

Iran Update



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
April 29, 2025, Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.[1] This network of entities and individuals has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from China to Iran. Two US-sanctioned Iranian cargo vessels delivered over 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate from China to Bandar Abbas, Iran, in early 2025.[2] Chinese assistance to Iran could help Iran replenish its missile stockpile and circumvent US sanctions. It is unclear if the Chinese government is directly supporting the effort, but the government's inaction against the entities involved enables continued Chinese support for Iran and its Axis of Resistance.

The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.[3] The Houthis claimed that the facility was a migrant detention center run by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), but IOM denied that it maintained the facility.[4] IOM did confirm that it was a migrant facility. The Houthis have similarly provided inconsistent casualty numbers.[5] The facility is located next to a military base, according to publicly available maps.[6] It is unclear whether the Houthis still operate this military base. An unspecified US defense official told Reuters that CENTCOM is conducting a battle-damage assessment and inquiry into these claims.[7] A UN report condemned Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeting the same detention center in Saada in 2022 that killed 66 people and injured 113 more.[8]

US Strikes Against Houthi Targets

April 18 to April 25, 2025



Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners.[9] Qassem said that the Lebanese state—not Hezbollah—would need to fulfill these goals.[10] Iranian media falsely portrayed this statement as a priority that Hezbollah would pursue on its own, rather than a priority that Qassem believes the Lebanese state and people should adopt.[11] Qassem reiterated Hezbollah’s commitment to the November 2024 Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement and stated that the Lebanese government serves as the main negotiator and armed force responsible for enforcing the ceasefire with Israel.[12] Qassem secondarily called on the Lebanese state to prioritize the reconstruction of infrastructure in Lebanon. Qassem also voiced support for a stronger Lebanese state and for removing the IDF. Qassem stated that assuming these co-occurring priorities would facilitate the revival of Lebanon.


Qassem may be attempting to absolve Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government. Hezbollah has faced considerable financial challenges after the end of major fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. These challenges have prevented Hezbollah from rapidly reconstructing pro-Hezbollah areas as Hezbollah did after previous rounds of fighting.[13] Hezbollah's effort to blame the government may be an attempt to rebuild Hezbollah's political capital in Lebanon after the war and amid slow reconstruction.

Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after an audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. The accused sheikh denied that he was responsible for the recording, and the Syrian Interior Ministry vowed to investigate and bring the real perpetrators to "justice." [14] Syrians protested the video in at least nine Syrian provinces on April 28 and 29, and videos of armed men threatening to retaliate reportedly circulated on social media.[15] A group of gunmen entered Jaramana, a majority Druze town southeast of Damascus, on April 28 and opened fire on a residential area.[16] Security sources told Western media that the gunmen were reportedly from neighboring Sunni-majority towns, including Meliha.[17] The General Security Services (GSS) and the Defense Ministry (MoD) deployed to Jaramana and cordoned off the town.[18] A Ministry of Interior source said that armed militants launched an "organized attack" against security services when they arrived at the scene.[19] It is unclear if the fighters were from any organized group. Engagements between the militants, Druze fighters, and government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 12 people.[20] Unspecified gunmen also attacked a joint checkpoint between local Druze factions and the GSS at the entrance to Ashrafiyeh Sahnaya, a town southwest of Damascus that has a large Druze population.[21]

Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state. The Druze community has held significant reservations about Syrian Transitional President Shara's government since the fall of the regime. Slow governmental response to large-scale confessionalist-motivated attacks against the Druze community epitomizes Druze fears about the new government. Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat al Hijri denounced the attackers as terrorists similar to al Qaeda and ISIS and criticized the Syrian transitional government's lack of protection of the Druze community in a speech on April 29.[22] This is similar to how Hijri recently described HTS as the "armed terrorist faction" that controls Damascus, suggesting that he views Shara's HTS-dominated government forces and the likely Sunni attackers of Jaramana in a similar light.[23] A Suwayda-based news outlet accused the government of remaining "silent" on the numerous anti-Druze demonstrations that took place in Syrian cities.[24] Other minority groups, such as the Kurds in northeastern Syria, are likely watching this incident with alarm. Kurdish political parties recently cited government protection of Kurdish citizens and their rights as one of their most important demands of the government.[25] The transitional government's inability to prevent confessionalist violence against minority groups is unlikely to build Kurdish confidence that the government will protect them if they disarm.

