

**Christina Harward, Daria Novikov, Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, and George Barros  
with Nate Trotter and William Runkel**

**April 24, 2025, 8:40pm ET**

**Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on April 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.**

**The official Kremlin spokesperson and the Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position.** Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in an interview with French news magazine *Le Point* published on April 23 that Russia's war goals have not changed since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and that Russia will achieve these goals "peacefully or militarily." [1] Peskov claimed that Russia would restart the war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government. Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire *TASS* published on April 24 that the Kremlin is "ready for a ceasefire, a truce, and peace talks" but only if these measures take Russia's interests into account and eliminate the "initial causes" of the war. [2] Peskov defined Russia's unchanged war aims as Russian President Vladimir Putin's demands for regime change in Ukraine, the demilitarization of the Ukrainian military, and Ukraine's neutrality and Putin's claims that Ukraine cede all of Russia's illegally annexed territory in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts to Russia. [3] US President Donald Trump's reported recent seven-point proposal to end the war would notably not fulfill all of Putin's demands. [4] Shoigu's claims about the "initial causes" of the war parallel Kremlin officials' consistent demand that any future peace settlement eliminate the "root causes" of the war, which Kremlin officials have claimed are NATO's alleged violation of obligations not to expand eastward and the Ukrainian government's alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians and the Russian language, media, and culture in Ukraine. [5]

Peskov and Shoigu continued to place conditions on Russia's agreement to Trump's proposed full ceasefire that would further Putin's goal of weakening the Ukrainian military, likely to prepare for future Russian aggression. Peskov claimed that Putin supports the idea of a full ceasefire but reiterated Putin's demand that European countries stop providing Ukraine with arms as a condition to Russia's agreement. [6] Shoigu similarly claimed that a ceasefire is possible as long as it does not allow Ukrainian forces to rest and regroup. [7] Peskov and Shoigu explicitly rejected the stipulation in Trump's reported proposal to end the war that would give Ukraine "a robust security guarantee" provided by a group of European states and possibly non-European states. [8] Shoigu claimed that European peacekeepers in Ukraine could lead to a direct clash between NATO and Russia, and Peskov claimed that Russia is against the idea of European peacekeepers in Ukraine because Ukrainian authorities "do not completely

control" the Ukrainian military.[9] Peskov's false allegations about Zelensky's lack of legitimacy and the Ukrainian government's inability to control the country's military directly mirror Putin's long-standing narratives along these same lines.[10] These Kremlin narratives are part of efforts to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and to relaunch its invasion – as Peskov explicitly stated Russia would do.

Peskov and Shoigu notably gave these interviews, containing similar narratives and talking points, to a Russian and French outlet – suggesting that the Kremlin is coordinating its messaging about Russia's commitment to achieving all of its war aims now and in the future to both international audiences in Europe and at home in Russia.

**Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements.** Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu claimed in an interview to Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 24 that Europe is preparing for a potential military conflict with Russia in three to five years.[11] Shoigu claimed that European states are building up their military presence near the western borders of the Union State of Russia and Belarus and are "not showing any readiness to deescalate the situation." Shoigu claimed that the European Union (EU) is trying to transform the EU into a "military organization aimed against Russia" and criticized the EU's efforts to develop Europe's defense industrial base (DIB). Shoigu claimed that the number of NATO military contingents deployed near Russia's western borders has increased by 2.5 times in the past year. Shoigu claimed that the number of military threats against Russia is growing, particularly as the Baltic states are building military bases on their own territory, Poland is purchasing armored vehicles, and various NATO states are modernizing their air defenses and purchasing American fighter jets. Shoigu complained that Poland, Lithuania, and Estonia are increasing their annual defense spending due to an "imaginary threat from the east." Shoigu claimed that the alleged threats to the security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Russia's "closest ally" Belarus remain in place and that Russia deployed Oreshnik ballistic missiles to Belarus due to these threats. Shoigu recalled that Russia's November 2024 amendments to its nuclear doctrine allows Russia to use nuclear weapons in the event of aggression against Russia or Belarus, including aggression with the use of conventional weapons. US President Donald Trump has persistently asked European states and NATO members to increase their defense spending.[12] Lavrov's and Peskov's excoriation of European states increasing investments in their defense - as Trump has requested - is a further indicator that Moscow's demands concerning Europe's future security architecture are incompatible with Trump's objectives for a strong and self-reliant Europe that contributes more equally to Europe's collective security.

