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April 15, 2025, 6:45 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on April 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergey Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that any future peace agreement ending Russia's invasion of Ukraine must include terms concerning Ukraine's neutrality; the demilitarization and "denazification" of the Ukrainian state; the abolition of Ukrainian laws that allegedly discriminate against Russian-speakers in Ukraine; and the recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed to Russian state business outlet *Kommersant* on April 14 that the current Ukrainian government is "unconstitutional" and that Russia "cannot give [Russian speakers living in occupied Ukraine] up" following the illegal and sham referendums Russia conducted in the four oblasts to join Russia in Fall 2022.[2] Lavrov reiterated that Putin "very clearly outlined" Russia's demands for a future peace agreement to end the war during Putin's speech on June 14, 2024, and stated that these June 2024 demands were "not some kind of request." Lavrov stated that there are "no secrets" about Russia's demands and reiterated the importance of addressing the "root causes" of the war in a future peace agreement.

Russian officials are using Putin's June 2024 speech as the Kremlin's current standing guidance on negotiations and the resolution of the war in Ukraine. Putin demanded on June 14, 2024 that Ukrainian forces must "completely withdraw" from Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and that Ukraine must officially abandon its goal of joining NATO (by amending its constitution in which that goal is enshrined) before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire and peace negotiations.[3] Putin stated that Russia is prepared to begin negotiations with Ukraine as soon as Ukraine agrees to withdraw from the entirety of the four oblasts. Putin also demanded that the international community recognize the four illegally annexed and occupied oblasts as part of Russia and lift all Western sanctions against Russia in the event of a resolution to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Putin reiterated his calls for Ukraine to agree to full demilitarization and "denazification" and abandon its aspirations to join any external security blocs. These demands would preclude the bilateral security agreements Ukraine has negotiated and is negotiating with several European states.

Putin and other Kremlin officials have routinely issued these same demands, including by using vague language to obfuscate Russia's most extreme demands.[4] Russian officials, including Putin, use this language to articulate their overarching demand that the West acknowledge Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Ukraine and force Ukraine to concede not only territory but also its future sovereignty and ability to defend itself. Kremlin officials have consistently demanded that:

- **Ukraine must demilitarize.** Putin named "demilitarization" as one of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and stated on July 4, 2024, that Ukraine should undergo "irreversible" "demilitarization" in the event of a future ceasefire.[5] Russia demanded in the April 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine shrink its military beyond pre-2022 levels and commit to never fielding a military capable of defending the country against future Russian aggression.[6] Russia demanded in the protocol that the Ukrainian military should be confined to fewer than 85,000 active-duty personnel, fewer than 15,000 National Guard personnel, and fewer than 1,400 tanks and armored vehicles. The pre-2022 Ukrainian military had 196,600 active-duty personnel, 60,000 National Guard personnel, and over 3,000 tanks and armored vehicles.
- **Ukraine must "denazify" and install a "legitimate" government.** Putin named "denazification" as another of the main goals of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and Russian officials have previously defined "denazification" as the "liquidation of those who instill" Russophobia in other people.[7] Russian officials often invoke the term "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government in Kyiv. Putin has routinely labeled all Ukrainian governments since 2014 as "illegitimate" and claimed on January 28 that Russia will not view any agreements it concludes with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[8]
- **Ukraine must abandon its aspirations to join NATO or any security bloc in the future.** Putin's demand for Ukraine's "neutrality" remains one of the central justifications for his full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[9] Russia demanded in the Istanbul Protocol draft agreement that Ukraine amend its constitution to remove the provision committing Ukraine to NATO membership and add a neutrality provision that would ban Ukraine from joining any military alliances, concluding military agreements, or hosting foreign military personnel or systems in Ukraine.[10]
- **Ukraine must concede occupied Ukrainian territory and "Novorossiia" to Russia.** Putin stated on June 14, 2024, that Russia will not be content with ending the war on the lines it currently holds and explicitly called for Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the non-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts as a prerequisite for any sort of "peace" negotiations with Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials have indicated that they have territorial ambitions beyond the administrative borders of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and often invoke the term "Novorossiia" (an amorphous, invented region in

Ukraine that Kremlin officials have claimed includes all of southern and eastern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia) to lay claim to other areas of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[12]

