



## Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment


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April 14, 2025, 5:45 pm ET

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on April 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.** Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently seized Oleksandropil, Panteleymonivka, and Valentynivka (all southwest of Toretsk) and pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynopil highway.[1] Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from positions east of the H-20 highway, seized Valentynivka, and are attacking Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka).[2] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) continue to attack north of Vozdvyzhenka (west of Oleksandropil and east of Pokrovsk) in the direction of Nova Poltavka and Novoolenivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk and west of Toretsk).[3] Russian milbloggers recently credited elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Panteleymonivka and Oleksandropil and elements of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) with seizing Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[4]

## Assessed Control of Terrain Southwest of Toretsk April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The Russian military command redeployed elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions from the Kurakhove direction to the Toretsk and eastern Pokrovsk directions in February 2025 and likely intended to leverage these redeployments to break out of Toretsk and advance towards Kostyantynivka along or parallel to the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[5] Elements of the Russian 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) previously operating in these two areas failed to break through Ukraine's defense in Fall 2024 and Winter 2024-2025, likely prompting the Russian military command to introduce elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions – potentially prematurely – into combat in order to maintain the operational tempo in these areas. Russian forces marginally advanced along the frontline between Vozdvyzhenka (northeast of Pokrovsk) and Sukha Balka in February and March 2025, but have made more tactically significant advances near Kalynove and along the Sukha Balka-Oleksandropil line since early April

2025.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may aim to eliminate the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk in order to level out their southern flank ahead of a planned push on Kostyantynivka, and recent Russian redeployments and tactical activity supports this assessment.[7] Russian forces likely intend to leverage advances southwest of Toretsk to push along the H-20 highway and facilitate deeper advances northeast of Pokrovsk along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway toward Kostyantynivka. Russian forces must break out of Toretsk, Chasiv Yar, advance toward Kostyantynivka broadly from the east, or advance roughly 24 kilometers from Pokrovsk along the T-0504 highway to Kostyantynivka's southwestern flank before Russian forces will pose any notable threat to seizing Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka, and a Russian offensive to seize the city or Ukraine's wider fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast would likely be a years' long effort - assuming that the West continues to bolster Ukraine's defense.[8]

**Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.** Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a reinforced company-sized Russian mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, several civilian vehicles, and an unspecified number of motorcycles on April 12.[9] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with over 20 armored vehicles, including over 10 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and several tanks.[10] The Ukrainian brigade stated that Russian forces attempted to advance in a wave of motorcycles ahead of the attacking armored vehicles to swiftly reach Ukrainian positions. Another Ukrainian brigade operating nearby stated that the Russian assault occurred near Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two tanks and 12 IFVs.[11] The Ukrainian National Guard published footage on April 14 showing Russian forces conducting a reinforced company-sized mechanized assault with three tanks, 18 IFVs, an unspecified number of MT-LB armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 41 motorcycles in an unspecified area of the Zaporizhia direction.[12] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault and destroyed two IFVs and one AFV.

Russian forces have been augmenting mechanized assaults with civilian vehicles, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) since late Fall 2024 after limiting their use of armored vehicles across the entire frontline, likely due to concerns about unsustainable armored vehicle losses in Summer and early Fall 2024.[13] Russian forces largely relied on small infantry groups to advance in Ukraine and used armored vehicles to transport infantry to the frontline and as fire support for infantry assaults in late Fall 2024 through Winter 2024-2025.[14] Russian forces continue to attack in small infantry groups along the frontline but may be recommitting armor to frontline assault operations as part of a general intensification along the entire frontline. Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov noted on April 14 that Russian forces are using more civilian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction due to their high degree of maneuverability for evading Ukrainian drones compared to slower armored vehicles.[15] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone operations are rendering Russian armored vehicle usage ineffective in the Pokrovsk direction, which is consistent with a long-term trend of Ukrainian drones discouraging Russian armored vehicle usage in this direction.[16] ISW has previously assessed that Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) cannot produce new armored vehicles

and artillery systems at rates that can offset Russia's current tempo of losses in the medium- to long-term, and Russian forces are likely using these alternative civilian vehicles in assault operations to bolster mechanized assaults amid concerns about dwindling supplies of Soviet-era armored vehicles.[17] The recent intensification in Russian armor usage suggests that the Russian military command may be growing less concerned about dwindling armored vehicle stores or at least may be willing to accept additional armored vehicle losses if Russian forces can secure additional gains before a possible future ceasefire.

