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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45 pm ET on April 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine. *The Telegraph* and *Axios* reported on April 22 and 23 that sources familiar with the matter stated that the United States presented Ukraine with a proposal to end the war during the April 17 meeting in Paris and that the United States expected that the April 23 multilateral talks in London would discuss the proposal.[1] There have been no official statements about the reported US proposal. *The Telegraph* reported that the document contains seven points about an immediate ceasefire, Ukrainian-Russian talks, Ukraine's inability to join NATO, territory, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the US-Ukrainian mineral deal, and US-Russian relations.[2] *Axios* and *The Telegraph* reported that the plan calls for the United States to "de jure" recognize Russian control of Crimea and "de facto" recognize Russia's occupation of most of the areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts that Russian forces currently occupy.[3] Russia would also reportedly have to withdraw from the parts of Kharkiv Oblast that Russian forces currently occupy. *Axios* stated that the plan would grant Ukraine "unimpeded passage" along the Dnipro River, with *The Telegraph* reporting that Ukraine would gain "unhindered access to the mouth" of the river. *The Telegraph* noted that the proposal states that Russian forces would withdraw from another unspecified area of Kherson Oblast.[4] The proposal calls for the ZNPP, which Russian forces currently occupy, to be "considered as Ukrainian territory" but under US operation.[5] The US-operated ZNPP would reportedly supply both Ukraine and Russia with electricity. The US proposal reportedly states that the United States would promise that Ukraine would not become a member of NATO, while Ukraine could still join the European Union (EU). The proposal would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" involving a group of European states and possibly non-European states, but the document does not offer details about how this "peacekeeping operation" would operate, nor mention US participation in this peacekeeping force. The United States would also reportedly lift all US sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014 and would enhance US-Russian economic cooperation, especially in the energy and industrial sectors. The proposal reportedly calls for Ukraine to receive compensation and assistance for reconstruction from an unspecified funding source.

The reported US proposal suggests that the Trump administration is seeking to simultaneously achieve a full ceasefire in Ukraine, conclude a peace settlement to end the war, and develop US-Russian economic relations – a sharp contrast to the timeline of events that the administration has called for in recent weeks. The White House stated on March 25 that Trump's "imperative that the killing on both sides of the [war] must stop" is a "necessary step toward achieving an enduring peace settlement" – demonstrating how the Trump administration viewed a full ceasefire as the first step toward securing a peace settlement.[6] Ukraine agreed to the March 18 US-proposed full ceasefire along the frontline and agreed to the US-supported extension of the unilateral Russian Easter truce on April 21 – in sharp contrast to Russia, which refused to accept or extend these US-proposed and US-supported ceasefires.[7] The White House also stated on April 15 that the United States "needs to see a ceasefire first" before developing US-Russian economic partnerships, and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio reportedly stated in February 2025 that US sanctions on Russia would remain in place until Russia and Ukraine had reached a peace deal to end the war – in contrast to the reported US proposal that would simultaneously put a ceasefire in place in Ukraine, lift US sanctions against Russia, and develop US-Russian economic cooperation.[8]

Significant details about the territorial swaps in the US proposal are unclear from the available reporting. Russian forces currently occupy a small part of Mykolaiv Oblast – the Kinburn Spit – and recently began conducting offensive operations into northern Sumy Oblast – two oblasts which the available reporting about the US proposal does not address.[9] It is unclear whether Ukraine would gain access only to the mouth of the Dnipro River or a wider littoral area along the river's left bank given differences between reporting from *Axios* and *The Telegraph*. Details about the extent of the territory near the ZNPP on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River that would be considered Ukrainian are also unspecified, but Russian forces would have to withdraw from some territory in the area according to the US plan as Russian forces currently occupy significant portions of Zaporizhia Oblast behind the Dnipro River's east bank. The Dnipro River would nevertheless present itself as a significant barrier between the Ukrainian-controlled and US-operated ZNPP from the rest of the territory under Ukraine's control under the reported US plan, assuming Russian forces do not withdraw from territory around the Kakhovka Reservoir to permit a land bridge from Ukrainian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast to the ZNPP. The location of such a strategically important facility close to the frozen frontline would greatly complicate Ukraine's ability to defend the ZNPP due to the lack of defensive depth.[10] ISW previously conducted a terrain study and assessed that freezing the Russian war in Ukraine on anything like the current lines – particularly those in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts – enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring, let alone defeating, a future Russian operations against war against Ukraine.[11]

Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace. Zelensky recalled on April 22 that Ukraine supported and continues to support Trump's March 18 unconditional ceasefire proposal.[12] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold discussions "in any format" after the implementation of a ceasefire.[13] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov similarly stated on April 23 that the Ukrainian delegation in London discussed ways to achieve a full and unconditional ceasefire as a "first step" toward a peace settlement and that Ukraine is committed to Trump's peace efforts.[14]

Ukrainian Economic Minister Yulia Svyrydenko stated on April 23 that Ukraine is ready to negotiate and that a full ground, air, and sea ceasefire is a necessary first step toward peace.[15]

Zelensky stated on April 22 that Ukraine does not legally recognize Russia's occupation of Crimea in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution, which ensures Ukraine's territorial integrity and recognizes the Autonomous Republic of Crimea as part of Ukraine.[16] Svyrydenko also noted that Ukraine cannot agree to a settlement that grants Russia a "stronger foundation" to regroup and renew its aggression in the future. ISW continues to assess that freezing the front along the current lines enormously advantages Russia and increases the risks and costs to Ukraine and the West of deterring and defeating future Russian aggression.[17] Russia's occupation of Crimea and Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts will continue to threaten Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa cities, the Ukrainian southwestern coast, and Ukrainian ships attempting to transit the western Black Sea.

Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan. Russian Federation Council Chairperson Valentina Matvienko stated on April 23 that Russia will "never participate" in any negotiations that discuss the possible deployment of European troops to Ukraine and that such a deployment is "unacceptable" to Russia, regardless of whether the peacekeeping forces deploy under the NATO framework or another "flag." [18] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov gave an interview to French news magazine *Le Point* published on April 23 and similarly rejected the prospect of European peacekeepers in Ukraine.[19] Peskov stated that Russia rejected the full ceasefire that Trump previously proposed because the ceasefire failed to meet all of Russia's demands, including that Ukraine cede all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts — all of which Russia has illegally declared annexed. Peskov claimed that the entirety of these four oblasts were "enshrined in our [Russian] Constitution as an integral part of Russia" and that the "war will end immediately" if Ukraine withdraws from these oblasts. Russian state-run and pro-Kremlin media outlets amplified Peskov's statements, as well as statements from other pro-Kremlin mouthpieces calling on Russia to refuse to give up any part of the four Ukrainian oblasts included in the Russian Constitution — in violation of international law and numerous treaties Russia previously signed with Ukraine.[20]

Russian officials continue to give no indication that the Kremlin is willing to make any concessions of its own. Peskov has reiterated multiple times in the past weeks — including on April 23 — that details about peace proposals should not be publicly available, likely as part of efforts to keep the precise terms obfuscated in hopes of further delaying negotiations and extracting concessions.[21] Russian officials have reiterated the Kremlin's demands in recent weeks, including Russia's rejection of European peacekeepers deploying to Ukraine, refusal to withdraw from any parts of occupied Ukraine, and territorial claims over areas of Ukraine that Russia does not currently occupy.[22] Russian state media recently amplified Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo's call for additional Russian territorial control along the Dnipro River in Kherson, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts — including areas that Russian forces would have to withdraw from under the reported US proposal.[23]

Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level. The UK Foreign Office announced on April 23 that the ministerial meeting was postponed for unspecified reasons but that "official level talks" would continue.[24] UK outlet *SkyNews* reported that the multilateral talks continued among

senior officials but "at a much lower level" than planned.[25] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov reported that he, Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Andriy Yermak, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha met with UK Foreign Minister David Lammy and UK Defense Minister John Healey in London about Ukrainian defensive capabilities and held a separate meeting with US Special Envoy to Ukraine Keith Kellogg on possible scenarios to end the war.[26] The Ukrainian delegation also met with UK National Security Advisor Jonathan Powell, French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonn, and German Chancellor's Advisor for Foreign and Security Policy Jens Plotner, and Umerov and Yermak reaffirmed Ukraine's commitment to a just and lasting peace, including to US President Donald Trump's peace initiative.[27] Yermak stated that the April 23 meeting was a "first step" towards a full settlement process.[28]

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff originally planned to attend the April 23 talks in London but pulled out no later than April 22.[29] The *Washington Post* reported on April 23, citing a diplomat familiar with the talks, that European diplomats cancelled the foreign ministerial meeting after Rubio pulled out of the meeting.[30] A US official and two European diplomats familiar with the matter told *CNN* on April 23 that Rubio did not attend the London talks because the Trump administration did not believe talks were "at a decisive point." [31] A US official told *Axios* that "the decision was made" for Rubio to not travel to London after the United States observed indications that Ukrainian officials wanted to discuss a 30-day temporary ceasefire, as the Trump administration initially proposed in March 2025, rather than the most recent US proposal for an immediate and decisive settlement.[32]