- **Any resolution of the war must address the war's "root causes."** Lavrov has repeatedly defined the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as NATO's alleged violation of commitments not to expand into eastern Europe and along Russia's borders in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine.[13] Russian officials have leveraged claims that Ukraine has mistreated Russian speakers to justify Russia's occupation and illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states. Lavrov told *Kommersant* on April 14 that Russia and the United States have not agreed on any "key parameters" of a potential agreement to end the war in Ukraine.[14] Lavrov stated that Putin's June 2024 demand that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblast — including the territory that Russia does not currently occupy — continue to serve as the basis of Russia's negotiating position.[15] Lavrov referred to Russia's claimed territory in Ukraine as Donbas and Novorossiia. Lavrov claimed that the Ukrainian government "does not represent Crimea, Donbas, or Novorossiia" or "a number of other territories that still remain under the control of [Ukraine.]" Lavrov specifically claimed that the Ukrainian government does not represent residents in Odesa City and that Russia built Odesa City and "many other" cities in Ukraine. Putin recently claimed that "Novorossiia" is an integral part of Russia, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov has defined "Novorossiia" as all of eastern and southern Ukraine, including Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[16] Putin claimed in 2023 that Odesa City, Crimea, and the entire "Black Sea region" have nothing "to do with Ukraine." [17] Lavrov's continued amplification of these claims indicates that Russia aims to occupy even more of Ukraine than the territory that Russia is currently demanding, despite engaging in ongoing negotiations with the United States ostensibly to end the war in Ukraine.

Lavrov also indicated Russia's desire to seize territory in countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia — including NATO member states. Lavrov claimed that it is "dangerous" when "fascists seize lands that never belonged to anyone except the Russian Empire [and] Soviet Union" and do "disgusting things there." Lavrov's statement indicates that the Kremlin views independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire as rightfully part of modern-day Russia. Moldova and NATO members Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were part of the Soviet Union and Russian Empire, and NATO member Finland and large parts of NATO member Poland were part of the Russian Empire. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev recently threatened Finland using narratives resembling those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasion of Ukraine, and Putin and other Russian officials are attempting to use Russia's previous colonization efforts to set informational conditions and justify future aggression against NATO states.[18]

Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities. Naryshkin claimed on April 15 that NATO states are strengthening their positions on their borders with Belarus and Russia, including Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast.[19] Naryshkin claimed that Poland and the Baltic states "should understand" that the "first to suffer" in the event of "NATO aggression" against the Union State of Russia and Belarus will be the Polish and Baltic political circles that have spoken about building up their defenses along their borders with Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast — although Naryshkin claimed that Russia "will certainly" inflict damage on the entire NATO bloc in this event.[20] Naryshkin claimed that European states, such as France, the UK, and Germany, are escalating the war in Ukraine, so Russia "needs to act preemptively" and "is ready for this." [21] Russian officials, including Putin, repeatedly threatened NATO in 2023 and 2024.[22] Naryshkin appears to be claiming that European efforts to shoulder more of Europe's own defense requirements and to defend against future Russian aggression — in line with Trump's calls for such efforts — are allegedly provocative and escalatory.

Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.[23] Putin rejected Trump's temporary full ceasefire on March 13, questioning whether Ukraine would be allowed to continue to mobilize forces, train newly mobilized soldiers, and receive military aid from its partners and allies and questioning the control and verification measures of a temporary ceasefire — questions which Lavrov reiterated on April 15.[24] Lavrov attempted to blame Ukraine for the lack of a full ceasefire, claiming that Ukraine "loves to lie." [25] Russian officials, led by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), have accused Ukraine of violating the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire almost every day since March 29 while offering no evidence of such violations, and the Kremlin appears to be using these unsubstantiated claims to also refuse Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal.[26] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on April 14 that Ukraine accepted Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal over one month ago.[27]

Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear. *Kommersant* asked Lavrov to comment on how neither the temporary ceasefire against energy infrastructure strikes nor the temporary ceasefire in the Black Sea are "fully in effect." [28] Lavrov responded, claiming "there are no such agreements," but then proceeded to discuss Putin's rejection of Trump's proposed 30-day full ceasefire. It remains unclear if Lavrov's response was about the temporary strikes ceasefire and proposed Black Sea ceasefire or the proposed temporary full ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 15 that the Kremlin would clarify the end date of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire with the Russian MoD and noted that "everything will depend on further orders from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief [Putin]." [29] Russian officials have routinely claimed almost every day since March 18 without evidence that Ukraine has violated the temporary energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire.[30] Naryshkin also claimed on April 15, without evidence, that Ukraine has been conducting strikes on energy infrastructure "almost every day" since March 18.[31] Russian forces may intensify long-range strikes against Ukraine in the coming days as the ceasefire comes to an end.


Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a

corps structure.[32] The 1st "Azov" Corps of the National Guard stated on April 15 that it will consist of four existing brigades and one new brigade.[33] Ukraine has yet to announce details about the second new corps. Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov stated on April 15 that the Ukrainian military is staffing new corps with commanders who have combat experience and that corps will become the main component for conducting operations.[34] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's efforts to form an echelon between Ukraine's brigades and operational groups of forces and to strengthen the army corps staff structure will likely improve Ukrainian command and control for Ukrainian brigades and help facilitate more effective operations.

Key Takeaways:

- **Two high-ranking members of Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle reiterated Putin's June 2024 non-negotiable demands that any resolution of the war in Ukraine must result in regime change, extensive territorial concessions, and long-term limitations on Ukraine's military after US Special Envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff's April 11 meeting with Putin.**
- **Kremlin officials continue to set informational conditions to demand that Ukraine surrender territory that Russia does not currently occupy and to justify Russia's ambitions of asserting control over independent countries, including NATO member states.**
- **Naryshkin threatened a Russian attack against NATO states in response to NATO states building up their defenses in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to increase its own defense capabilities.**
- **Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of Trump's proposal for a 30-day full ceasefire.**
- **Russia may recognize the end of the 30-day energy infrastructure strikes ceasefire soon and intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear.**
- **Ukraine's National Guard announced on April 15 the formation of two new army corps on the basis of two existing brigades, amid Ukraine's continued efforts to transition to a corps structure.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk and Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced near Velyka Novosilka and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

See topline text.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 14 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that Russian forces are advancing toward Vodolahi (west of Sudzha near the international border).[35]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 15 that fighting continued west of Sudzha near Oleshnya and south of Sudzha in Gornal and near the St. Nicholas Monastery (northeast of Gornal).[36] Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Oleshnya, Gornal, the territory of St. Nicholas Monastery and its tactical high ground, and forest areas in Kursk Oblast near the international border.[37]

The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces reported on April 14 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in Kursk Oblast.[38] The Airborne Assault Forces stated that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank, three armored personnel carriers, and two golf carts. Ukrainian outlet *Militarnyi* reported that the Russian mechanized assault occurred on the outskirts of Guyevo.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the "Pitersk" Battalion of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly operating near Sudzha.[40] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and sniper elements of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[41]


Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 15, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that Russian forces cleared Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[42]

Fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[43] Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked between Popovka and Demidovka.[44]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), the Rosgvardia "Steel" Brigade, and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) and reportedly operating near Popovka and Demidovka.[45]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 14 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed on April 15 that Russian forces advanced north of Sumy City toward Vodolahy and northeast of Sumy City near Veselivka, Zhuravka, and Basivka.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Sumy City near Loknya, Volodymyrivka, and Bilovody and north of Sumy City toward Vodolahy.[47]

A Russian milblogger called on April 15 for civilians to evacuate Sumy City as it is becoming a frontline city and claimed that Russian forces would increase strikes against Sumy City as Russian forces continue their offensive in Sumy Oblast.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[49]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 15 but did not advance.

Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 15 that Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored fighting vehicles, an infantry fighting vehicle, and a TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system near Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) in the past three days.[50] The Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces are trying to improve their tactical positions in the contested "gray zone" near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City near the international border).[51]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Zapad-Akhmat" Battalion and 116th Special Purpose "Stalnaya" Brigade are reportedly operating in Vovchansk.[52] Drone operators of the Russian "Antagonist" drone detachment are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[54]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Makiivka and Hrekivka (both southeast of Borova).[55]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Olhivka on April 14 and 15.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces entered Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman) and advanced east of Novomykhailivka, southwest of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman), and near Torske (east of Lyman).[57]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Katerynivka, Zelene Dolyna, Nove, Novomykhailivka, and Ridkodub and east of Lyman near Torske on April 14 and 15.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have started conducting infantry assaults in groups of about 10 personnel instead of groups of two or three.[59] The spokesperson noted that heavy close-range fighting is ongoing in the Lyman direction. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces transferred unspecified units to the area from the Kupyansk direction and are not facing personnel constraints. An officer in a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are deploying one signalman to hide in a Ukrainian position, establish communications, and wait for a larger Russian infantry group to reach the position and are no longer deploying three or four personnel to reach a Ukrainian position.[60]


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assault northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 14 and 15.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly attacking towards Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued assaults in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar in the direction of Maiske; and south of Chasiv Yar from Andriivka, near Ozaryanivka, and towards Predtechyne and Stupochky on April 14 and 15.[63]

Russian Ministry of Defense-run outlet *Zvezda News* reported on March 11 that Russian forces have established workshops to repair tanks and armored vehicles in near rear areas of occupied Ukraine, including in occupied Bakhmut.[64] *Zvezda News* reported that Russian technicians can repair most issues within one to five days. ISW has recently observed an increase in Russian armored vehicle usage

throughout the theater, and Russian forces may be relying on repair workshops in near rear areas to quickly repair damaged vehicles and return the vehicles to frontline units.[65]


Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Toretsk.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in northwestern Toretsk.[66]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are advancing along the frontline between Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk) and Valentynivka (southwest of Toretsk) and advanced west of Valentynivka and one kilometer in the direction of Sukha Balka (north of Valentynivka).[67]

Russian forces continued assaults in Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; northeast of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka and Valentynivka.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are attacking near Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk).[69]




Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 and 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Dachenske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and the industrial zone in eastern Pishchane (southeast of Pokrovsk).[70]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Kalynove (east of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavtivka, Zelene Pole, and Novotoretske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novooleksandrivka, Kotlyne, and Udachne on April 14 and 15.[72]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and drone operators of the "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[73]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 15 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka).[74]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Troitske on April 14 and 15.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 15 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Kostyantynopil; north, south, and east of Bahatyr; and southeast of Odradne (all west of Kurakhove).[76]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, Olesksiivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and toward Odradne on April 14 and 15.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and in the Kostyantynopil direction.[78]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 139th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr, and drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly operating near Odradne.[79]

Russian forces recently advanced roughly 800 meters in the Velyka Novosilka direction during a large-scale mechanized assault.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian armored vehicles east of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[80] A Ukrainian source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on April 14 that Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault consisting of at least 20 armored vehicles and 41 motorcycles toward Shevchenko on April 13.[81] The Ukrainian source noted that a Russian tank drove to the outskirts of Shevchenko but that the tank "blew up." The large-scale Russian mechanized assault notably only advanced roughly 800 meters across open fields and a small water feature.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further east of Shevchenko.[82] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayevev stated on April 15 that Ukrainian forces have "regained control" of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) at an unspecified time in the past two months.[83]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko on April 14 and 15.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attempted to enter Shevchenko but could not gain a foothold.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating near Vilne Pole, and elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) and reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (west of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[86] Drone operators of the 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction, and elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia City highway east of Shcherbak (southwest of Orikhiv).[88]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bahate (southeast of Orikhiv).[89]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Lobkove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske on April 14 and 15.[90]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on April 15 that Russian forces conducted a battalion-sized infantry assault with military equipment support in the Orikhiv direction on April 14.[91] Voloshyn noted that Russian forces usually attack in small infantry groups along the Scherbaky-Stepove-Lobkove line, however. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces attempted to create an electronic warfare (EW) "corridor" and quickly advanced through the corridor to reach Ukrainian positions. Voloshyn added that Russian forces have intensified their use of "chemicals," particularly tear gas, during assault operations.




Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 15 but did not advance.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 52 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 26 drones in eastern, northern, and central Ukraine and that 19 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck Donetsk Oblast and that an Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missile struck Sumy Oblast.[94]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction April 15, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. [Click here to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.](#)

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force

generation efforts, and technological adaptations. [Click here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. [Click here](#) to read the Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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