



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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April 28, 2025, 8:15 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click [here](#) to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:20 pm ET on April 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine, this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort. The Kremlin announced on April 28 that Putin declared a ceasefire in honor of Victory Day on May 9 – when Russia celebrates the Soviet Union's contributions to defeating Nazi Germany during the Second World War (while minimizing the role played by the United States) – between midnight on the night of May 7 to 8 and midnight on the night of May 10 to 11.[1] The Kremlin stated that Russian forces will respond to any Ukrainian ceasefire violations. The Kremlin claimed that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions to eliminate the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia is exchanging information with the United States about the Victory Day ceasefire and characterized the unilateral ceasefire as a "manifestation" of Russia's goodwill.[2] The Kremlin is preparing to welcome a significant number of foreign dignitaries, including from former Soviet, Latin American, Asian, and African countries, for Russia's Victory Day celebration, and Putin likely seeks to avoid the embarrassment of Ukrainian strikes during these celebrations.[3]

Putin previously declared a unilateral ceasefire in honor of Easter in mid-April 2025, but Russian and Ukrainian sources repeatedly accused each other of violating the ceasefire throughout the theater in

Ukraine.[4] Russia also repeatedly accused Ukraine of violating the 30-day moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes but rarely offered evidence of these alleged violations.[5] ISW previously noted that the energy strikes ceasefire and Easter ceasefire underscored the need for the details of any future ceasefire or peace agreement to be publicly available, formally agreed to in advance by all parties, and to include robust monitoring mechanisms.[6] Putin's proposed Victory Day ceasefire does not include any additional monitoring mechanisms, and Russian sources will likely leverage the lack of such mechanisms to again flood the information space with unsubstantiated claims of Ukrainian ceasefire violations. Russian officials appear disinterested in establishing meaningful monitoring mechanisms or a general public basis for these ceasefires, likely because Russia benefits from weaponizing the vague and unclear conditions of the ceasefires against Ukraine.

Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine. Putin appears to be opportunistically declaring ceasefires during major religious and military holidays in order to force Ukraine to accept the ceasefire or risk appearing intransigent to the West. Unilaterally declaring ceasefires also allows Putin to distract attention from his rejection of the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire proposal and to maintain the illusion that he is interested in peace negotiations while keeping full control over the conditions and timing of any ceasefire agreements. Russian forces seized on the Easter ceasefire to shell and conduct reconnaissance of frontline Ukrainian positions and damaged vehicles along the frontline in preparation for future Russian assaults, and Russian forces will likely use the Victory Day ceasefire for similar preparatory efforts.[7] Putin likely views the Victory Day ceasefire as a chance for Russian forces to rest ahead of future frontline activity in Ukraine and as a way to ensure that Ukraine does not conduct any significant long-range strikes against Russia during Victory Day celebrations. Putin likely does not view the Victory Day ceasefire as a serious step towards lasting peace in Ukraine.

Ukraine, in contrast to Russia, continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated on April 28 that Trump has made it clear that he wants a permanent ceasefire first (presumably before negotiations for a final end to the Russian invasion).[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 28 that Ukraine supported the US proposal for a full ceasefire, proposed a ceasefire on strikes against civilian infrastructure, and proposed extending the Easter truce – all proposals that Russia has rejected.[9] Zelensky stated that there is no reason to wait for May 8 to start the temporary ceasefire and called for an immediate, full, and unconditional ceasefire for at least 30 days, as this is the "foundation that could lead to real diplomacy." Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha similarly called for an immediate ceasefire and questioned why Putin was "waiting" for May 8.[10] Sybiha reiterated Ukraine's support for a "long" and complete ceasefire.

Ukrainian and European representatives reportedly recently presented the United States with a proposal to end the war that called for a full, unconditional air, sea, and land ceasefire – in line with Trump's continued calls for a full ceasefire.[11] Putin's continued efforts to obfuscate his previous rejections of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals run counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement, and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.[12]

The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States. The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) published a readout of an April 27 phone call between Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that claimed that Lavrov and Rubio emphasized establishing "prerequisites for starting negotiations" toward a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine.[13] The US State Department's readout of the call notably did not mention discussions of "prerequisites" to negotiations, and the Russian MFA statement notably contradicts the Kremlin's April 28 claim that the Victory Day ceasefire demonstrates Russia's supposed readiness for peace negotiations without preconditions.[14]

Putin, Lavrov, and other senior Russian officials have consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine withdraw from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[15] Putin stated in June 2024 that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. The Kremlin is insisting on significant Ukrainian territorial and political concessions as prerequisites to negotiations in an effort to begin negotiations from the strongest position and achieve longstanding Russian goals in Ukraine through diplomatic means that it is unable to secure on the battlefield.

Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own. Russian officials, including Putin, have repeated Russia's longstanding demands that any resolution to the war in Ukraine must include Ukrainian regime change, demilitarization, abandonment of aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc, and the cession of territory to Russia.[16] Lavrov reiterated these demands in an interview with Brazilian outlet *O Globo* published on April 28 and claimed that any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes." [17] Lavrov and other Russian officials have repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[18] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's invasions, occupation, and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory since 2014.

Lavrov additionally demanded during the April 28 interview that the international community recognize Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and Crimea as part of Russia and that the West return frozen Russian assets.[19] Lavrov also demanded that the West provide Russia with "security guarantees" against supposed threats from NATO and the EU. Lavrov's statements mirror Putin's December 2021 demands that NATO commit to not accepting Ukraine or any other countries as new members; that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement; that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after May 1997; that NATO refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; that NATO states refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in areas from which they could reach Russia; and that the United States refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe or nuclear missiles outside of US territory.[20] Putin's December 2021 demands notably extend beyond Ukraine

and aim to roll back NATO. The Kremlin likely seeks to intensify these demands amid ongoing negotiations with the United States to manipulate Western leaders into acquiescing to Putin's demands. These demands would weaken NATO under the guise of terms of a peace negotiation to end the Russian invasion of Ukraine and allow Russia to set conditions to strengthen its position for future aggression against Ukraine and NATO.

Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on April 28 that the Russian military recently achieved its objective of pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast and thanked North Korean forces for their active participation in these efforts.[21] Putin personally thanked North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un and reiterated that Russia and North Korea acted in accordance with the December 2024 bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[22] Putin also claimed that North Korea's involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine did not violate international law. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov also recently acknowledged North Korea's participation in retaking Kursk Oblast.[23] Russian officials have previously refused to acknowledge North Korean soldiers operating in Kursk Oblast and attempted to disguise North Korean soldiers as Russian forces from the Republic of Buryatia.[24] The Kremlin's abrupt rhetorical shift suggests that Russia is no longer concerned about the possibility of Western retaliation for involving North Korean forces directly in its war against Ukraine.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on April 28 that North Korea's participation in operations in Kursk Oblast demonstrates the effectiveness of the Russian-North Korean Strategic Partnership Treaty and affirms that Russia is "absolutely" prepared to provide North Korea with reciprocal military assistance in the future.[25] The North Korean Central Military Commission stated on April 28 that Kim ordered the deployment of North Korean troops to Kursk Oblast in accordance with the partnership agreement and that the "sacred mission" in Kursk Oblast solidified the "friendship and solidarity" between Russians and North Koreans.[26] The United States and the wider West largely failed to meaningfully respond to Russia's growing military cooperation with Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Former US President Joe Biden's decision to ease restrictions on Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using US-provided long-range missile systems in November 2024, formally cast as a response to the introduction of North Korean forces into the war, did not significantly impact the Kremlin's calculus in expanding its military cooperation with North Korea or Russia's wider military planning in Kursk Oblast and elsewhere in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[27]

Russian milbloggers reacted triumphantly to official announcements of Russian and North Korean forces concluding operations in Kursk Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that North Korea's and Russia's announcements provide a general deterrent to future Ukrainian and Western operations on Russian territory.[28] Some milbloggers also advocated for Russia to expand military, economic, and labor collaboration with North Korea, including in the event of future military aggression against North Korea.[29] Other milbloggers emphasized the bravery of North Korea's forces and claimed that North Korea and its people have shown themselves to be better allies than many Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states.[30]

Russian officials and milbloggers are likely leveraging Russia's recent operational and diplomatic successes in Kursk Oblast to prepare the information space for Victory Day celebrations on May 9, which a number of international partners will attend. The Kremlin likely plans to highlight Russian successes in Kursk Oblast during the May 9 celebrations, as Russian forces have not been able to achieve significant battlefield successes in Ukraine in the past year.

Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) reported on April 27, citing Western military and intelligence officials, that Russia is expanding military bases near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, and upgrading railway lines and other infrastructure along Russia's western border with NATO.[31] WSJ reported that the Kremlin plans to create a new army headquarters near Petrozavodsk in the next several years and that Russia is integrating roadways and railways in the Moscow Military District (MMD) with infrastructure in Belarus. Sources stated that Russia intends to form new divisions on the basis of existing brigades in the Leningrad Military District (LMD) in the coming years and that Russia is constructing new barracks and training grounds and upgrading warehouses and railways near Petrozavodsk to accommodate the future influx of personnel. A senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for "later use." ISW previously assessed that Russia's restoration of the MMD and LMD is part of a long-term restructuring effort to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war against NATO.[32]