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed in an interview with French news magazine *Le Point* published on April 23 that Russia does not intend to attack anyone and that Russia did not and does not have any problems with new NATO members Finland and Sweden.[13] Peskov claimed that Finland is "little by little" building military infrastructure on its territory. Putin alleged that Russia is reacting to such moves by "taking steps to ensure its security" but "has no potential for conflict...neither in the Baltic countries nor in Finland." Peskov claimed that Russia has no territorial claims in the Baltic states, but Peskov claimed that Baltic authorities are discriminating against Russian citizens living there. Peskov proceeded to claim that Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 because Ukrainian authorities were allegedly trying to "exterminate" Russians in the country.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly claimed that Russia had no intention of invading its neighbors on the eve of Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia, and Peskov made a similar claim on the eve of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[14] Peskov is notably using Kremlin narratives about alleged discriminations against Russian speakers in Ukraine to describe the Baltic states – a thinly veiled threat given Russia repeated use of Moscow's alleged need to protect its "compatriots abroad" to justify multiple Russian invasions of nearby states.[15] European states' efforts to increase their own defenses are in line with US President Donald Trump's push for Europe to shoulder more of its own defense requirements, including by increasing how much European NATO states spend on defense annually. The European NATO states that Peskov and Shoigu highlighted in their complaints about Europe's alleged militarization – Finland, Poland, and the Baltics – are notably the most threatened due to their proximity to Russia. Helsinki, Finland; Tallinn, Estonia; and Riga, Lithuania are roughly 160 kilometers, 190 kilometers, and 215 kilometers from Russia's Leningrad and Pskov oblasts, respectively. Vilnius, Latvia and Warsaw, Poland are roughly 160 kilometers and 230 kilometers from Kaliningrad Oblast, respectively. Moscow, in contrast, is roughly 600 kilometers from the Russian-Latvian border – the closest NATO state border. Shoigu's thinly veiled nuclear threats against NATO are part of the Kremlin's broader reflexive control campaign to influence Western decision-making in Russia's favor and against Western states' own interests. Shoigu's nuclear threats are attempts to push European states to self-deter and reduce their buildups of their defenses – leaving NATO's eastern border largely undefended. These reflexive control efforts are in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2021 demand before launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine that NATO not deploy any military forces to states that became NATO members after 1997, including Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.[16]


Peskov's and Lavrov's threatening statements against NATO members Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania parallel other Kremlin officials' statements likely intended to set information conditions to support Russian efforts to seize territory in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on April 14 that it is "dangerous" when "fascists seize lands that never belonged to anyone except the Russian Empire [and] Soviet Union" and do "disgusting things there." [17] Lavrov's statement indicates that the Kremlin views independent countries once colonized by the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire as rightfully part of modern-day Russia. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev also recently threatened Finland using narratives resembling those that the Kremlin has used to justify its invasions of Ukraine.[18]

**Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025.**

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 215 drones and missiles at Ukraine, including 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Voronezh, and Kursk oblasts; 37 Kh-101 cruise missiles from airspace over Saratov Oblast; six Iskander-K cruise missiles from occupied Donetsk Oblast; 12 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea; four Kh-59/Kh-69 cruise missiles from airspace over Belgorod Oblast; and 145 Shahed and decoy drones from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 7 Iskander-M missiles, 31 Kh-101 missiles, 6 Kalibr missiles, 4 Kh-59/Kh-69 missiles, and 64 Shahed drones, and that 68 decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian President

Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia's strike series injured at least 80 Ukrainians and killed 9 people in Kyiv City alone, and damaged residential areas, energy infrastructure, and other buildings in five raions of the city.[20] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes also damaged civilian, industrial, rail, and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City, and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, and Sumy oblasts.[21]

Russian forces have adjusted their long-range strike tactics and weapons in recent weeks, likely to mitigate Ukrainian air defenses and inflict significant damage even when Ukrainian forces intercept some Russian drones and missiles.[22] Such adaptations disproportionately affect civilians, as ISW has previously noted.[23] US President Donald Trump stated in a post on Truth Social on April 24 that he is "not happy" with Russia's overnight strikes against Kyiv City, calling them "not necessary" and stating that Russia has "very bad timing." [24] Trump called on Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop such strikes and agree to his proposal to end the war.



