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April 16, 2025, 5:00 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on April 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that Trump made it "very clear" that US-Russian economic partnerships could be an incentive for Russia to end its war against Ukraine, but that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" — likely in reference to a temporary or permanent full ceasefire in Ukraine.[1] The Trump administration has previously characterized a temporary full ceasefire as a "necessary step" toward achieving an enduring peace settlement in Ukraine.[2] Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the joint US-Ukrainian 30-day full ceasefire proposal when Trump called Putin on March 18, and senior Russian officials have reiterated Putin's rejection since then by attempting to deflect blame onto Ukraine and secure additional bilateral concessions from the United States.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that Ukraine's decision to extend martial law and continue general mobilization until August 6, 2025 is an attempt to preserve Ukraine's "unstable structure" and implied that Ukraine's ban on negotiations with Russia is inhibiting progress towards ending the war.[4] The Ukrainian government is legally prohibited from lifting martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine, however. Russian authorities also appear to be intensifying their recruitment efforts, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain its current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding.[5] The Kremlin is continuing efforts to blame Ukraine for the lack of progress towards Trump's desired full ceasefire. Ukraine has already agreed to Trump's temporary full ceasefire proposal, while Kremlin officials have consistently reiterated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's non-negotiable demands for regime change in Ukraine, extensive territorial concessions, and limitations on Ukraine's military that would render Ukraine defenseless as conditions must be met before Russia can agree to a future ceasefire.[6]

Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine. *Reuters* published a joint investigation with UK-based research organization Open Source Center (OSC) on April 15 detailing the extent of Russia's dependence on North Korean artillery and the evolution of North Korean forces' participation in fighting alongside Russian forces.[7] *Reuters* and the OSC tracked 64 shipments from North Korea to Russia from September 2023 to March 2025 that involved 16,000 containers

carrying millions of North Korean artillery rounds and recorded a shipment from North Korea as recently as March 17, 2025. *Reuters* and the OSC reported that four Russian-flagged ships — the *Angara*, *Maria*, *Maia-1*, and *Lady R* cargo ships — transported the ammunition from North Korea's port of Rajin to the Russian ports of Vostochny and Dunai. *Reuters* reviewed Russian military documents of everyday Russian artillery usage that showed that some Russian units depended on North Korean artillery shells for half or more of their shells used in daily fire missions. *Reuters* reported that an unspecified Russian unit fighting in Zaporizhia Oblast reported that nearly 50 percent of its 152mm D-20 howitzer rounds and 100 percent of its 122mm rockets fired came from North Korea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told *Reuters* that North Korea has provided Russia with three million artillery rounds and an unspecified number of mortar rounds since mid-2023 and that half of all of Russia's artillery rounds come from North Korea. The GUR also stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles as of January 2025.

Ukrainian military commanders and intelligence continue to indicate that North Korean forces have innovated their training and battlefield tactics following their participation in Russia's war. A Ukrainian regimental commander fighting in Kursk Oblast told *Reuters* that 3,000 additional North Korean forces that arrived in Kursk Oblast in mid-February 2025 were better prepared and more "adapted to modern combat" than the original contingent of North Korean forces that began fighting alongside Russian forces in November 2024.[8] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak stated on April 15 that North Korean forces have changed tactics from conducting assaults in large groups to attacking in groups of one or two people, have learned drone and electronic warfare (EW) tactics, and are successfully using Russian weapons and tactics on the battlefield.[9] Chernyak indicated that Russian and North Korean forces are somewhat compensating for language barriers that were causing friction during combat operations, as North Korean forces now receive orders and conduct assaults without communicating with Russian units.

Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast. Russian law enforcement officials told Kremlin newswire TASS on April 16 that Russian authorities detained Smirnov and former Kursk Oblast Vice Governor Alexei Dedov on suspicions of fraud and will seek their arrests.[10] Russian law enforcement authorities claimed that Smirnov and Dedov are under investigation for embezzling funds from the state-owned Kursk Oblast Development Corporation (KODC) meant for constructing defensive fortifications in the Kursk Oblast border area.[11] Russian authorities previously detained KODC executives in December 2024 on similar charges of embezzlement, in what ISW assessed at the time to be a concerted Kremlin effort to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for failing to repel Ukraine's incursion.[12] Russian officials notably arrested former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov in May 2024 on similar charges of embezzling funds dedicated to constructing fortifications due to his perceived disloyalty and criticisms of the Russian military high command.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Smirnov as Kursk Oblast Governor with then Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee Head Alexander Khinshtein on December 5, 2024, and claimed


