaa_elargies_dans_les_territoires_de_djugu_mahagi_et_la_ville_de_bunia.html; https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/1906247636740395336
[4] https://docs.un.org/s/2024/432; https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/07/24/dr-congo-deadly-militia-raid-ituris-displaced; https://www.africanews.com/2022/01/17/drc-more-people-killed-in-two-militia-attacks-in-ituri
[5] https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/1906260522711802361; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/25/actualite/securite/le-general-ychaligonza-annonce-une-prochaine-operation-conjointe-fardc; https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/1906247636740395336; https://x.com/KivuMorningPost/status/1905343502017327356; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-149026_coalition_fardc_updf_en_ituri_les_operations_sujaa_elargies_dans_les_territoires_de_djugu_mahagi_et_la_ville_de_bunia.html; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/31/actualite/securite/les-militaires-ougandais-de-lupdf-accueillis-avec-euphorie-bule; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4080447?ln=en&v=pdf
[6] https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s-2025-176_in_english.pdf; https://www.theeastafrican.co dot ke/tea/news/east-africa/codeco-militia-adds-to-congo-peace-bid-woes-4770030
[7] https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/1903131622200811985
[8] https://www.updf.go dot ug/bilateral-relations/codeco-rebel-leaders-meet-gen-kainerugaba-apologize-for-attacks-on-updf; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250423-ouganda-le-chef-de-l-arm%C3%A9e-rencontre-des-membres-de-la-milice-congolaise-codeco; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/04/24/actualite/securite/ouganda-des-discussions-pour-la-paix-en-ituri-entre-une-faction-de
[9] https://www.updf.go dot ug/bilateral-relations/codeco-rebel-leaders-meet-gen-kainerugaba-apologize-for-attacks-on-updf
[10] https://www.updf.go dot ug/bilateral-relations/codeco-rebel-leaders-meet-gen-kainerugaba-apologize-for-attacks-on-updf
[11] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1681856/politique/rdc-le-chef-de-larmee-ougandaise-sest-entretenu-avec-des-membres-de-la-codeco
[12] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20250323-uganda-the-quiet-power-in-the-eastern-drc-conflict; https://apnews.com/article/uganda-eastern-congo-bunia-b5472a670a6506e9d875a1c11512deca
[13] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, available at www.acleddata.com; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032024_article-3.pdf; https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241206-uganda-congo-mission-faces-scrutiny-amid-claims-of-regional-double-dealing
[14] https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1895538541683458395
[15] https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests.pdf#page=8; https://lepotentiel dot cd/2024/10/17/la-rdc-et-louganda-signent-le-premier-avenant-relatif-a-la-modernisation-des-routes-kasindi-beni-beni-butembo-bunagana-rutshuru-goma; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241030-ouganda-rdc-museveni-et-tshisekedi-entendent-poursuivre-leur-lutte-contre-le-groupe-adf; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241113-rdc-d%C3%A9l%C3%A9gation-parlementaire-ouganda-renforcer-relations-bilat%C3%A9rales; https://www.ubos.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/TRADE-BULLETIN-AUGUST-2024-RELEASE.pdf
[16] https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/en/2022/06/14/ugandas-operation-shujaa-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo-fighting-the-adf-or-securing-economic-interests; https://nilepost dot co.ug/news/122972/updf-congolese-army-commence-construction-of-security-roads-to-ease-operation-against-adf; https://www.egmontinstitute.be/app/uploads/2024/06/Kristof-Titeca_Policy_Brief_345_vFinal.pdf?type=pdf; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250330-rdc-les-prix-montent-%C3%A0-bunia-dans-l-est-du-pays-en-raison-des-op%C3%A9rations-militaires; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250328-rdc-en-ituri-la-pr%C3%A9sence-de-l-arm%C3%A9e-ougandaise-au-centre-de-discussions-%C3%A0-bunia; https://buniaactualite dot cd/ituri-laxe-routier-largu-katoto-coupe-la-milice-de-la-codeco-pointee-du-doigt; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-149003_insecurite_en_ituri_un_convoi_militaire_instaure_sur_le_troncon_bunia_mahagi.html; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/31/actualite/societe/baisse-du-prix-du-carburant-bunia-apres-la-securisation-de-fataki
[17] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/22/actualite/securite/ituri-vehicules-de-marchandises-et-passagers-victimes-des-groupes; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/23/actualite/securite/trois-vehicules-de-transport-en-commun-tombent-des-embuscades-des; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/24/actualite/societe/les-affrontements-entre-la-codeco-et-larmee-ougandaise-perturbent-les; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/26/actualite/securite/hausse-du-prix-du-haricot-la-suite-des-affrontements-updf-codecourdpc
