



Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment

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April 21, 2025, 6 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11am ET on April 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Correction: This article was corrected on April 22, 2025 to change "battalion" to "brigade" in "elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Battalion...". We apologize for the error.

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff's 0800 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on the previous day to 0800 on the current day, the 1600 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600, and the 2200 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200. Any reports of Russian ground activity in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 20, 2200 SITREP are by default an accusation of Russia's 30-hour unilateral Easter truce that started at 1800 Moscow time on April 19. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in the Ukrainian General Staff's April 21, 0800 SITREP occurred after the end of the truce.]

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine. Zelensky stated on April 20 that Ukraine and Russia achieved a long-range strikes ceasefire between April 19 and 20 and during the day on April 20 and proposed a temporary ceasefire on long-range missile and drone strikes against civilian infrastructure for a minimum of 30 days, with the opportunity to extend the ceasefire beyond 30 days.[1] Putin announced the end of the Easter truce on April 21 and rejected Zelensky's proposed temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure while speaking to journalists, stating that Russia would need to "sort out" the proposed civilian infrastructure strikes moratorium.[2] Putin attempted to soften his rejection of Zelensky's ceasefire proposal by claiming that Russia and other unspecified actors need to study strikes against civilian targets where military personnel are operating and "make appropriate decisions." Putin did not suggest the possibility of creating independent monitoring mechanisms to determine the legitimacy of such strikes, and Russian officials have previously expressed disinterest in Western-led monitoring mechanisms as a condition of future ceasefires in Ukraine.[3] Putin also attempted to justify Russia's recent missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and to obfuscate his ongoing rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals. Putin acknowledged that Russian forces recently struck civilian infrastructure in Sumy City — likely referring to the April 13 Russian missile strike against Sumy City

— but suggested that the reported presence of Ukrainian military personnel in Sumy City constituted a legitimate military target.[4] Putin claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian military personnel during a recent Russian strike against Odesa City.


Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered.

Zelensky reiterated on April 20 Ukraine's readiness to agree to a full and unconditional ceasefire for a minimum of 30 days.[5] Putin rejected the full ceasefire proposal on April 21, claiming that Ukraine was attempting to "seize the initiative and talk about expan[ding]" the ceasefire, and alleging that Russia would need to "carefully evaluate everything." [6] Ukraine and the United States initially proposed a full ceasefire on March 13, and Putin and other Russian officials have repeatedly rejected the proposal over the past five weeks.[7] The US Department of State told *Reuters* on April 20 that the United States would welcome the extension of the Easter truce, however.[8] US President Donald Trump expressed hope on April 20 that Russia and Ukraine would make a deal this week, possibly referring to a general ceasefire agreement that would precede future peace negotiations.[9] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov appeared to respond to Trump's statement by stating that the Kremlin is not ready to discuss a time frame to end the war.[10] Putin's continued rejection of the US-Ukrainian March 2025 proposed general ceasefire and the Kremlin's refusal to commit to any time frame to end the war highlight Putin's disinterest in ending the war via peace negotiations in the near term.[11] Putin's continued rejection of US and Ukrainian ceasefire proposals runs counter to Trump's stated approach of first establishing a ceasefire and then negotiating a broader peace agreement and to Trump's goal of achieving a lasting peace in Ukraine.

Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim.

Saldo stated on April 21 to Kremlin newswire *TASS* that the "return" of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River is "fundamentally important" and an "absolute priority" for Russia.[12] Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces will continue efforts to use the east (left) bank of the river as a "lever of pressure" against Russia and that the presence of Ukrainian forces on the west bank hinders the resumption of shipping along the river. Saldo concluded that "the segment of the [Dnipro River] that passes through Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts must be completely under [Russian] control" so as to guarantee the development of infrastructure "associated with the river." Russian forces only currently occupy positions on the east bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has consistently demanded since June 2024 that Ukraine cede all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to Russia.[13] Saldo appears to be calling for additional Russian territorial claims along the river in central Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — an oblast that Russia has not formally claimed or illegally annexed. It is unclear how much territory along the banks of the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Saldo is claiming must be under Russian control or if Saldo is implying that Russian forces must occupy extensive territory east and northeast of the river such that Russia "completely control" the river and its immediate surrounding areas. Russian forces may want to control a minimum 25 kilometers of territory on both banks of the Dnipro River so as to prevent Ukrainian forces from conducting tube artillery strikes against the area.

