



The Order of Battle of Hamas’ Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades, Part 1: North and Central Gaza

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The al Qassem Brigades are the military component of Hamas and the means by which Hamas seeks to destroy the Israeli state and form an Islamic state in Palestine. Hamas is a highly organized group that views terrorism and military action as the only method through which it can destroy the Israeli state.¹ The al Qassem Brigades are commanded by Mohammad Deif and are subordinated to the overall Hamas political leadership responsible to Ismail Haniyeh.² They coordinate closely with the Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.³ Hamas defines itself as a “Palestinian national liberation and resistance movement” intent on establishing an Islamic Palestinian state that stretches “from the River Jordan...to the Mediterranean and from Ras al Naqurah...to Umm al Rashrash.”⁴ It is also a member of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” the regional coalition of states and groups that Tehran has built as part of its effort to destroy Israel and expel the United States from the Middle East.⁵ Hamas states that “armed resistance” is a “strategic choice” to protect the Palestinian people and rejects “any attempt to undermine [Hamas] resistance.”⁶ Hamas is fighting alongside other Palestinian resistance groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with which it engages in operational and tactical coordination.⁷

Hamas sees itself in a multi-generational fight against Israel and some other Palestinian groups that will consist of multiple distinct phases.⁸ Hamas sought to undermine secular Palestinian groups in the 1980s and 1990s to Islamicize the Palestinian people as part of the Hamas effort to form an Islamic state.⁹ Hamas then opposed the Oslo Peace Process to prevent Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community from blocking the hypothetical pathway to an Islamic Palestinian state covering the entirety of historic Palestine.¹⁰ Hamas sees control of “some parts” of Palestine as an interim goal prior to the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state.¹¹ The al Qassem Brigades state that they will “tolerate” only a temporary truce and that a permanent truce or recognition of the Israeli state is forbidden.¹²

Hamas launched the October 7 attacks in this larger context to derail Arab-Israeli normalization efforts, to destabilize Israel, and eventually to destroy it.¹³ Israel began a ground operation into the Gaza Strip on October 27 with the stated aim of destroying Hamas’ governing and military capabilities.¹⁴ Israeli ground forces first partially cleared the northern Gaza Strip before moving south after an seven-day cessation of fighting that ended on December 2 and 3.¹⁵

The United States is reportedly encouraging Israel to move from Israel’s current “high intensity” military operations to an approach centered on targeted killings to remove key Hamas leaders from the battlefield.¹⁶ This strategy will reportedly “resemble...narrow” US campaigns to target terrorist leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹⁷ This US strategy was not successful in destroying terrorist organizations in either country. ISIS and al Qaeda retained the ability to reconstitute themselves multiple times in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.¹⁸ Targeted killings can degrade a terrorist organization, but cannot destroy one, particularly one as large, established, and well-organized as Hamas.

The stated Israeli objective is the destruction of Hamas’ governing and military capabilities.¹⁹ ISIS reconstituted itself from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq after the US withdrawal in 2011, building an army of its own that shattered two Iraqi Army divisions and captured Iraq’s second largest city barely three years later.²⁰ The commander of US Central Command said in March 2023—less than two years after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan—that the Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan was “six months” from being able to conduct a major attack on short notice.²¹ This strategy of leadership decapitation can degrade terrorist groups to a point for as long as the targeted strikes continue but has shown itself ineffective in destroying well-organized, resilient military organizations. Such a strategy is therefore incompatible with the stated Israeli objectives vis-a-vis Hamas, and its adoption would require Israel to reduce its war aims substantially.