Shara's government took several initial steps following the Jaramana attacks that suggest it may move more resolutely to protect the Druze community. A transitional government delegation met with Jaramana's Druze leaders on April 29 and agreed to hold the perpetrators of the attack responsible.[26] The GSS also coordinated with Druze militias to escort hundreds of Druze university students from

Latakia, Tartous, and Homs provinces back to Jaramana and Suwayda Province.[27] Security services were also deployed to Druze areas across Syria.[28] These are minor steps that certainly do not meet the expectations that the Druze or Kurdish communities have demanded of Shara, however. Shara is unlikely to allay the fears of these groups without repeated concrete actions that take real steps towards protecting Syria's minority communities.



Key Takeaways:

- Hezbollah Priorities:** Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem argued that Lebanon could not rebuild without an Israeli withdrawal from the five small positions Israel holds, an end to Israeli airstrikes, and the release of Lebanese prisoners. Qassem may be attempting to absolve

Hezbollah of responsibility for the slow pace of reconstruction in pro-Hezbollah areas by blaming the Lebanese government.

- **Iran-China Relations:** The United States sanctioned six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China on April 29 for procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients for the IRGC, which demonstrates how Iran draws meaningful military support from China.
- **US Air Campaign in Yemen:** The Houthis have continued to provide conflicting information about a facility in southwestern Saada City that US Central Command (CENTCOM) targeted in an airstrike on April 27.
- **Druze-Government Relations in Syria:** Confessionalist-motivated armed militants targeted the Syrian Druze community on April 28 and 29 after audio in which a Druze sheikh allegedly insults the Prophet Mohammad circulated on social media. Confessionalist violence in Jaramana and across the country may discourage minority groups, including the Syrian Druze, from disarming and integrating into the state.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 814,000 rials to one US dollar on April 28 to 813,000 rials to one US dollar on April 29.[29]

A fire broke out at the “Ava Nar Parsian” warehouse in Shahin Shahr, Esfahan Province, on April 29.[30] The explosion killed two individuals and injured two others.[31] Iranian authorities announced that the cause of the explosion remains under investigation.[32] The facility manufactures fireworks and gunpowder and operates under the supervision of the Iranian National Security Council (NSC), a sub-council of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).[33] A similar explosion in May 2021 occurred at “Sepahan Nargostar,” a complex in the same district of Esfahan Province that was linked to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (HESA).[34] The incident follows a major explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port on April 26 and Iran’s thwarting of a “widespread” cyberattack on April 28.[35]

The Iranian Parliament initiated impeachment proceedings against Roads and Urban Development Minister Farzaneh Sadegh on April 29.[36] A member of the ultraconservative Paydari Front, Mohammad Mannan Raisi submitted the motion, and 40 other parliamentarians signed it. Raisi cited “inaction” at the Ports and Maritime Organization, closure of the national housing registration website, failure to implement laws tied to population growth policies, and poor handling of housing market regulations as the main reasons for the motion of impeachment.[37] The impeachment motion follows the April 26 explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, Iran’s largest container port, which handles approximately 85 percent of Iran’s shipping container traffic.[38] Iranian officials cited safety failures and “false statements” in the exploded cargo’s documentation at Shahid Rajaei Port, which raises broader concerns about government oversight.[39] The regime may use impeachment efforts like this one to demonstrate responsiveness to public demands and manage potential unrest. A large protest broke out after a deadly incident in 2022, after the collapse of a building in Khuzestan Province, constructed by individuals close to the regime.[40] Demonstrators expressed anger over the government’s failure to enforce construction standards and its mismanagement of the disaster’s aftermath.[41]

Iran continues to bolster economic ties with neighboring countries to mitigate the impact of international sanctions on the Iranian economy. Iran and Kyrgyzstan held their 14th Joint Economic Committee meeting in Tehran on April 26 and 27.[42] Iranian officials, including Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, met with Kyrgyz officials to discuss trade facilitation and port and transit cooperation. The officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a joint investment committee to streamline future cooperation efforts. Iran and Kazakhstan separately signed an MOU on April 29 to expand port and transit cooperation.[43] Kazakhstan will reportedly present an investment plan for Shahid Rajaei Port in Iran soon. The port was severely affected by an explosion and a series of fires on April 26.[44]