**A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.** Kremlin newswire *TASS* stated on April 11 that the Second Western District Military Court rejected an appeal against a February 28 ruling that changed Popov's house arrest to two months of pre-trial detention.[18] Russian ultranationalist outlet *Tsargrad* claimed on April 11 that Popov's lawyer stated that Russian authorities had not yet considered Popov's petition to suspend court proceedings and send Popov to fight in Ukraine.[19] Popov's lawyer stated on April 9 that Popov signed a military service contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and would return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending criminal trial.[20] A Russian security official stated to Russian state business outlet *Kommersant* on April 9 that Popov would assume command of an unspecified "Storm Z" penal detachment operating in Ukraine. Popov publicly appealed to Putin in March 2025 to reinstate him in active military service, and Popov's support base, particularly within the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities, widely supported the appeal. The court's seeming reversal of the decision to send Popov to the war in Ukraine suggests that the Kremlin continues to struggle to respond to situations in which the Kremlin's desired outcome is at odds with that of the Russian ultranationalist and veteran communities. The Kremlin may be conflicted about how to punish Popov for weaponizing the information space in July 2023 when he attempted to reverse his removal from command. The Kremlin likely fears that allowing Popov to return to the battlefield at his request would set a precedent in which popular commanders and officials could threaten to blackmail the Kremlin into accepting their demands.


*Read more about Popov's arrest in ISW's latest [special edition](#).*

### **Key Takeaways:**

- **Russian forces appear to be leveraging redeployed elements of the 8th Combined Arms Army to close the Ukrainian pocket southwest of Toretsk and level the frontline as part of ongoing Russian efforts to attack Kostyantynivka from the south.**
- **Russian forces appear to be intensifying their use of armored vehicles throughout the theater after mainly relegating armored vehicles to fire support roles and relying on infantry assaults to advance in late 2024 and early 2025.**
- **A Russian military court recently decided to keep former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in custody after reports that Popov would command a penal assault detachment in Ukraine.**



- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk and Toretsk and Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Siversk, Toretsk and Pokrovsk.



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Alleged Ceasefire Violations**

*Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.*

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 14 without evidence that Ukrainian forces struck energy facilities in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts and occupied Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts eight times over the past day.[21] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin told Kremlin-affiliated outlet *Izvestia* on April 14 that Ukrainian forces have violated the ceasefire on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure almost every day since March 18.[22]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko stated on April 13 that Russia is intensifying long-range strikes and offensive operations along the frontline despite that Ukraine and the United States offered Russia an unconditional general ceasefire in mid-March 2025.[23]

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in the area.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[24]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Guyevo and are pushing Ukrainian forces out of the St. Nicholas Monastery northeast of Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[25]

Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya (southwest of Sudzha).[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Gornal and Oleshnya.[27]

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful HIMARS strike on April 11 against the forward command post of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Guyevo, wounding the regiment's commander and killing the regiment's deputy commander and a communications platoon commander.[28] The Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces previously conducted drone and rocket strikes against the command post and that the Russian military command "made no effort" to move or conceal the command post. A Ukrainian source reported on April 13 that a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter aircraft conducted a AASM Hammer stand-off weapon strike against Russian positions in Tetkino (southwest of Kursk City).[29] Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Stela-10 short-range surface-to-air missile system in Kursk Oblast.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) and 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[31] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near the St. Nicholas Monastery.[32]

## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 14, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of most of Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City) but that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the settlement's western outskirts.[33] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Demidovka (southeast of Popovka) and that Russian forces are clearing the settlement.[34]

Fighting continued in Popovka and Demidovka.[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka and Popovka.[36]



Elements of the "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Popovka.[37]



**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 13 and 14 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Sumy near the international border in Zhuravka and northeast of Sumy near Loknya,

Basivka, and Veselivka.[38] Russian state television program *Vesti* claimed that Russian forces occupy 70 square kilometers of Sumy Oblast, though ISW has only collected evidence to assess that Russian forces occupy 43.61 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Russian forces attacked near Basivka on April 13 and 14.[40] A milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Vodolahy (north of Sumy near the international border).[41]

Order of Battle: Drone units of the Russian "Anvar Spetsnaz" detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy).[42] Elements of the Russian 1434th "Akhmat-Chechnya" Regiment are reportedly operating near Veselivka and Volodymyrivka (north of Sumy) and Vodolahy.[43]

### **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**


**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 14 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 13 and 14.[44] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 14 that Russian forces used three armored vehicles and eight motorized vehicles to deliver infantry to frontline positions near Vovchanski Khutory and that Ukrainian strikes destroyed two armored vehicles and six motorized vehicles.[45]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stepove Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on April 13 and 14.[47]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are using heavy equipment less frequently and are attacking with motorcycles, quad bikes, and buggies.[48] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces are trying to strike the Russian rear before Russian forces approach the frontline.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[49] Elements of the "Sheikh Mansur" volunteer battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stroivka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[50]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 14 but did not advance.**