Hamas is a terrorist organization that uses formal military structures, not a clandestine organization operating networked, decentralized cells. Hamas’ leaders structured the al Qassem Brigades to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization with doctrinally correct unit echelons and command hierarchies to facilitate recovery in the face of the loss of leaders or the destruction of elements of units.²² The al Qassem Brigades organize themselves into echelons from the squad all the way to the brigade level just as conventional militaries do.²³ Militaries design their command structures to ensure continuity of command during combat as units take casualties and leaders die. Commanders prepare their subordinates throughout the chain of command to absorb command duties in the event that a commander is killed or incapacitated. Targeted killings alone will thus not permanently degrade or destroy Hamas. Hamas very likely retains a deep bench of experienced military commanders, most of whom will be prepared to rebuild the organization and train new tactical-level leaders. The commander of Hamas’ North Brigade, for example, held his position for 18

years prior to his death on November 26.²⁴ Hamas will almost certainly replace him with another capable senior commander as soon as the situation allows if it has not already done so. Hamas has replaced at least one battalion commander killed by the IDF during the current operations within about two weeks.

This report presents an initial order of battle (ORBAT) of the al Qassem Brigades at the brigade and the battalion level. The lack of adequate reporting on Hamas' units at the company level and below precludes a more detailed presentation of those echelons. This ORBAT presents the formal structure of the al Qassem Brigades during the Israeli ground operation in Israel. The actual structure of the al Qassem Brigades may change as the ground operation progresses and Israeli forces destroy Hamas units or render them combat ineffective. This report presents three of Hamas' five geographic brigades: the North Brigade, the Gaza Brigade, and the Central Brigade. CTP-ISW will publish the ORBATs of the other two Hamas territorial brigades at a later date.

This report presents CTP-ISW's assessment of the approximate estimated combat effectiveness of Hamas' military forces based on Israeli military reporting and CTP-ISW's assessments of the Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip that began on October 27, 2023.²⁵ The report identifies the commanders of the brigades and battalions where feasible, noting which are reportedly still alive and which have reportedly been killed.

CTP-ISW presents the Hamas' battalions using the names that Hamas itself or Palestinian sources use. Israel describes these forces using different names.²⁶ Hamas and Palestinian sources name these units for geographic locations and important Hamas "martyrs," including Imad Aql, a mentor of Mohammed Deif, the current commander of Hamas' military wing.²⁷ Hamas supporters and other Palestinian sources sometimes use these names interchangeably, referring to one battalion by several different names.²⁸

This report draws on open-source information from Hamas and its supporters, Palestinian journalists and activists, Western media, and the Israel Defense Forces. Where possible, this report correlates reports and statements by the IDF and Hamas to confirm the existence of Hamas units. The sourcing for commanders, however, relies heavily on the IDF as Hamas has not regularly reported out its casualties during the ongoing Israeli ground operation. Hamas has notably reported the deaths of several brigade commanders, however, including both the North and Central Brigade commanders. When possible and appropriate the ORBAT gives context to Israeli reports of Hamas casualties by providing Hamas denials and counterclaims. CTP-ISW is generally unable to adjudicate competing claims.

The maps below display the notional locations of battalion areas of responsibility in Hamas' military wing, the al Qassem Brigades. Each battalion is depicted on the major settlement in the battalion's area of responsibility or on the location for which the battalion is named.

The maps also show CTP-ISW's assessment of the relative combat capability of Hamas battalions and brigades. CTP-ISW categorizes Hamas units into two groups: combat effective and degraded. CTP-ISW does not currently assess that any Hamas battalion or brigade has yet been rendered combat ineffective as of the date of publication of this report. Combat effectiveness measures a unit's ability to perform its mission; a unit is combat ineffective when it is no longer able to complete its mission.²⁹ CTP-ISW defines "degrade" as a temporary effect whereby a unit's losses seriously impede its ability to continue executing assigned missions while the unit remains able to operate.

CTP-ISW assesses that at least seven of 19 Hamas battalions in the three brigades covered by this report are degraded and at least six are currently under intense IDF pressure. Battalions of one or both of the two Hamas brigades in southern Gaza are also under intense IDF pressure. CTP-ISW will expand this ORBAT to include those units in coming days.