Russian authorities are also preparing to update Russia's National Security Strategy, likely to reflect Russian President Vladimir Putin's greater territorial ambitions in Europe and ongoing efforts to justify future aggression against NATO. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed during an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Russia is preparing to update its National Security Strategy to account for the new problems and threats that Russia is facing.[33] Shoigu claimed that Russia's updated National Security Strategy must account for the "crisis" of European security, the formation of a new global order, and the challenges that the changing world presents to Russia. Shoigu stated that Russia's National Security Strategy defines Russia's "long-term, strategic goals" and the "main instruments" for achieving these goals. Russia updates its National Security Strategy every five years, and last updated the strategy in 2021.[34]

Czech Defense Minister Jana Černočová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.[35] Černočová also announced that the initiative secured funding for further artillery deliveries to Ukraine through Fall 2025. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavský stated that Canada, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands previously provided funds to the initiative. Lipavský reported that Czechia aims to supply Ukraine with 125,000 rounds of ammunition per month in 2025, but will deliver as much ammunition as possible.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin announced another unilateral ceasefire in Ukraine – this time in honor of a major Soviet and Russian military holiday, while continuing to reject the March 2025 US-Ukrainian 30-day general ceasefire**

proposal. Putin continues to refuse any ceasefire other than on terms that advantage his war effort.

- Putin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine, counter to US President Donald Trump's goal of using a general ceasefire as a stepping stone towards an enduring and sustainable peace agreement in Ukraine.**
- Ukraine – in contrast to Russia – continues to demonstrate its support for Trump's desired full, permanent ceasefire.**
- The Kremlin continues attempts to hold legitimate ceasefire negotiations hostage in order to secure additional concessions from Ukraine and the United States.**
- Lavrov reiterated on April 28 Russia's longstanding demands for Ukraine's surrender and concessions from the West, as Russia continues to offer no concessions of its own.**
- Russian and North Korean officials touted the success of their joint military operations in Kursk Oblast in order to highlight the international community's inability to deter Russian efforts to involve its allies directly in Russia's war against Ukraine, as the Kremlin pledged to offer North Korea reciprocal active military support.**
- Russia is reportedly expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland and stockpiling new tanks, likely in preparation for future aggression against NATO.**
- Czech Defense Minister Jana Černočová announced on April 27 that the Czech Ammunition Initiative will have delivered another 400,000 rounds of large-caliber artillery ammunition to Ukraine by April 30.**
- Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violations
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian officials continued on April 28 to praise Russian forces for seizing the remainder of Kursk Oblast, while Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in border areas.[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha).[37]


Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain limited positions in Gornal (south of Sudzha) and the windbreaks near Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[38] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade with recently seizing Oleshnya.[39]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 28, but Russian forces did not advance.[40]

Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on April 27 that Russia has redeployed elements of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) and a battalion each of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and the 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) to respond to Ukrainian attacks into northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast.[41]

Ukrainian forces struck the "Kremniy El" microelectronics plant in Bryansk City on the night of April 27 to 28. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 28

that unspecified drones struck the "Kremniy El" plant in Bryansk City that produces microelectronics for missiles systems, including Iskander missiles; Pantsir air defense systems; radars; electronic warfare (EW) systems; and drones.[42] Geolocated footage published on April 27 shows an explosion near the plant.[43] Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on April 28 that Russian forces shot down tens of drones over the oblast and that the strikes started fires in residential and industrial buildings.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces shot down 102 drones over Bryansk Oblast overnight.[45]



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Loknya (northeast of Sumy City) and likely seized the fields west and southwest of Basivka (north of Loknya) and southeast of Zhuravka (northwest of Loknya).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 83rd VDV Brigade are advancing north of Bilovody (northwest of Loknya and south of Zhuravka).[47]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northwest of Loknya.[48]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces recently repelled a Ukrainian reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault in the direction of Basivka.[49]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on April 28 that Russian forces are continuing to deploy small infantry groups to attack the international border near Basivka and Zhuravka and that Russian forces occasionally use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) but are not using armored vehicles in the area.[50]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) and the Chechen "Gorets" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that drone operators of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up) participated in the seizure of Veselivka (north of Sumy City).[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 27 and 28.[53]

The commander of a Ukrainian infantry group operating in the Vovchansk direction stated that the situation in the area is more complicated now than it was in February and March 2025 and that Tykhe (east of Vovchansk) is the most active area.[54] The commander reported that Russian forces are more actively conducting artillery strikes and assaults, including with mopeds, and that Russian forces have rotated troops in this direction, increasing the number of Russian forces and reserves. The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting artillery preparation before attacking with armored vehicles and then assault groups.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz "Vakha" Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Udy (north of Kharkiv City).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Russian forces recently seized southern Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and advanced on the settlement's eastern outskirts.[56]


Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 28 that elements of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized the entirety of Kamyanka.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[58]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Mala Shaplivka and Zapadne, northeast of Kupyansk near the international border near Krasne Pershe, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 27 and 28.[59]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are not conducting mechanized assaults in the Kupyansk direction and are instead launching daily infantry assaults in groups of two to three personnel.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Stepova Novoselivka.[61]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka and east of Borova near Nadiya and Kopanky on April 27 and 28.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Ridkodub, Nove, Yampolivka, Katerynivka, Myrne, and Kolodyazi and toward Novyi Myr; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman in the Serebryanske forest area on April 27 and 28.[63]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 28 that Russian forces are conducting assaults ranging in size from small infantry groups to entire detachments.[64] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces have a personnel advantage in some areas of 10 to 1.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area.[65]



Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced on the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[66]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on April 27 and 28.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including elements of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]), advanced southeast of Chasiv Yar and on the outskirts of Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar).[68]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar; north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske and Markove; south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka on April 27 and 28.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[70]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction stated on April 28 that Russian forces use civilian cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles to transport infantry to frontline positions, but cannot approach within three kilometers of the frontline without Ukrainian forces striking the vehicles.[71] The commander added that Russian forces are using large numbers of radio-controlled and fiber-optic drones in the area.[72] The commander reported that Russian forces have intensified guided glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and Kramatorsk in an attempt to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and target Ukrainian artillery positions. Kostyantynivka City Military Administration Head Serhii Horbunov stated on April 28 that Russian forces struck Kostyantynivka overnight and killed three civilians and injured five.[73]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 109th Separate Rifle Regiment (1st "Slovyansk" Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[74] Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[75]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to a dam north of Toretsk.[76]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk) and that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) have almost seized the entirety of Tarasivka (southwest of Toretsk).[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Tarasivka and that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) advanced northwest of Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[78]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; west of Toretsk near Petrivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Yelyzavetivka, Oleksandropil, Stara Mykolaivka, and Tarasivka and toward Nova Poltavka on April 27 and 28.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Sukha Balka

and between Niu York (south of Toretsk) and Sukha Balka.[80] A Russian source claimed that elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are repelling Ukrainian counterattacks near Yelyzavetivka.[81]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that the number of Russian artillery and drone strikes and personnel is gradually increasing compared to previous weeks.[82] The NCO stated that Russian forces are not conducting offensive operations with a large number of armored vehicles, but are conducting daily assaults in small groups, sometimes with bicycles, electric scooters, and motorcycles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) and 80th "Sparta" Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk direction.[83] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka.[84] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka and Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[85]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized most of Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk).[86]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novoserhiivka on April 27 and 28.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Pishchane (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Novoserhiivka.[88]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division and 30th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 2nd CAA, CMD) and 74th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are attacking southwest of Pokrovsk.[89] Mashovets stated that elements of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Kotlyne and Udachne.[90] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command introduced forces and means from the 201st Military Base (CMD) and 137th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) to the Pokrovsk direction over the past few weeks and returned elements of the 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) to the frontline after having previously withdrawn elements of the brigade to the reserve.[91] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly conducted guided glide bomb strikes against a bridge near Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk).[92]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 and 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast and northwest of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[93]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further northeast of Nadiivka.[94] One Russian milblogger claimed on April 27 that Russian forces almost completely recaptured Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), and another milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of the settlement.[95]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Troitske, Sribne, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 27 and 28.[96]

A Russian milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) are untrue.[97]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD), 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), and 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are operating near Uspenivka.[98] Mashovets stated that elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD), reinforced by elements of the 51st CAA (SMD), 201st Military Base (CMD), and 137th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD), are attacking near Kotlyarivka and Troitske.[99]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[100]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil on April 27 and 28.[101] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne (west of Kurakhove).[102]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 338th Rocket Artillery Brigade (EMD), 200th Artillery Brigade, and 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[103] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly conducted guided glide bomb strikes against a bridge near Zelenyi Kut (west of Oleksiivka).[104]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 28 but did not advance.

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka).[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Fedorivka (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[106] Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[107]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the Hulyaipole direction on April 28.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Hulyaipole (northeast of Orikhiv).[108]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbakyy, and Lobkove on April 28.[109]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[110]




Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on April 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 28 that Russian forces seized the islands between Krynky and Kozachi Laheri (both northeast of Kherson City) and crossed into southern Tyahinka (north of Krynky) in right (west) bank Kherson Oblast.[111] Another Russian milblogger denied on April 28 claims that Russian forces crossed the Dnipro River, but claimed that Russian forces have seized unspecified islands east of Kherson City.[112] ISW has not observed further claims of Russian advances in right bank Kherson Oblast as of this report, but will continue to report on activity in the Kherson direction.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivka Railway Bridge, on April 27 and 28.[113]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Krynky.[114]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction April 28, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 27 and 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 166 strike and decoy drones from near Kursk and Oryol cities and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[115] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 74 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Sumy, and Cherkasy oblasts.[116]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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