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove; east of Borova near Nadiya and Serhiivka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekiivka Serhiivka on April 13 and 14.[51]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) and 4th Tank Division (1st GTA, MMD) are attacking along the Lozova-Pershotravneve line (northeast and east of Borova).[52]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman), advanced east of the settlement, and advanced within Nove (northeast of Lyman).[53] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Makiivka (northeast of Novomykhailivka), northwest of Novolyubivka (southwest of Novomykhailivka), north of Kolodyazi (south of Novomykhailivka), and to Zelena Dolyna (southwest of Novomykhailivka).[54] Mashovets stated that Russian forces advanced to the Zhrebets River in an unspecified area between Yampolivka and Torske (east of Lyman).[55]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Nove, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Kolodyazi, and Yampolivka and toward Zelena Dolyna and Ridkodub and east of Lyman near Torske on April 13 and 14.[56]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 254th, 283rd, 488th, and 1428th motorized rifle regiments; 59th Tank Regiment; and 148th Reconnaissance Battalion (all of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are attacking in the Nove-Lypove (northeast of Lyman) and Zelena Dolyna directions.[57] Mashovets noted that the 1428th Motorized Rifle Regiment is not operating at full strength and lacks one to two battalions. Mashovets stated that elements of the 164th and 169th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), with support from at least two motorized rifle regiments from the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th CAA), are attacking in the Yampolivka-Torske direction and south of Yampolivka.




## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**

## Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[58]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[60]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on April 14.[61]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 14 but did not advance.**

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 13 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian reinforced company-sized mechanized assault toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) with 13 armored vehicles, civilian vehicles, and motorcycles on April 12.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Andriivka; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on April 13 and 14.[63]

**Ukrainian forces recently advanced within and northeast of Toretsk.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Korolenka Street in northwestern Toretsk.[64]

*See topline text for assessed Russian advances in the Toretsk direction.*

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Krymske (northeast of Toretsk) along the O-0519 Bila Hora-Druzhba road.[65]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 14 that elements of the Russian 132nd, 5th, and 9th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA, SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[66]

**Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 13 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in western Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[67]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Zelene Pole, Novotoretske, Kalynove, and Vodyane Druhe and toward Malynivka, Stara Mykolaivka, and Oleksandropil; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on April 13 and 14.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yelyzavetivka.[69]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reported on April 14 that Russian forces are using the largest number of vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction, mainly as fire support and to support any Russian breakthroughs.[70] Trehubov noted that heavy armored vehicles are currently ineffective as "breakthrough weapons" and fire support - or even infantry transports - due to the number of drones in the air. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 14 that Russian forces have stopped conducting mechanized assaults in the area after experiencing significant armored vehicle losses a week ago (about April 7).[71] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces have reverted to deploying small infantry in groups of two to five and using civilian vehicles and motorcycles during attacks. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have been sending more mobilized personnel and less trained personnel on assaults in recent weeks. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed that a Russian soldier operating



in the Pokrovsk direction recently complained that Russian forces are only receiving drones through humanitarian aid and Telegram channels' fundraisers and that this quantity of drones is insufficient.[72] The milblogger claimed that Russian drone technology is inferior to Ukraine's. The milblogger claimed that these issues are systemic and exist in other unspecified areas of the frontline.

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are operating along the Tarasivka-Stara Mykolaivka-Oleksandropil line.[73] Drone operators of the "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating near Myrne (east of Pokrovsk).[74]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.**


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Troitske, are advancing west of Bohdanivka (both southeast of Novopavlivka), and entered Kotlyarivka (east of Novopavlivka) from the east and south.[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and Preobrazhenka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 13 and 14.[76]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are operating in the Nadiivka-Kotlyarivka area (east of Novopavlivka).[77] Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division are reportedly also operating near Zaporizhzhia and Troitske (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[78]



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters near Oleksiivka (west of Kurakhove).[79] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields south of Bahatyr (southwest of Kurakhove).[80]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Oleksiivka, Bahatyr, and Andriivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 13 and 14.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near Bahatyr.[82]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division and 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are operating near Andriivka and that elements of the Russian

36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) and 57th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Rozlyv.[83] Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[84]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southwest of Odradne (north of Velyka Novosilka) and east of Shevchenko.[85]

Russian forces attacked north of Odradne; northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vesele and Burlatske; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Shevchenko and Pryvilne; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on April 13 and 14.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne.[87]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th CAA, EMD) are operating near Burlatske and Pryvilne.[88] Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) and 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[89]

**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**


**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Nesteryanka (northwest of Robotyne).[90]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks northwest of Robotyne near Kamyanka, Stepove, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 13 and 14.[91]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), “Viking” Spetsnaz detachment, 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a reformed Soviet-era unit), and 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[92]


## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 13 and 14 but did not advance.[93]**



## Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction April 14, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



### Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 13 to 14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 62 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 40 drones and that 11 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that the strikes damaged civilian infrastructure in Odesa, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[95]



## **Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)**

*ISW is suspending Russian mobilization and force generation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days.*

## **Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)**

*ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW will be introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations in the coming days.*

## **Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)**

*ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click here to read the Russian Occupation Update.*

## **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



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