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas

Hamas political leader: Ismail Haniyeh (currently located in Qatar)³⁰


Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip: Yahya Sinwar (reportedly in Gaza)³¹

Yahya Sinwar is a Hamas hardliner who served previously as a liaison between the group's political and military wings prior to assuming leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2017.³² Sinwar was personally close to Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin.³³ Sinwar was the leader of Hamas' internal security apparatus, which Hamas used to violently suppress other Palestinian political groups during the 1990s.³⁴ Israel imprisoned Sinwar in 1988 for murdering two Israeli soldiers.³⁵ Israel released Sinwar in an exchange in 2011.³⁶ Sinwar opposed the prisoner exchange that freed him and was one of the masterminds of the October 7 attacks, alongside Mohammed Deif.³⁷

The Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades

Commander: Mohammed Deif³⁸

Deputy Commander: Marwan Issa³⁹




North Brigade—North Gaza Governorate

Commander: Ahmed Abu Ghandour (KIA 26 NOV 2023)⁴⁰

- Beit Lahia Battalion—Beit Lahia, North Gaza Governorate⁴¹
 - Status: Degraded.
 - Commander: Wael Rajab (KIA 26 NOV 2023)⁴²
- Beit Hanoun Battalion—Beit Hanoun, North Gaza Governorate⁴³
 - Status: Degraded.⁴⁴
 - Commander: Abu Hamza Fayyad (Alive as of 29 OCT 2023)⁴⁵
- al Khalifa al Rashidun Battalion—Jabalia Camp, North Gaza Governorate⁴⁶
 - Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
 - Commander: Ibrahim Biari (KIA 31 OCT 2023).⁴⁷ Hamas denied that the IDF killed Biari on 31 OCT.⁴⁸
- Martyr Suhail Ziadeh Battalion—East Jabalia, North Gaza Governorate⁴⁹
 - Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.


- Commander: Rafaat Salman Abu Abdullah (KIA 26 NOV 2023).⁵⁰ Abu Abdullah also served as the deputy commander of the North Brigade.⁵¹
- Jabalia al Balad (Abdul Raouf Nabhan) Battalion—Jabalia City, North Gaza Governorate⁵²
 - Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
 - Commander: Unknown
- Imad Aql (Western) Battalion—Western Jabalia Camp and the Tawam area, North Gaza Governorate⁵³
 - Status: Degraded.
 - Commander: Unknown
 - The IDF said that this battalion is responsible for the northwestern coast of the Gaza Strip in North Gaza Governorate.⁵⁴ The IDF killed the battalion operations officer on November 20.⁵⁵
- Elite Battalion⁵⁶
 - Status: Unknown.



Gaza Brigade—Gaza Governorate

Commander: Izz al Din al Haddad (Abu Suheib) (Alive as of 7 OCT 2023)⁵⁷

- Sabra-Tal al Islam Battalion—Sabra and Tal al Hawa neighborhoods, Gaza Governorate⁵⁸
 - Status: Degraded.
 - Commander: Mustafa Daloul (KIA 3 NOV 2023)⁵⁹
- Daraj wal Tuffah Battalion—Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods, Gaza Governorate⁶⁰
 - Status: Degraded.⁶¹ This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
 - Commander: Rafat Abbas (KIA 26 OCT 2023)⁶²
 - The IDF said it “severely degraded” the battalion and eliminated its leadership on 26 OCT 2023.⁶³
- Radwan Battalion—Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, Gaza Governorate⁶⁴
 - Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
 - Commander: Unknown
 - The IDF said it killed the Radwan Battalion’s deputy commander on 24 OCT 2023.⁶⁵ The IDF refers to this battalion as the “al Furkan” Battalion.”⁶⁶
- Shujaiya Battalion—Shujaiya neighborhood, Gaza Governorate⁶⁷
 - Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
 - Commander: Wissam Farhat (KIA 02 DEC 2023)⁶⁸
 - The Shujaiya’s Battalion new commander is Amad Abdullah Ali Qariqa, who previously served as Wissam Farhat’s deputy.⁶⁹ The IDF said on December 2 that it “significantly damaged” the battalion’s capabilities.⁷⁰
- Zaytoun Battalion—Zaytoun Neighborhood, Gaza Governorate⁷¹
 - Status: Degraded.
 - Last known commander: Ahmed Abdul Ahl (KIA 16 MAY 2021)⁷²
- Shati Battalion—al Shati Refugee Camp, Gaza Governorate⁷³
 - Status: Degraded.⁷⁴
 - Commander: Khalil Mahjad Samjad (KIA on or before 13 NOV 2023).⁷⁵ The IDF said that it killed a second Shati Battalion commander, Haitham al Hawari, on December 3, suggesting that Hamas had promoted a replacement for Samjad within roughly two weeks of his death.⁷⁶
 - IDF operations “significantly damaged” the al Shati Battalion, which suffered at least 200 killed. The IDF also destroyed the battalion’s strongholds and a key headquarters.⁷⁷ The IDF reported on November 13 that it killed the battalion commander and his two deputies on an unspecified date.⁷⁸
- Elite Battalion.⁷⁹ Neither Hamas nor the IDF has confirmed an “Elite Battalion” within the Gaza Brigade. The Gaza Brigade may control an Elite Battalion, given independent reporting from Gulf Arab media and the existence of an Elite Battalion in the North Brigade.
 - Status: Unknown.