Russian Occupation Official Vladimir Saldo Demanded Russian Control Over Territory Around the Dnipro River on April 21, 2025



Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own. Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are notably included in the amorphous, invented region of "Novorossiia" that Kremlin officials often claim is "integral" to Russia and invoke to make additional territorial claims in southern Ukraine.^[14] Putin invoked the term "Novorossiia" on April 21 at the "Service" All-Russian Municipal Award Ceremony, claiming that municipal workers are working in very difficult conditions "in the regions of Donbas and Novorossiia."^[15] Putin has previously instructed Russian forces to create "buffer zones" in areas of Ukraine to which Russia has not formally laid claim, including in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.^[16] Saldo's call for Russian control of areas in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts along the Dnipro River to "guarantee the development of infrastructure" would be consistent with Putin's previous objectives concerning the creation of "buffer zones."




Kremlin officials continued to reiterate Russia's pre-war demands on April 21. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 21 that Ukraine's potential membership in NATO would threaten Russia's national interests and that this is one of the "root causes" of the war.^[17] Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that any peace settlement in Ukraine needs to eliminate the "root causes" of the war, including NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward.^[18] Saldo's and Peskov's statements demonstrate how Russian officials continue to claim that Russia's pre-war demands are non-negotiable while also making increasingly extensive territorial demands of Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's April 20 proposal for a temporary moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure, declined Zelensky's offer to extend Putin's own 30-hour Easter truce, and attempted to justify recent Russian strikes against civilian targets in Ukraine.**
- **Putin reiterated his rejection of the full ceasefire that Zelensky and the US have offered.**
- **Russian state media amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's calls for additional territorial concessions from Ukraine in areas to which Russia has not yet laid formal claim.**
- **Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial claims along the Dnipro River is consistent with other Kremlin official statements, as Russia continues to make extensive territorial demands of Ukraine while offering no concessions of its own.**

- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Toretsk.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation

- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Russian Technological Adaptations
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

See topline and axis sections for reports of Easter truce violations.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fighting continued in border areas of Kursk Oblast on April 21, and Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of violating the Easter truce on April 20.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from all settlements in Kursk Oblast that Ukrainian forces previously occupied except Gornal (south of Sudzha).[19]

Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting continues southwest of Sudzha near Oleshnya and south of Sudzha near Gornal.[20]


The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce by attacking near Oleshnya on April 20.[21] Russian sources claimed on April 20 that elements of the Chechen "Kashtana" and "Pitersky" Akhmat Spetsnaz detachments and the Russian 15th Tank Brigade (subordination unclear, possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) recently repelled a Ukrainian attack near Goptarovka (southeast of Sudzha along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast administrative boundary) on April 20 in violation of the Easter truce.[22]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly continuing to operate in Kursk Oblast.[[23](#)] Elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Oleshnya.[[24](#)] Elements of the Russian 11th VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Gornal, and elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are operating near Guyevo (northeast of Gornal).[[25](#)]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 21 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone launch site near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (west of Sudzha) on April 29 and wounded and killed up to 20 drone operators.[[26](#)]

Fighting continued in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on April 21, and a Russian source accused Ukrainian forces of violating the Easter truce on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction April 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced south of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).^[27]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka on April 21.^[28]


A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked toward Popovka and Demidovka on April 20 in violation of the Easter truce.^[29]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Popovka.[30]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

A Ukrainian official accused Russia of violating the Easter truce in the area on April 20, amid continued Russian attacks in northern Sumy Oblast on April 21.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukraine's State Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated on April 21 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups consisting of roughly 15 personnel are attempting to advance across the international border in Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.^[31] Demchenko stated that Russian forces are attacking near Basivka, Novenke, and Zhuravka (all northeast of Sumy City) and that Russian forces occasionally use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to advance as rapidly and deeply as possible to secure a foothold while waiting for reinforcements.

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces continued attacking in unspecified areas in Sumy Oblast.^[32]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guard unit stated on April 21 that Russian forces violated the truce by conducting a drone strike on Semenivka (northwest of Sumy City) on April 20.[33]

Russian	Main	Effort	–	Eastern	Ukraine
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)


A Ukrainian official accused Russia on April 21 of violating the Easter truce in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 20.

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battery operating in the Vovchansk direction (northeast of Kharkiv City) stated on the morning of April 21 that Russian forces conducted drone strikes and mortar fire in the area within the past day.[34] The commander reported that Russian forces in the area primarily used the Easter truce to strengthen positions, rotate personnel, and prepare for assault operations. The commander stated that Russian forces have started conducting mechanized assaults with armored vehicles supported by 10 to 20 motorcycles in the Vovchansk direction.

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces conducted "large-scale" military operations in the Kharkiv direction during the truce on April 20 but that fighting continued after the truce ended at 0000 April 21.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating the Easter truce in the Kupyansk direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.



Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces occupy northwestern Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), but this advance likely did not occur within the last 24 hours.[36]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and north of Kupyansk near Holubivka, but it is unclear if some attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[37]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Holubivka on April 20.[38] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on April 21 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to cross the Oskil River on the afternoon of April 20 in violation of the Easter truce.[39]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on April 21 that Russian forces are constantly conducting assaults in small groups near Dvorichna (northeast of Kupyansk) and have one of their main force concentration in the area.[40] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions stated on April 20 that Russian forces cannot carry out "massive assaults" in the area and are attacking in small groups of two to three infantry.[41] The Ukrainian brigade reported that Russian forces are using terrain features in other sectors of Kupyansk and Lyman directions to dig in near trees.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[42]

Ukrainian sources accused Russian forces of violating the Easter truce in the Borova direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Makiivka (southeast of Borova) and advanced southwest of Lovoza (northeast of Borova).[43]


The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on April 21.[44]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya, but it is unclear if some attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[45]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Nadiya on April 20.[46]

Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman as Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Lyman direction on April 20.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[47]



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces entered Ridkodub (northeast of Lyman).[48] Another milblogger claimed on April 20 that Russian forces advanced southwest of Nove (southeast of Ridkodub) and north of Novomykhailivka (east of Ridkodub), but it is unclear if Russian forces made this alleged advance during the Easter truce.[49]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Lyman near Nove, Novomykhailivka, Myrne, and Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske on April

21.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Nove.[51]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Myrne, Katerynivka, Nove, and Yampolivka, but it is unclear if some attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[52]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the Easter truce by attacking near Myrne, Katerynivka, Nove, and Yampolivka on April 20.[53]


Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces conducted drone and artillery strikes against the areas near Kolodyazi, Yampolivka, Terny (northeast of Lyman), and Kreminna (east of Lyman in the Russian forces' rear) in violation of the Easter truce.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub, and artillery elements of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating near the Serebryanske forest area (east of Lyman).[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other on April 21 of violating the Easter truce in the Siversk direction on April 20.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast April 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 20 and 21, but it is unclear if the attacks occurred on April 20 or 21.^[56] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 21 that Russian forces attacked the same settlements, but it is unclear if the attacks occurred on April 20 or 21.^[57]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 20.^[58]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces violated the truce by attacking near Bilohorivka on April 20.[59]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on April 20 that the Siversk direction remains tense and that Russian forces are frequently conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes and motorcycle assaults.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 20 and both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other on April 21 of violating the Easter truce in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 20.

Russian forces attacked north of Chasiv Yar near Markove on April 21.[61]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora, but it is unclear if some attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[62]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on April 20.[63]


Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces violated the truce by shelling Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline) and conducting drone and artillery strikes in Chasiv Yar.[64]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 21 that the most active area in Chasiv Yar remains the Pivnichnyi and Novopivichnyi raions as well as the central part of the settlement.[65] Mashovets noted that Russian forces continue attempts to bypass the city by attacking near Stupochky and north along Markove-Maiske line in an effort to envelop Ukrainian positions in Chasiv Yar. Mashovets stated that Chasiv Yar has become a contested "gray" zone.[66]

A Russian milblogger complained on April 20 that Ukrainian forces operating in the Chasiv Yar direction possess superior drone capabilities.^[67]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported on April 21 that elements of the Russian 217th, 299th, and 331st airborne (VDV) regiments (all 98th VDV Division), elements of the 4th, 85th, and 88th motorized rifle brigades (all of the 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), and elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.^[68] Mashovets reported that irregular elements of the "Veterany" Assault Brigade and 88th "Hispaniola" Volunteer Brigade (both of the Russian Volunteer Corps) and elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 7th Military Base (49th CAA, SMD), and Chechen 204th "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Regiment are also operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction as both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce on April 20.



Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 19 and 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into the southwestern outskirts of Toretzsk and eastern Dachne (north of Toretzsk), respectively.[69]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced further into central Dachne, in the fields east of Dachne, near Krymske (north of Toretzsk), and near Sukha Balka (south of Toretzsk).[70] Another Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that elements of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) seized Sukha Balka.[71]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dachne, Dyliivka, and Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka; and south of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on April 21.[72]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Druzhba; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka, but it is unclear if some of the attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[73]


The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Druzhba, and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka.[74]

Russian sources claimed on April 20 and 21 that Ukrainian forces violated the truce by attacking near Sukha Balka.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment and 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly operating near Toretsk, Leonidivka, Niu York (south of Toretsk), and Sukha Balka, and elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Dachne and near Dyliivka (north of Toretsk).[76] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD), drone operators of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC]), 381st Artillery Regiment, and 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both 150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Ivanopillya (northwest near Toretsk).[77]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Pokrovsk direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction April 21, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Pokrovsk along the T-0406 Pokrovsk-Udachne highway before the start of the Easter truce.^[78] The milblogger also claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced to central Myrolyubivka, northeast of Kalynove (both east of Pokrovsk), north and northeast of Lysivka (southeast of Pokrovsk), and northeast of Kotlyne, and seized Zvirove (both southwest of Pokrovsk).^[79]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Yelyzavetivka and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne on April 21.^[80] Russian sources claimed that fighting continued south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko and that

Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Myrolyubivka.[81]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP and Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces attacked east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka, Novotoretske, and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne, but it is unclear if some of these attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[82]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Yelyzavetivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 20.[83] Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces violated the truce in several areas of the Pokrovsk direction on the morning of April 20 by attacking in small infantry groups of two to three personnel with light vehicles and motorcycle support.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued assaults aimed at pushing Ukrainian forces from Zvirove throughout the truce.[85]

Russian sources claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce in the Pokrovsk direction by counterattacking east of Pokrovsk near Tarasivka and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Leontovychi (former Pershe Travnja), and conducting drone strikes and shelling on April 20.[86]

A servicemember in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces have exhausted heavy vehicle reserves in this direction, which has caused Russia's recently observed intensified use of buggies and motorcycles.[87]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Udachne.[88] Elements of the 3rd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in Zvirove.[89]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Novopavlivka direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Preobrazhenka (east of Novopavlivka) and advanced southeast of Novopavlivka to central Horikhove, south of Troitske, and west and southwest of Bohdanivka.[90]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP and Russian sources reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka, Novooleksandrivka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove and Troitske.[91]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP and Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and east of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Preobrazhenka, but it is unclear if some attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[92]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and east of Novopavlivka near Novooleksandrivka and Preobrazhenka on April 20.[93]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 20 that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce in the Novopavlivka direction by conducting drone strikes and shelling Russian positions near Uspenivka.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD), including its 6th and 80th regiments, are reportedly operating near Troitske.[95] Elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Uspenivka.[96]

Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the Kurakhove direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.

Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 21 that Russian forces advanced west of Kostyantynopil.[97]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on April 21.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 21 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and that Russian forces resumed offensive operations toward Bahatyr and Odradne (southwest of Bahatyr) in the morning.[99]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynopil and toward Odradne, but it is unclear if some of these attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[100]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Kostyantynopil and toward Odradne on April 20.[101]

Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Ukrainian forces violated the Easter truce by attacking near Bahatyr.[102]

The Ukrainian General Staff accused Russian forces of violating the Easter truce in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 20 amid continued fighting in the area on April 21.

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on April 21.[103]


The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne, but it is unclear if some of these attacks occurred on April 20 during the Easter truce.[104]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Skudne on April 20.[105]

Russian forces may be expanding their field fortifications in occupied Donetsk Oblast north of occupied Mariupol. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on April 21 that Russian forces are fortifying their positions northwest of Mariupol Raion in Mykilska Hromada.[106] Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces are moving engineering assets and fortification building materials and preparing not only for an offensive but also for a defensive.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 21, and Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the area on April 20.



The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove on April 21.^[107] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 21 that Russian forces continued fighting southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Lobkove and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka.^[108]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 0800 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Mala Tokmachka, but it is unclear if some of the attacks occurred on


April 20 during the Easter truce.^[109]

The Ukrainian General Staff's April 20 2200 SITREP implied that Russian forces violated the truce by attacking near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Mala Tokmachka on April 20.^[110]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on April 21 that Russian forces conducted significantly fewer artillery and drone strikes than usual from April 20 to 21 in the Orikhiv direction and that Russian forces used the Easter truce to regroup, evacuate wounded personnel, restore their positions and barriers, and conduct reconnaissance to prepare for future assaults.^[111] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on April 21 that Russian forces are fortifying their positions and moving manpower and ammunition from occupied Crimea through Prymorsk toward Tokmak and Polohy (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City).^[112] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 21 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Garmon-M radar station in an unspecified area of Zaporizhia Oblast.^[113]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.^[114]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dnipro direction on April 21, and Russian and Ukrainian sources accused each other of violating the Easter truce in the



The Ukrainian General Staff's April 21 1600 SITREP reported that Russian forces attacked in the Dnipro direction on April 21.[115]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin implied that Russian forces violated the truce by striking Kherson Oblast between 0600 April 20 and 0600 April 21.[116]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 and 21 that Ukrainian forces violated the truce by conducting artillery and drone strikes in the Kherson direction and by infiltrating unspecified areas of Oleshky (southeast of Kherson) on April 20.[117]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 20 and 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Onyx anti-ship cruise missile from occupied Crimea towards Kherson Oblast, two Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea towards Mykolaiv Oblast, and 96 Shahed and decoy drones from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[118] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 42 drones over Ukraine and that 47 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes affected Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Cherkasy oblasts.[119]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

ISW is suspending Russian technological adaptations coverage in its daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments. ISW is introducing a new product line tracking Russian mobilization, force generation efforts, and technological adaptations. Click [here](#) to read the Russian Force Generation and Adaptations Update.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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