Graphic by Daniel Mealie, Jessica Sobieski, Jennie Olmsted, Vivien Flokas, and Tetiana Trach  
© 2025 Institute for the Study of War

**Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition procurement on April 23.** Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen announced that Denmark will provide an additional 317 million Danish Kroner (approximately \$30.5 million) to Ukraine in 2025 to purchase artillery shells through Estonia.[25]

**A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an ongoing Kremlin effort to punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals that undermine Putin's power vertical.** The Tambov Garrison Military Court found Popov guilty of fraud and forgery of official documents on April 24 and sentenced Popov to five years in a low-security penal colony.[26] The Tambov Garrison Military Court also stripped Popov of his military rank and accolades and fined him 800,000 rubles (about \$9,613). Popov publicly appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on March 20, 2025, proclaiming his innocence and asking to return to military service in Ukraine in exchange for the suspension of his impending trial.[27] Putin may have first granted and later rejected Popov's appeal. Popov's lawyer, Sergey Buynovsky, reported on April 11 that Popov signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) agreeing to command a penal assault detachment fighting in Ukraine.[28] Buynovsky told Russian state media outlet *RBK* on April 24 that Russian authorities did not send Popov to the battlefield due to a "lack of vacancies" at the frontline.[29] The Kremlin relieved Popov of his command in July 2023 and later arrested him in May 2024 likely due to Popov's perceived disloyalty, attempted blackmail, and criticisms of the Russian MoD.[30] Russian ultranationalists, officials, and officers have been demanding Popov's release and return to the frontlines since his arrest. The Kremlin likely decided against deploying Popov to the frontlines to prevent him from leveraging his popularity and influence in the information space to pressure Putin.[31] The Kremlin appears to be prioritizing Putin's regime stability by sending a clear message that the Kremlin will not tolerate any actor's attempt to weaponize the information space to achieve a political objective that undermines Putin's total authority.


#### **Key Takeaways:**

- **The official Kremlin spokesperson and the Russian Security Council secretary repeated a series of long-standing Russian demands that purposely preclude the establishment of a stable and enduring peace in Ukraine and set conditions for future Russian aggression from an advantaged position.**
- **Kremlin officials continue to baselessly threaten NATO states for adhering to US President Donald Trump's objective that Europe take on more of its own defense requirements.**
- **Russian forces conducted a large series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 23 to 24, the largest strike series against Kyiv City thus far in 2025.**
- **Denmark announced a new military aid package to Ukraine for artillery ammunition procurement on April 23.**
- **A Russian military court sentenced former 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov to imprisonment, likely as part of an**



ongoing Kremlin effort to punish Russian military commanders who weaponized the information space to advance their political goals that undermine Putin's power vertical.

- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk. Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Toretsk.



***We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.***

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

### **Alleged Ceasefire Violations**

There are currently no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

### **Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation**

**Russian forces continued efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in Kursk Oblast on April 24 but did not advance.**

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south and southwest of Guyevo (south of Sudzha near the international border).[32]

Russian sources claimed that fighting continued near Gornal (southwest of Guyevo) and Oleshnya (west of Sudzha).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to break through into Kursk Oblast to Goptarovka (south of Sudzha near the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border).[34] Another Russian milblogger claimed that reports of a Ukrainian attack near Otruba (southwest of Korenevo near the international border) are untrue.[35] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces continue entering the western outskirts of Popovka.[36]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian drones are complicating Russian efforts to advance near Gornal.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating near Gornal.[38]

**Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.**

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Mostovaya Street in southwestern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[39]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Demidovka.[40]

Fighting continued near Demidovka and Popovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to break through to Krasnoyarsk Raion.[42]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Demidovka and Popovka.[43]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and other Ukrainian forces conducted a strike against the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan on April 23.**<sup>[44]</sup> The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russia produces about 300 Geran-2 drones (the Russian analogue of the Iranian Shahed-136 drone), Shahed drones, and other unspecified drones per day at the facility located over 1,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike damaged the drone final assembly shop.

**Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)**

**Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.**


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to northern Loknya (northeast of Sumy City).<sup>[45]</sup>

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City).<sup>[46]</sup>

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment and 1434th “Akhmat-Chechnya” Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.<sup>[47]</sup>



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



## **Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine**

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast** (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

**Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 24 but did not advance.**


Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchanski Khutory and Vovchansk on April 23 and 24.[48]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast** (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)



# Assessed Control of Terrain in Luhansk Oblast

## April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction on April 24.**

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on April 24 that there has been little fighting in this direction for several days, after Russian forces suffered high losses during an infantry assault supported by all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), buggies, and motorcycles.[49]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 24 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove, Bohuslavka, and Nova Kruhlyakivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on April 23 and 24.[50]

**Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Lyman direction on April 24 but did not advance.**

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman toward Lypove and northeast of Lyman near Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Ridkodub, and Kolodyazi, and toward Novyi Mir and Zelena Dolyna on April 23 and 24.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nove, Ridkodub, and Kolodyazi.[52]

A Ukrainian unit published footage on April 23 of Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian platoon-sized mechanized assault in the Lyman direction and reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Russian armored personnel carriers (APCs).[53] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 24 that Russian forces are constantly conducting infantry assaults and continue to supply infantry with man-portable electronic warfare (EW) devices.[54]


Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "Smuglyanka" Detachment are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[55] Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Nove.[56]

**Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)**



# Assessed Control of Terrain in Donetsk Oblast

## April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 24 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced about one kilometer toward Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk).[57]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Bilohorivka and east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske on April 23 and 24.[58]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 24 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka, and south of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne on April 23 and 24.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[60] Elements of the 1st detachment of the Russian "Volki" (Wolves) Sabotage and Reconnaissance Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction.[61] Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating in Bakhmut (east of Chasiv Yar).[62]

**Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in Toretsk.**

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within northwestern and southwestern Toretsk.[63]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within northwestern Toretsk and west of Krymske (east of Toretsk).[64]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dyliivka, north of Sukha Balka, and east of Tarasivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[65]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Toretsk itself, northeast of Toretsk near Dachne and Dyliivka; east of Toretsk near Krymske and Druzhba; southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka, Kalynove, Stara Mykolaivka, Yelyzavetivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Berezivka, and west of Toretsk near Petrivka and toward Shcherbynivka on April 23 and 24.[66]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attacking along the Siverskyi Donetsk-Donbas Canal near Druzhba and Dyliivka and are attacking within Toretsk most actively in Zabalka Microraion in southern Toretsk and in northern Toretsk. [67] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are advancing along the H-20 Donetsk City-Kostyantynivka highway toward Sukha Balka and Romanivka (west of Toretsk) and are attacking southwest of Toretsk toward Stara Mykolaivka, Oleksandropil, and Tarasivka. Mashovets attributed recent Russian tactical advances in the Toretsk direction to the introduction of elements of the Russian 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments and of the 68th and 163rd tank regiments (all of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) into battle near Toretsk three weeks ago (around April 3). Mashovets reported that forces of up to five motorized rifle regiments of the 150th and 20th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA) - which recently regrouped from the Kurakhove direction


- and forces of up to six separate rifle regiments of the "mobilization reserve" of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[68]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are operating in the Baranivka-Tarasivka direction (southwest of Toretsk), that elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are operating near Sukha Balka, and that elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are operating in the Druzhba-Dachne direction.[69] Mashovets reported that elements of the 348th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and a battalion of the 2nd "Veterany" Volunteer Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are also operating in the Toretsk direction attached to elements of the 51st CAA or 8th CAA.[70] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th and 9th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA) are operating in the Toretsk direction.[71] Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating north of Toretsk, and drone operators of the Russian 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zorya (north of Toretsk).[72]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction

## April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 24 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces seized half of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and marginally advanced near Pishchane (south of Pokrovsk).[73] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk) and are 900 meters from Pokrovsk itself.[74]


Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Pokrovsk near Novotoretske and Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Vidrozhennya (formerly Novyi Trud) and Shevchenko and toward Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 23 and 24.[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked between Pishchane and Shevchenko.[76]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Udachne, and elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Zvirove.[77] Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[78]



# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Pokrovsk Direction

## April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST






## Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 24 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized half of Horikhove (east of Novopavlivka) and advanced in fields south of Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), north of Nadiivka (east of Novopavlivka), and from Preobrazhenka toward Kotlyarivka (both east of Novopavlivka).[79]

Russian forces continued ground attacks northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, Uspenivka, Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Nadiivka, Kotlyarivka, and Troitske on April 23 and 24.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyarivka, Troitske, and Bohdanivka (both southeast of Novopavlivka).[81]



**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on April 24 but did not make confirmed advances.**

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Russian forces advanced south of Bahatyr (west of Kurakhove) and 1.5 kilometers east of Bahatyr, and reached the southeastern outskirts of Odradne (southwest of Kurakhove).[82]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv, Bahatyr, and Odradne on April 23 and 24.[83] Russian milbloggers claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Rozlyv, south of Bahatyr, and southeast of Odradne.[84]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kurakhove direction reported on April 24 that Russian small infantry groups of three to eight soldiers are attempting to advance as close to Ukrainian positions as possible on motorcycles, buggies, and quad bikes.[85]

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on April 24 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked north of Velyka Novosilka near Skudne, northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvilne, and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Rivnopil and Novodarivka on April 23 and 24.[86] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole.[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the direction of Shakhtarsk.[88]


**Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)**

**Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 24 but did not advance.**

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv toward Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, Lobkove, and Mali Shcherbaky on April 23 and 24.[89]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), and drone operators of the Russian “Storm” detachment and of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[90]


# Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 24, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST





**Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on April 23 and 24 but did not advance.[91]**

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the Antonivka Road Bridge (east of Kherson City).[92]



## **Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)**

*Please see topline text for updates on Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.*

## **Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)**

Nothing significant to report.

**Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.**



[1] [https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063\\_24.php#11](https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063_24.php#11)

[2] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23763027>

[3] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425>;  
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624>

[4] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025>

[5] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125>; <https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/23728811>;  
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>;

<https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/7657482>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041325>;  
[https://t.me/tass\\_agency/310276](https://t.me/tass_agency/310276) ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23666505>

[6] [https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063\\_24.php#11](https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063_24.php#11)

[7] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23763027>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2025>

[9] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23763027>; [https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063\\_24.php#11](https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063_24.php#11)

[10] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar022525>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2024>

[11] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23763027>

[12] <https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/video/trump-casts-doubt-on-nato-commitments-as-world-leaders-reconsider-sharing-intel-with-u-s-233691717720>; <https://www.seattletimes.com/business/trump-shuns-europe-and-its-defense-industry-tries-to-capitalize/>; <https://www.msnbc.com/opinion/msnbc-opinion/trump-nato-europe-defense-security-putin-rcna196988>; <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-02-27/trump-shocks-europe-into-defense-spending-shakeup>;

[13] [https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063\\_24.php#11](https://www.lepoint dot fr/monde/exclusif-dmitri-peskov-porte-parole-de-poutine-la-russie-veut-atteindre-nos-buts-pacifiquement-ou-militairement-23-04-2025-2588063_24.php#11)

[14] <https://ria dot ru/20220217/vtorzhenie-1773378285.html>; <https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/823222>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/13740685>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/13773973>; [https://www.itv dot ru/news/2008-04-30/194773-rossiya\\_ne\\_sobiraetsya\\_voevat\\_s\\_gruzией](https://www.itv dot ru/news/2008-04-30/194773-rossiya_ne_sobiraetsya_voevat_s_gruzией)