Iran continues to pursue defense and economic cooperation with Zimbabwe. Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh met with Zimbabwean Defense Minister Oppah Muchinguri-Kashiri in Tehran on April 28.[45] Nasir Zadeh stated that Iran can support Zimbabwe's counterterrorism efforts. Iranian defense officials previously met with Zimbabwean officials in April 2024 to discuss defense cooperation, likely to pursue uranium or other minerals in Zimbabwe.[46] Nasir Zadeh and Muchinguri-Kashiri also criticized US sanctions on Iran and Zimbabwe and emphasized the importance of cooperation to circumvent sanctions.[47] Iran and Zimbabwe previously signed 12 bilateral economic agreements in July 2023.[48] These meetings are part of an ongoing Iranian effort to improve ties with African states as part of Iran's broader neighborhood policy centered on building relations with regional and extra-regional states to undermine the impact of international sanctions.

Syria

The Syrian Kurdish Independents Association rejected the Kurdish Unity Conference's April 26 platform.[49] The Syrian Kurdish Independents Association is a political organization founded in Turkey in 2016, now based in Turkish-controlled Afrin.[50] The organization opposes the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and considers the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the SDF to be terrorist organizations.[51] Tammo emphasized that Syrian Kurds are an integral part of Syrian society and rejected the conference's goal to secure a federal system that grants authority to Kurdish "militias." [52] Kurdish political parties released a unified statement on April 26, which called for a federal Syrian structure that could create a unified entity to administer all Kurdish-majority regions in northeastern Syria.[53] The head of the Syrian Kurdish Independents Association, Abdul Aziz al Tammo, claimed on April 27 that the agreement was established among external actors and is not representative of Syrian Kurds.[54] Tanno criticized the conference for not demanding the release of illegal detentions in SDF prisons and an end to Kurdish child abductions in the Qandil Mountains.[55]

Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani stressed the urgent need for sanctions relief and called on the UN to prevent Israel from continuing to destabilize Syria.[56] Shaibani spoke at the UN Security Council. He noted the Syrian transitional government's current engagement with international mechanisms like the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM), the Fact-Finding Mission to Syria, and the Human Rights Council to support economic recovery, reconstruction, and transitional justice.[57] Shaibani warned that Assad-era sanctions will hinder progress in these areas and could drive a cycle of violence.[58] Foreign Minister Shaibani stated that Syria will not be a source of instability in the region or pose a threat to its neighbors.[59] Shaibani

warned that Israeli airstrikes and border incursions in Syria constitute violations of Syrian sovereignty, risk igniting grievances that could destabilize the region.[60] He urged the United Nations to partner with the Syrian transitional government to support the growth of a secure and prosperous Syria.[61]



Iraq

Nothing Significant to Report.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

- Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas

- Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition to control all of Yemen
- Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip


CENTCOM conducted at least 17 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since 1:00 pm ET on April 28.[62]

CENTCOM conducted at least three airstrikes targeting Houthi sites in Harf Sufiyan, Amran Governorate, and one airstrike targeting al Mahadhir, Sahar District, Saada Governorate, on April 28.[63] CENTCOM also conducted at least six airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure in Rabt al Anan, al Jawf Governorate, on April 29, which is approximately 20km behind the frontlines in Marib Governorate.[64] CENTCOM struck Houthi infrastructure in Maqbanah District, Taiz Governorate, four times at approximately 9:00 am ET on April 29, which is less than 50km from the southern frontlines in Taiz Governorate.[65]

At least three separate CENTCOM sorties struck Houthi underground facilities and weapons depots around Sanaa City on April 28.[66] A Yemeni journalist reported that one of these sorties killed nine Houthi fighters at Barash Camp on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City, including the air defense site commander Captain Ahmed Asem Abu al Ezz, one of the base's senior officers Abu Zaid al Muayyad, and Abdullah al Dhari, a Fater-1 missile air defense system expert.[67] The Fater-1, which is a Houthi version of the Soviet-made SA-6 surface-to-air missile system, has a maximum range of 24 km and a maximum altitude of 14 km.[68]

US Strikes Against Houthi Targets

April 29, 2025 at 2:00 PM EST



The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

See the topline section.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks in the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends

that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.



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