that Smirnov resigned "at his own request."^[14] Senior Russian officials emphasized in December 2024 that Putin appointed Khinshtein because Smirnov did not adequately communicate with or support Kursk Oblast residents regarding housing issues but did not accuse Smirnov of corruption at that time.^[15] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin refrained from replacing Smirnov directly following the Ukrainian incursion or during Russian regional elections, likely in support of efforts to downplay the societal impacts of the incursion.^[16] The Kremlin likely detained Smirnov and Dedov now since Russian forces have mostly pushed Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast.^[17]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka). The Ukrainian General Prosecutor's Office and Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported on April 16 that there is footage of Russian forces taking three Ukrainian servicemembers prisoner near Rozdolne on April 11 and executing one of the unarmed Ukrainian POWs.^[18] ISW has observed a sharp increase in credible reports and footage of Russian forces executing Ukrainian POWs throughout 2024 and 2025 and continues to assess that Russian military commanders are either complicit in or enabling their subordinates to conduct these executions in violation of international law.^[19]

Key Takeaways:

- **The White House reiterated that the United States will not engage in economic agreements with Russia until Russia agrees to a ceasefire, amid continued Russian efforts to deflect blame onto Ukraine for the Kremlin's rejection of such a ceasefire.**
- **Russia is reportedly heavily dependent on North Korean artillery ammunition as North Korea continues to learn lessons from Russia's war against Ukraine.**
- **Russian authorities recently detained former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, likely as part of the Kremlin efforts to scapegoat Kursk Oblast officials for their failure in responding to Ukraine's August 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast.**
- **Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces recently executed at least one unarmed Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) near Rozdolne (northeast of Velyka Novosilka).**
- **Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka.**

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We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

Ukraine and Russia have not yet concluded a maritime ceasefire agreement due to ongoing Russian demands for Western sanctions relief. Negotiations regarding the conditions of the ceasefire on strikes against energy infrastructure are ongoing, and the resolution of these negotiations remains unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed without evidence on April 16 that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk oblasts and occupied Kherson Oblast six times over the past day.^[20]

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 16 that the Kremlin is not ready to announce the exact time when the 30-day energy infrastructure strike ceasefire will end.^[21] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 16 that Russia may resume strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities on April 19.^[22] ISW continues to assess that the details of the strikes ceasefire — including its end date — remain unclear given the lack of publicly available agreement texts.^[23] Russia may intensify its long-range strikes against Ukraine when Russia recognizes the end of the ceasefire.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation


Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of their limited remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 16 but did not advance.

Fighting continued near Gornal and Oleshnya (both southwest of Sudzha) and on the territory of St. Nicholas Monastery (northeast of Gornal).^[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.^[25] Elements of the Russian 89th Guards Engineering Regiment, BARS-Kursk (Russian Combat Army Reserves), and 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.^[26]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 16, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 16 that Russian forces cleared Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).^[27]

Fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka.^[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Popovka and Demidovka and attempted to attack across the international border near Marine (south of Demidovka in Sumy Oblast).^[29]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka.^[30]

Ukrainian forces struck the base of a Russian missile brigade in Ivanovo Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 16 indicates that Ukrainian drones struck the Russian 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) in Shuya, Ivanovo Oblast.^[31] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck near the base of the 112th Missile Brigade.^[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces destroyed seven drones over Ivanovo Oblast, and the Ivanovo Oblast operational headquarters claimed that Russian forces repelled a drone strike in Shuya.^[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Vodolahy, Bilovody, and Loknya and that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Sumy City near Zhuravka and Basivka.[34]

Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on April 15 that Russian forces are striking border areas in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts with drones but previously struck these areas with artillery.[35] Demchenko reported that Russian forces frequently attack and conduct guided glide bomb strikes in the Sumy-Kursk Oblast border area.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 16.


Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 16 that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction but that Russian forces are rotating troops and preparing to resume assaults.[36]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border).[38]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups daily and are conducting large assaults with infantry fighting vehicles and tanks two to three times per week.[39] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces began using armored vehicles after reinforcements arrived at the frontline. The spokesperson of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian aviation has been "extremely active" in the area and that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes against Kupyansk and

nearby

areas.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[41]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[42]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and Hrekivka and toward Olhiivka and Novoserhiivka on April 15 and 16.[43]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Svatove (east of Borova in the Russian rear).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman) and south of Nove (southwest of Novomykhailivka).[45] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have almost completely pushed Ukrainian forces out of Novomykhailivka.[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Nove, and Zelena Dolyna and southeast of Lyman in the Serebrianske forest area on April 15 and 16.[47]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces are attacking in small groups.[48]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[49]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 16 but did not advance.


Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka and Vyimka on April 15 and 16.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself, south of Chasiv Yar toward Stupochky and Predtechyne, and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka on April 15 and 16.[51] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction reported on April 15 that Russian forces conducted an at least reinforced company-sized mechanized assault in the area - likely in reference to the unsuccessful Russian mechanized assault consisting of 13 armored vehicles toward Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and Klishchiivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar) on April 12.[52] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces conducted the assault in five waves - four in the morning and one in the evening - and that Ukrainian forces destroyed nine armored vehicles and damaged four.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 15 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway west of Oleksandropil (southwest of Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk).^[53]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Oleksandropil and entered Sukha Balka (north of Oleksandropil) from the southwest.^[54]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; north of Toretsk near Krymske; west of Toretsk near Leonidivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Oleksandropil, and Valentynivka on April 15 and 16.[55]

Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that most Russian assaults in the Toretsk direction are occurring in central and southern Toretsk and toward Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Oleksandropil.[57] Drone operators of the 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[58] Elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[59]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 15 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southeastern Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).^[60]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Zelene Pole (east of Pokrovsk).^[61]


Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Zelene Pole, Kalynove, and Vodanye Druhe and toward Stara Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Novooleksandrivka;

northwest of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove and Udachne on April 15 and 16.^[62] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian force seized Kalynove, but ISW assesses that Russian forces seized the settlement as of April 12.^[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian “Vanya Ivanov” Group are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.^[64] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including its 33rd, 242nd, and 255th motorized rifle regiments, are reportedly operating near Tarasivka (east of Pokrovsk) and Kalynove.^[65] Drone operators of the “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).^[66] Drone operators of the 80th “Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk).^[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced within Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).^[68]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and toward Novoserhiivka, east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka and Troitske, and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 16.^[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations the Kurakhove direction on April 16 but did not make confirmed advances

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and near Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[70]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Andriivka, and Bahatyr and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv and toward Odradne on April 15 and 16.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Dniproenerhiya (north of Velyka Novosilka) and in northeastern Vesele (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: [73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Shevchenko (northwest of Velyka Novosilka).[74]


Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya and northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Fedorivka, Vesele, Burlatske, Vilne Pole, and Shevchenko on April 15 and 16.[75]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 16 that Ukrainian forces previously advanced in the northern outskirts of Dniproenerhiya but that Russian forces occupy all of the settlement.[76] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that there is no confirmation that Ukrainian forces seized Dniproenerhiya.[77] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev stated on April 15 that Ukrainian forces have "regained control" of Dniproenerhiya at an unspecified time in the past two months.[78]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 16, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) seized Mali Shcherbaky (southwest of Orikhiv).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv near Kamianske and Lobkove, and in Stepove on April 15 and 16.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 16 that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack Russian positions near Lobkove.[81]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 15 that Ukrainian forces still hold southwestern and northern Shcherbakiv (southwest of Orikhiv).[82] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also maintain positions in northern, western, and eastern Stepove. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces occupy southern and central Lobkove but that the northern part of the settlement is a contested "gray zone."

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[83]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on April 16 but did not advance.[84]



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chada, Crimea; and Kursk and Bryansk cities.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 57 drones in eastern, northern, central, and southern Ukraine and that 34 drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that drones struck Sumy, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Poltava oblasts.[86]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is suspending occupation coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Occupation Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other

geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

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- [1] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-EpOMoo5EY> ; [https://kyivindependent dot com/economic-partnership-with-us-could-spur-russia-to-end-war-white-house-says/](https://kyivindependent.com/economic-partnership-with-us-could-spur-russia-to-end-war-white-house-says/) ; <https://suspilne dot media/995761-u-bilomu-domi-vvazaut-so-rf-hoce-zakinciti-vijnu-proti-ukraini/>
- [2] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025>
- [3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-18-2025> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040425>
- [4] <https://lenta dot ru/news/2025/04/16/v-kremle-napomnili-o-zaprete-kieva-na-peregovory/> ; <https://tass dot u/politika/23697857>
- [5] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024> ; <https://www.president dot gov.ua/ua/documents/constitution/konstituciya-ukrayini-rozdil-v> ; <https://unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/ukraine/ukr.constitution.e.pdf>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-april-15-2025>
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