[18] https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/11/actualite/securite/au-moins-52-civils-tues-en-une-nuit-dans-une-attaque-de-la-milice; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/civilian-death-toll-exceeds-80-after-east-congo-militia-attack-says-un-mission-2025-02-14; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/06/actualite/securite/ituri-renfort-des-troupes-ougandaises-dans-le-territoire-dirumu; https://apnews.com/article/uganda-eastern-congo-bunia-b5472a670a6506e9d875a1c11512deca; https://www.voanews.com/a/ugandan-army-deploys-to-town-in-northeast-dr-congo/7994433.html; http://radiookapi dot net/2025/03/02/actualite/securite/arrivee-dune-nouvelle-vague-de-militaires-ougandais-en-ituri; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-military-says-it-killed-242-rebels-east-congo-this-week-2025-03-22; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/19/actualite/securite/vive-tension-fataki-apres-le-passage-des-militaires-ougandais; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/19/actualite/securite/affrontements-entre-larmee-ougandaise-et-la-milice-codeco-fataki; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-149003_insecurite_en_ituri_un_convoi_militaire_instaure_sur_le_troncon_bunia_mahagi.html; https://buniaactualite dot cd/ituri-un-systeme-de-convoi-militaire-instaure-sur-la-rn27-pour-securiser-le-trafic-vers-bunia; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/22/actualite/securite/nouveaux-affrontements-entre-larmee-ougandaise-et-la-milice-codeco-en; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250330-rdc-les-prix-montent-%C3%A0-bunia-dans-l-est-du-pays-en-raison-des-op%C3%A9rations-militaires; https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/democratic-republic-congo-flash-update-1-ituri-violence-fataki-djugu-territory-causing-displacement-and-hindering-humanitarian-access-27-march-2025; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/26/actualite/securite/situation-securitaire-volatile-fataki-et-djaiba-apres-des; https://actualite dot cd/2025/03/27/ituri-des-bastions-des-miliciens-codeco-bombardes-par-lupdf-dans-plusieurs-entites; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/28/actualite/securite/nouveaux-combats-djugu-entre-la-codeco-et-larmee-ougandaise
[19] https://theconversation.com/m23-rebels-are-marching-across-eastern-drc-the-interests-driving-players-in-the-conflict-249738; https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2025/03/18/joseph-kabila-s-curious-excursion-to-kampala,110388771-art; https://x.com/SamuelBaker_B/status/1901966101317136821/photo/2; https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4080447?ln=en&v=pdf; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/02/06/actualite/securite/ituri-renfort-des-troupes-ougandaises-dans-le-territoire-dirumu; https://apnews.com/article/uganda-eastern-congo-bunia-b5472a670a6506e9d875a1c11512deca; https://www.voanews.com/a/ugandan-army-deploys-to-town-in-northeast-dr-congo/7994433.html; http://radiookapi dot net/2025/03/02/actualite/securite/arrivee-dune-nouvelle-vague-de-militaires-ougandais-en-ituri; https://www.radiookapi dot net/2025/03/19/actualite/securite/vive-tension-fataki-apres-le-passage-des-militaires-ougandais
[20] https://x.com/ChrisOMagezi/status/1903131622200811985; https://x.com/mkainerugaba/status/1890818774573498565; https://chimpreports dot com/codeco-rebel-leaders-meet-gen-muhoozi-apologize-for-attacks-on-updf-in-ituri
[21] https://pulitzercenter.org/stories/big-men-ugly-history-and-ruthless-congo-basin-timber-smuggling-business; https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/uga/all/show/2023; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241202-shujaa-jeu-equilibriste-ouganda-est-de-la-rdc; https://www.monitor dot co.ug/uganda/business/commodities/gold-reclaims-spot-as-uganda-s-largest-export-commodity--4601492
[22] https://docs.un.org/en/S/2019/469
[23] https://enactafrica.org/enact-observer/ugandas-reforestation-plan-cuts-illegal-logging; https://ungreatlakes.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/greater_virunga_transboundary_collaboration_secretariat_-_illegal_trade_in_timber_charcoal_and_wildlife_report_-_february_2013.pdf; https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/timber-smuggling-drc-through-uganda-rest-world
[24] https://www.congoresearchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/report-crg-ebuteli-uganda-operation-shujaa-drc-adf-securing-economic-interests.pdf#page=8
[25] https://www.jstor.org/stable/43817369
[26] https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/05/why-congos-m23-crisis-lingers-on
[27] https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf
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