The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 22 that legal consultations between the US and Ukraine regarding the mineral deal are underway, though the date for signing the deal remains "unclear." [33] US President Donald Trump told reporters on April 17 that the mineral deal could be signed as early as April 24.[34] Ukrainian officials announced on April 17 that the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum of intent outlining steps toward completing the bilateral mineral deal, but the document did not include a specific signing date.[35]


Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones. Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who often reports on successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory, stated on April 23 that it was "loud" at the Alabuga SEZ and implied that there were "somewhat successful" strikes in the area.[36] Kovalenko noted that Russia produced over 6,000 Shahed drones and thousands of decoy drones at the Alabuga SEZ in 2024 and that Russia ordered the Alabuga SEZ to produce 8,000 to 10,000 Shaheds and 15,000 decoy drones in 2025.[37] Russian sources published footage purportedly showing a fire in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, near the Alabuga SEZ and showing Russian air defenses attempting to down drones in the area.[38] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated that five Ukrainian drones with 250-kilogram warheads struck the facility and that Russian forces only downed one drone.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 23 that Russian forces shot down a drone over the Republic of Tatarstan.[40] ISW recently assessed that Russia is likely increasingly adapting its drones to overcome Ukraine's mobile fire groups that have proven successful at downing Shahed drones.[41]

Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. Ukrainian Deputy Head of the Main Department of Anti-Mine Action, Civil Protection, and Environmental Safety Colonel Valeriy Veber reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces recorded 767 cases of Russian forces using chemical weapons in March 2025 and 7,730 cases since February 2023.[42] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 14 that Russian forces are dropping RG-Vo hand grenades with a type of riot control agent (RCA) onto Ukrainian positions near Shcherbaky in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[43] Russian sources openly acknowledged that Russian forces were dropping RG-Vo grenades containing tear gas from drones as early as December 2023.[44] Ukrainian military officials also reported on April 16 and 17 that they identified a capsule with concentrated chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) gas, a type of RCA banned under the CWC, on Russian Shahed drones and that Russia may be using these drones to disperse poisonous substances among the civilian population.[45]

Key Takeaways:

- **The United States reportedly recently presented Ukraine with a seven-point proposal to end the war in Ukraine in which the United States would recognize Crimea as part of Russia and allow Russian forces to continue to occupy significant parts of southern and eastern Ukraine. Available reporting about the contents of the US proposal suggests that it marks a sudden and substantial change in the Trump administration's strategy for ending the war in Ukraine.**
- **Ukrainian officials reiterated Ukraine's continued commitment to the United States' March 2025 proposal for a full ceasefire as part of efforts to achieve a lasting peace.**
- **Russian officials rejected aspects of Trump's reported peace plan.**
- **Senior US, Ukrainian, and European officials held bilateral and multilateral talks about support for Ukraine and ending the war in London on April 23, but officials cancelled the scheduled multilateral talks at the foreign minister level.**
- **The US and Ukraine continue to take steps toward signing a joint mineral deal.**
- **Ukrainian forces likely conducted a drone strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan, where Russia assembles Iranian-provided Shahed drones.**
- **Russia continues to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian forces and civilians in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.**
- **Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast and near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Russo-Ukrainian War April 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis

- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are currently no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces recently advanced near the international border in Kursk Oblast as part of efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 22 shows Russian forces recently advanced south of Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border).[46]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Russian forces seized the St. Nicholas Monastery southwest of Guyevo.[47] A Russian naval infantry battalion claimed that Ukrainian forces only maintain positions in Kursk Oblast in Gornal (southwest of Sudzha).[48]

Fighting continued southwest of Sudzha in Oleshnya and Gornal on April 22 and 23.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking unspecified Russian positions in Kursk Oblast.[50]

Order of Battle: A medical group and other elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast, including near Gornal.[51] Sapper elements of the Russian 92nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment (Russian Engineer Troops) are reportedly clearing mines in the border areas of Kursk Oblast.[52] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Guyevo.[53] Elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 382nd Naval Infantry Battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating near the St. Nicholas Monastery.[54]

Fighting continued in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on April 23.


Fighting continued northwest of Belgorod City near Popovka and Demidovka on April 23.[55] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Popovka and Demidovka.[56]



Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that positional battles continued in northern Sumy Oblast.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[58]



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory and Vovchansk on April 22 and 23.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Veter” detachment of the 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on April 23.