[15] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-orthodox-church-declares-%E2%80%9DCholy-war%E2%80%9D-against-ukraine-and-articulates-tenets>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-9-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-4-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2024>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-22-2024>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2024>

[16] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225>

[17] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>

[18] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025>

[19] <https://t.me/kpszsus/33182>



- [20] [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13957](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13957); [https://t.me/V\\_Zelenskiy\\_official/13959](https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13959);  
<https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/1058>; [https://kyivdotgp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?\\_m=publications&\\_t=rec&id=387468](https://kyivdotgp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_t=rec&id=387468); [https://suspilne.media/kyiv/1001893-kombinovana-ataka-rf-na-kiiv-postrazdali-ludi/?utm\\_source=copylink&utm\\_medium=ps](https://suspilne.media/kyiv/1001893-kombinovana-ataka-rf-na-kiiv-postrazdali-ludi/?utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps); <https://suspilne.media/kyiv/1001893-kombinovana-ataka-rf-na-kiiv-postrazdali-ludi/>; [https://t.me/mvs\\_ukraine/49009](https://t.me/mvs_ukraine/49009)
- [21] <https://t.me/osirskiy/1134>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/CinCAFofUkraine/posts/pfbido2dTe2Gy6QAXpRqWTxyany6Qsgy9FkeLrDHaVcpMK44FgDCGTaybJKnz8jDBmBCpWDL>; [https://t.me/Klymenko\\_MVS/1393](https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1393);  
<https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/04/24/u-kyievi-zbilshylas-kilkist-postrazhdalyh-vnaslidok-rosijskogo-udaru/>; <https://suspilne.media/kharkiv/1001965-na-harkivsini-vnaslidok-udariv-rf-poskodzena-infrastruktura-ukrzhaliznici/>; <https://suspilne.media/1001943-unaslidok-nicnoi-ataki-rf-poraneni-dvoe-zaliznicnikiv-ukrzhaliznica/>
- [22] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-12-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825>
- [23] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225>
- [24] <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/114392923237368367>
- [25] <https://www.fmn.dk/da/nyheder/2025/danmark-udmonter-over-300-mio.-kroner-til-artilleriammunition-til-ukraine/>
- [26] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311928](https://t.me/tass_agency/311928); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311929](https://t.me/tass_agency/311929) ;  
[https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311930](https://t.me/tass_agency/311930); [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311931](https://t.me/tass_agency/311931)
- [27] <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7588103>
- [28] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine>
- [29] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine>; <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/04/2025/680a10159a7947dc1061d1d6>
- [30] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine>
- [31] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-sentenced-popular-russian-general-lead-penal-assault-detachment-ukraine>
- [32] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22582>; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27476>
- [33] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311903](https://t.me/tass_agency/311903); <https://t.me/wargonzo/26120>;  
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27476>; <https://t.me/epoddubny/23225>;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/34723>; <https://t.me/milinfolive/146772>;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69758](https://t.me/dva_majors/69758); <https://t.me/yurasumy/22582>

- [34] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27476>; <https://t.me/rybar/69886>
- [35] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90525>
- [36] <https://t.me/rybar/69886>
- [37] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26105>; <https://t.me/epoddubny/23225>
- [38] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/162366](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162366); <https://t.me/wargonzo/26120>
- [39] [https://t.me/WarArchive\\_ua/27565](https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27565); <https://t.me/brygada47/1420>
- [40] <https://t.me/rybar/69886>
- [41] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26105>
- [42] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69758](https://t.me/dva_majors/69758)
- [43] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27469> ; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69774](https://t.me/dva_majors/69774) ; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90478>
- [44] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23429>
- [45] [https://x.com/Raver\\_\\_\\_/status/1915093138886062460](https://x.com/Raver___/status/1915093138886062460); <https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1915100696321610180>
- [46] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22582>
- [47] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69739](https://t.me/dva_majors/69739)
- [48] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>
- [49] <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/24/okupant-otrymav-dobryache-po-zubah-poblyzu-kupyanska-rozbyly-motoryzovanyj-nakat/>; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFICKlCoo20>
- [50] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>
- [51] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63725>; [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69758](https://t.me/dva_majors/69758)
- [52] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63725>
- [53] [https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/8634](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8634); <https://t.me/umftteam/461>
- [54] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SLi5kC3hXsQ> ; <https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/04/24/trishky-kosmonavty-abo-cherepashky-nindzya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-vidbyvayut-shturmy-pihotyncziv-z-antenkamy/>
- [55] [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69798](https://t.me/dva_majors/69798)
- [56] <https://t.me/vysokygovorit/19478>
- [57] [https://t.me/tass\\_agency/311892](https://t.me/tass_agency/311892)