Central Brigade—Central Governorate

Commander: Ayman Nofal (KIA 17 OCT 2023).⁸⁰ Nofal previously served on Hamas' military council, led the al Qassem Brigades intelligence service, and served as a liaison with other Palestinian resistance factions in the joint operations room.⁸¹ Palestinian factions formed this operations room in 2020 and it helped plan the October 7 attacks.⁸² Nofal said that drills coordinated by the operations room sought to “tell the enemy that the walls and engineering measures on the borders of Gaza will not protect them.”⁸³ The Central Brigade released a training video in July 2023 called “We Are Coming” showing its forces practicing close quarters combat in urban environments, which is notable in the context of the October 7 attacks.⁸⁴

- Deir al Balah Battalion—Deir al Balah, Central Governorate⁸⁵
 - Status: Combat Effective.
 - Commander: Wael Asfa (KIA 05 NOV 2023)⁸⁶
- Al Bureij Battalion—al Bureij, Central Governorate⁸⁷
 - Status: Combat Effective.
 - Commander: Iyad al Tayyib (Abu Bilal) (Likely KIA, date unknown). An anti-Hamas, Rafah-based blogger on Twitter said on November 27 that Iyad al Tayyib “fell in the war.”⁸⁸

- Al Maghazi Battalion—al Maghazi, Central Governorate⁸⁹
 - Status: Combat Effective.
 - Commander: Unknown
- Nusairat Battalion—Nusairat, Central Governorate⁹⁰
 - Status: Combat Effective.
 - Commander: Unknown
 - The IDF announced on October 24 that it killed the Nusairat Battalion’s deputy commander.⁹¹
- Elite Battalion.⁹² Neither Hamas nor the IDF has confirmed an “Elite Battalion” within the Gaza Brigade. The Central Brigade may control an Elite Battalion, given independent reporting from Gulf Arab media and the existence of an Elite Battalion in the North Brigade.
 - Status: Unknown.



¹ <https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf>; <https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86>

² <https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86>; book sourcing

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- ⁵ <https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran-Is-Adapting-for-Modern-Conflict-and-Warfare.pdf?x91208>
- ⁶ <https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf>
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- ⁸ <https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf>
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- ²⁸ <https://twitter.com/salehdardona99/status/1725970632007934354>
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<https://t.me/ah12mad3/31584>; <https://t.me/bintalqasaam22/3950>;
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- ⁸² <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67480680>
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- ⁸⁴ <https://t.me/ggiaigjdnyjnd/50793>
- ⁸⁵ <https://t.me/ah12mad3/20540>
- ⁸⁶ <https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1721523669850087455>;
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- ⁸⁸ <https://x.com/talalovech/status/1729031134686900328?s=20>
- ⁸⁹ [شهداء-القسام/2455/إبراهيم-محمد-الماشي](https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/2455/إبراهيم-محمد-الماشي)
- ⁹⁰ <https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/1859>; <https://t.me/hsona01/49543>
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- ⁹² [مؤسس-كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام/](https://highwia dot com/مؤسس-كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام/)