Ukrainian forces advanced in the Borova direction, but this advance did not occur recently.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Nadiya (east of Borova).[61]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Novoserhiivka, and Hrekivka on April 22 and 23.[62]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Svatove-Kreminna Direction April 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Lyman direction on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, Myrne, and Kolodyazi and toward Zelena Dolyna, Hlushchenkove, and Novyi Myr and east of Lyman near Torske on April 22 and 23.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" detachment, Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz "Shram" Group, and the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast April 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia's proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhonokamyanske on April 22 and 23.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryhorivka.[66]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 23 that Russian forces are using motorcycles in the Siversk and Lyman directions in a similar manner as in the

Pokrovsk direction. □ Trehubov stated that Russian forces use motorcycles to quickly traverse open terrain, infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines, and consolidate positions before bringing forward reinforcements. Trehubov said that Russian forces have not achieved any tactically significant battlefield successes since integrating motorcycles into combat, however.



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Chasiv Yar itself, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Bila Hora on April 22 and 23.[67]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on April 23 that Russian forces have a manpower advantage and use armored vehicles to bring infantry as close to the

frontlines as possible before dismounting and attacking on foot.[68] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using assault tactics in different sequences in an effort to achieve tactical surprise. Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kredo-M1 portable radar system in Chasiv Yar.[69]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Reconnaissance Battalion and the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[70]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Toretsk.[71]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage posted on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Sukha Balka (southwest of Toretsk).[72] Russian milbloggers credited the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) with the seizure of Sukha Balka.[73] Geolocated footage posted on April 22 and April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along a waste heap in northern Toretsk and northwest of Leonidivka (west of Toretsk).[74]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed Russian forces advanced in the fields north and northwest of Sukha Balka.[75]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself, north of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka, east of Toretsk near Druzhba and Krymske, southwest of Toretsk near Petrivka and Leonidivka, and toward Romanivka, and west of Toretsk toward Shcherbynivka on April 22 and 23.[76]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 23 that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses by quickly approaching Toretsk in armored personnel carriers and by assaulting Ukrainian positions using groups of up to 15 motorcycles.[77] The commander added that Russian forces are using tanks to transport infantry as close as possible to Ukrainian positions.[78]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [AC], SMD) recently advanced 1.5 kilometers into Dachne (north of Toretsk) on motorcycles.[79] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Druzhba (east of Toretsk).[80] Elements of the Russian 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (both of the 8th CAA) are reportedly operating near Stara Mykolaivka (southwest of Toretsk).[81]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Moskovska Street in central Tarasivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[82]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed on April 23 that Russian forces seized Tarasivka, and Russian milbloggers attributed the settlement's seizure to elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD).[83]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Pokrovsk near Berezivka, Nova Poltavka, Vodyane Druhe, and Stara Mykolaivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske, Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, Zelene Pole, Kalynove, and Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of


Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka, Shevchenko, and Vidrodzhennya (formerly Novyi Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on April 22 and 23[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC), SMD) are reportedly operating near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk in the Russian forces' rear).[85] Elements of the Russian "Vega" Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[86]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka, Novomykolaivka, and Novooleksandrivka, and toward Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Preobrazhenka, Kotlyariivka, and Nadiivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Troitske on April 22 and 23.[87]



Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[88]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Rozlyv and toward Bahatyr and Odradne (both southwest of Kurakhove).[89]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Odradne on April 22 and 23.[90] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bahatyr and Odradne.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vilne Pole (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and in central Vilne Pole.[92]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, Shevchenko, and Vilne Pole; west of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novodarivka and Rivnopil and toward Novopil on April 22 and 23.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne Pole.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zelene Pole (west of Velyka Novosilka).[95]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Pyatykhatky, Lobkove, Shcherbaky, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 22 and 23.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 23 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pyatykhatky.[97]

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems and four Russian Starlink antennas in unspecified locations in southern Ukraine in the past day.[98]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 417th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Mala Tokmachka.□ Drone operators of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment's "Shaman" drone detachment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Orikhiv, and elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 23, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on April 23.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 22 to 23 and a missile strike on April 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 134 strike and decoy drones from Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 67 drones and that 47 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones

struck industrial sites, civilian infrastructure, energy infrastructure, and commercial enterprises in Kherson, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[100] Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted a missile strike against civilian infrastructure facilities in Sumy Oblast during the day on April 23.[101]

Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office Head Spartak Borysenko reported on April 23 that Russian forces recently used modified Shahed and Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136) containing 12-channel control modules and payloads up to 90 kilograms during unspecified strikes against Kharkiv City.[102] The modified drones reportedly have increased resistance to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and carry payloads nearly double the size of the 40-kilogram Shahed drones that Russia utilized in 2022.



Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.



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