- [58] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>
- [59] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>
- [60] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27440>; [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/51676](https://t.me/mod_russia/51676)  
<https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90505>
- [61] [https://t.me/philologist\\_zov/2328](https://t.me/philologist_zov/2328)
- [62] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34693>
- [63] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1915247269105778836>; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/162324](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162324);  
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1915245891725803598>; <https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/21751>
- [64] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1915247269105778836>; [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/162324](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162324);  
<https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1915441179119833263>; [https://t.me/Khyzhak\\_brigade/1020](https://t.me/Khyzhak_brigade/1020)
- [65] <https://t.me/rybar/69870>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22579>; <https://t.me/rybar/69861>
- [66] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ohxg6dyt76wLnuFroMnZonceTJtbTM7eHYkDyYzoeDCXWcGMCM6eynnDmm4itGpLl>;  
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02i6BmA6M7BsREyFXWPQk3QFpGbEN5W2rUvTaqTwff9Ynnshypxw55LChz3W6x1ezvl>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23391>;  
[https://t.me/Khortytsky\\_wind/8547](https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8547); [https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69765](https://t.me/dva_majors/69765); <https://t.me/rybar/69870>
- [67] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2710>
- [68] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2709>
- [69] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2710>; <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2711>
- [70] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2709>
- [71] <https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2709>
- [72] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22580>; [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/13722](https://t.me/nm_dnr/13722)
- [73] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34682>
- [74] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34718>
- [75] <https://t.me/yurasumy/22578>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/34718>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26105>
- [76] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34682>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34718>
- [77] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34682>
- [78] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90483>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90477>

- [79] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63721> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63722>;  
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/34685>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22576>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90515>
- [80] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63742>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>;
- [81] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63721> ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63722>;  
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63742>
- [82] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/14587](https://t.me/voin_dv/14587)
- [83] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>; <https://t.me/yurasumy/22575>;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69758](https://t.me/dva_majors/69758)
- [84] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/14587](https://t.me/voin_dv/14587); <https://t.me/yurasumy/22575>
- [85] [https://armyinform\\_dot\\_com.ua/2025/04/23/plyuvaty-na-zhyttya-svoyih-soldativ-rosiyan-u-shturmy-prodovzhuyut-vidpravlyaty-na-nezahyshhenij-legkij-tehniczi/](https://armyinform_dot_com.ua/2025/04/23/plyuvaty-na-zhyttya-svoyih-soldativ-rosiyan-u-shturmy-prodovzhuyut-vidpravlyaty-na-nezahyshhenij-legkij-tehniczi/)
- [86] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>
- [87] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/14587](https://t.me/voin_dv/14587)
- [88] [https://t.me/voin\\_dv/14576](https://t.me/voin_dv/14576)
- [89] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>
- [90] [https://t.me/boris\\_rozhin/162377](https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162377); <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27458> ;  
[https://t.me/dva\\_majors/69749](https://t.me/dva_majors/69749); [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/51653](https://t.me/mod_russia/51653); [https://t.me/ZA\\_FROHT/41675](https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/41675) ;  
[https://t.me/voin\\_dv/14583](https://t.me/voin_dv/14583)
- [91] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23435>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23432>;  
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23463>
- [92] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27457>