

**Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Anna Harvey,
Davit Gasparyan, and George Barros with Nate Trotter**

April 29, 2025, 6 pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government.[1] Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea. Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on April 29 that Ukrainian civilians, particularly those living in the Black Sea region, must "determine their own future." [2] Patrushev specifically noted that Odesa City spent over two centuries as the Russian Empire's and Soviet Union's outpost in the Black Sea and claimed that Odesa City residents have "nothing in common" with the current Ukrainian government. These statements are a reference to Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2023 claim that Ukrainians living in the Black Sea region have nothing "to do with Ukraine" and that Odesa is a "Russian city" and follows Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's April 14, 2025 claim that the Ukrainian government "does not represent" residents of Odesa City and other Ukrainian territories. [3] Patrushev claimed that Russia "respects the will of the [Ukrainian] people" and attempted to justify Russia's illegal annexation of occupied Crimea, Donbas, and "Novorossiia" — an invented region in Ukraine which the Kremlin has claimed includes all of eastern and southern Ukraine and is an "integral" part of Russia. [4] Medvedev also claimed that the current Ukrainian government does not speak for the Ukrainian people. [5] Medvedev's and Patrushev's statements reference the longstanding Kremlin demand for regime change in Ukraine with the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government that could struggle to oppose or even support the Kremlin's goal to occupy more territory in Ukraine at a later time of the Kremlin's choosing. [6]

Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the "illegitimacy" of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's presidency would create legal difficulties in direct peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but that Russia is more interested in starting negotiations and "everything else is secondary." [7] Peskov claimed on April 24 that Russia would restart its war should "people...question the legitimacy" of Zelensky and stated that Russia has "no confidence" in the Ukrainian government. [8] Putin and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that

all Ukrainian governments since 2014 are "illegitimate" and that Russia would not view any agreements concluded with the current Ukrainian government as binding.[9] Putin and other Russian officials have similarly claimed that Zelensky is illegitimate because Ukraine did not hold presidential elections in 2024, and have additionally alleged that all Ukrainian civil authorities are therefore illegitimate since the president appoints regional officials.[10] The Ukrainian Constitution explicitly prohibits elections during periods of martial law and invasion by a hostile country, however.[11] The Kremlin is deliberately coupling its purported interest in Russian-Ukrainian peace negotiations with its false narrative of Zelensky's illegitimacy in order to set conditions for Russia to claim that any future peace settlement that Russia signs with Zelensky is illegitimate, to renege on the agreement, and relaunch the invasion at the time of Russia's choosing. **Any long-term peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine must include Russia's explicit recognition of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian Constitution.**

Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire. Lavrov claimed on April 29 that the May 8 to 11 ceasefire will be the "beginning of direct negotiations, without preconditions," but stated that Russia considers the US- and Ukrainian-proposed 30-day ceasefire to be a "precondition." [12] Lavrov reiterated Putin's rejection of the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term ceasefires, claiming that Russia cannot accept any longer-term ceasefire since such ceasefires require extensive monitoring measures. Lavrov stated that Russia does not think "honest" monitoring is possible during a 30-day ceasefire in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on April 29 that the Ukrainian government does not have full control over all Ukrainian military units and will be unable to guarantee that Ukrainian forces adhere to the May 8 to 11 ceasefire.[13] Putin similarly declared a unilateral Easter ceasefire in mid-April 2025, and Russia has consistently accused Ukraine of violating previous ceasefires while rarely offering evidence supporting these accusations.[14] Ukraine - unlike Russia - supports US President Donald Trump's proposals for a 30-day temporary ceasefire or more permanent ceasefires.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is leveraging unilateral ceasefires to achieve informational and battlefield advantages in Ukraine and to maintain the illusion that Russia is interested in meaningful peace negotiations.[16]

Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population. Medvedev claimed that the West is attempting to use a principle of "peace through force" to harm Russia, but that Russia's only possible response to this principle is "peace through fear." [17] Medvedev claimed that other approaches do not work but that "fear still works." Medvedev claimed that the leaders in the European Union (EU) are "Russophobic" and that Russia's relations with Europe have "passed the point of no return." [18] Medvedev attempted to argue that allegations that Russia is trying to attack Europe are "nonsense." [19] Patrushev claimed that parts of Europe, including France and Germany, are "flirting with the Nazis" and "deploying the military machine against Russia." [20] Patrushev claimed that the United Kingdom (UK), the EU, and NATO leaders are threatening Russia and criticized NATO for holding large-scale exercises on its eastern flank, claiming that these exercises are practicing offensive actions against Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke on April 29 at the "Great Heritage — Common Future" forum dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second World War and claimed that Russia


must prevent the revival of Nazism and the spread of destructive ideologies, including Russophobia and national or religious intolerance.[21] Putin's statements paralleled those of Medvedev and Patrushev, but were more tempered as Putin did not criticize or threaten Europe. Kremlin officials, including those within Putin's inner circle, have recently threatened European states, including NATO member states, and are setting conditions to justify potential future Russian aggression against Europe.[22]

Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies. Putin claimed that the world must create a new security architecture, particularly in Eurasia.[23] Putin claimed that the basis of this Eurasian security architecture could be already existing organizations, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), BRICS, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Patrushev similarly claimed in the April 29 TASS interview that the "Western-centric world" is no longer useful and that the popularity of BRICS and the SCO is growing.[24] Putin first proposed an alternative Eurasian and world security system in June 2024, reportedly with the support of People's Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping.[25] The organizations that Putin listed as the possible foundation of his proposed Eurasian security architecture are mostly Russian- or PRC-dominated and are meant as alternatives to the United Nations (UN) or US-led alliances. Putin's renewed calls for the creation of a Eurasian security architecture notably come as Russian and North Korean officials abruptly started to publicly acknowledge their military cooperation in Russia's war in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been building a web of overlapping coalitions and partnerships, including within the CSTO, CIS, ASEAN, BRICS, and SCO, to offset the limits of Russian state power.[27] These efforts aim to make Russia's geopolitical clout more resilient and to expand the space in which Russia can spread narratives and create perceptions.

Key Takeaways:

- **Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev stated on April 29 that Russia's war in Ukraine must end in Russian "victory" and the "destruction" of the current Ukrainian government. Senior Kremlin officials continue to signal that Russia has greater territorial ambitions than just the occupied areas of Ukraine, particularly in areas bordering the Black Sea.**
- **Senior Russian officials reiterated the longstanding, false Russian narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, likely in order to set conditions to manipulate ceasefire negotiations and renege on any future Russian-Ukrainian agreements at a time of Russia's choosing.**
- **Russian officials are setting conditions to baselessly accuse Ukraine of violating Russia's unilateral May 8 to 11 ceasefire, as the Kremlin has done during previous ceasefires, while rejecting Ukraine's proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.**
- **Kremlin officials within Putin's inner circle continue to threaten NATO as Putin himself refrains from doing so — likely as part of Kremlin efforts to justify future Russian aggression against NATO to the Russian population.**

- Putin promoted his previously proposed Eurasian security architecture on April 29 as part of Russian efforts to create an alternative Russian-led bloc that furthers Putin's goals of destroying NATO and weakening the West and its allies.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod and Sumy oblasts and near Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and Velyka Novosilka.



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and

specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

- Alleged Ceasefire Violation
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus

Alleged Ceasefire Violations

There are no active ceasefires in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported continued fighting in Kursk Oblast on April 29 as Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their limited remaining positions in the area.[28]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 29 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in unspecified border areas of Kursk Oblast.[29]


Russian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the fields west of Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[30]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in fields southwest of Popovka (west of Demidovka).[31]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Popovka, in Grayvoron Raion (west of Belgorod City), and in unspecified areas along the Kursk-Belgorod Oblast border.[32]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Belgorod Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian airbase and explosives factory in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast on the night of April 28 to 29. Russian opposition outlet *Astra* reported on April 29 that sources in the Ukrainian security services and Russian rescue services stated that Ukrainian drones struck the Savasleyka Air Base, where a branch of the 4th Center for Combat Application and Crew Training is stationed, and the state-owned Sverdlova Plant in Dzerzhinsk that produces industrial explosives.[33] *Astra* reported that at least one Ukrainian drone struck the air base and that two drones hit the explosives plant. Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on April 29 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strikes over two raions in the oblast.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in northern Bilovody (northeast of Sumy City).[35]


Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed April 29 that Russian forces advanced further in northern Bilovody, in the fields northeast of Bilovody, and near Zhuravka (northeast of Sumy City).[36]

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued northeast of Sumy City near Bilovody and Loknya.[37]

Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported on April 29 that Russian forces do not control Zhuravka, Veselivka, Basivka, or Novenke (all northeast of Sumy City) and that these areas are in a contested "gray zone." [38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade, as well as elements of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[39]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Sumy Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on April 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lytpsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Vovchanski Khutory on April 28 and 29.[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Doroshivka (northwest of Kupyansk), and some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced in fields west of Doroshivka.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and west of Kamyanka (northeast of Kupyansk near the international border) and to central Mala Shaplivka (north of Kupyansk).[43]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk near Kindrashaivka, Zapadne, and Mala Shaplivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushlivka on April 28 and 29.[44]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov rejected on April 29 the Russian MoD's April 28 claim that Russian forces seized Kamyanka.[45] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian fortifications and outposts remain in the village and that fighting continues in the area. An officer in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue efforts to cross the Oskil River in multiple places to create a full bridgehead, but that Russian forces remain unable to establish pontoon crossings.[46]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kupyansk Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces limited continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka on April 28 and 29.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the eastern outskirts of Lypove (north of Lyman) and advanced southeast of the settlement, reached northern Kolodyazi (southeast of Lypove), and advanced south of Nove (immediately east of Lypove).[48]

Russian forces continued ground attacks north of Lyman near Nove and toward Lypove, Ridkodub, and Zelena Dolyna, and northeast of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Myrne, Katerynivka, Kolodyazi, and Novyi Mir on April 28 and 29.[49]




Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hryhorivka (northeast of Siversk), indicating that Russian sources no longer claim that Russian forces have seized all of the settlement.[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on April 28 and 29.[51]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on April 29 that Russian forces seized northern Stupochky (south of Chasiv Yar) and advanced in fields east of Chasiv Yar.[52]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar, north of Chasiv Yar toward Mayske and Markove, and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Bila Hora on April 28 and 29.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[55]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Tsentralna Street in southern Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[56]


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Tarasivka, Vodyane Druhe, and Berezivka (all southwest of Toretsk).[57]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka, Stara Mykolaivka, Oleksandropil, Yelyzavetivka, and Tarasivka on April 28 and 29.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Berezivka (southwest of Toretsk).[59]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported on April 29 that Russian forces recently conducted a combined mechanized and motorized assault of an unspecified echelon in the Toretsk direction with armored vehicles and motorcycles.[60] Ukrainian Luhansk Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 29 that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry and motorized assaults in the Toretsk direction and are increasingly using motorized vehicles and fiber-optic drones.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 68th Tank Regiment, are reportedly operating near Toretsk.[62] Drone operators of the Russian "Rubikon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Shcherbynivka.[63] Elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and the 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynove (southwest of Toretsk).[64]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Toretsk Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the railroad line west of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[65]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces occupy one-third of Zvirove (southwest of Pokrovsk) and advanced northeast of Sukhyi Yar (southeast of Pokrovsk).[66]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Novotoretske, and toward Malynivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Zelene, and Chunyshyne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novoserhiivka, Zvirove, and Pishchane on April 28 and 29.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kotlyne, Lysivka, Udachne, and near Shevchenko.[68]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone activity is complicating Russian advances and logistics near Sukhyi Yar and Lysivka and that central Lysivka is a contested "gray zone." [69]

Order of Battle: Engineering elements of the Russian 12th Separate Engineering Brigade (201st Military Base, Central Military District [CMD]), sappers of the 351st Separate Engineer Sapper Battalion (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD), and "Somali" Battalion of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction. [70]



Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Uspenivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[71]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations toward Novopavlivka; northeast of Novopavlivka near Uspenivka and Novooleksandrivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlayrivka, Troitske, Nadiivka, and Sribne; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka on April 28 and 29.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Uspenivka.[73]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that small Russian assault groups mostly attack toward Ukrainian positions on foot but sometimes use motorcycles.[74]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kurakhove direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the H-15 Kurakhove-Zaporizhzhia City highway (southwest of Kostyantynopil), west of Kostyantynopil, and north and northwest of Rozlyv (southwest of Kurakhove).[75]

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Bahatyr, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Kostyantynopil and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne and Bahatyr on April 28 and 29.[76] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on April 29 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault consisting of five motorcycles near Odradne.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Odradne and Bahatyr.[78]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces recently destroyed two bridges over the Vovcha River near Zelenyi Kut and Novoukrainka (both west of Oleksiivka).[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating near Bahatyr.[80]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Novopavlivka Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on April 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Vilne Pole.[81]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Pryvvilne, Vilne Pole, Burlatske, Shevchenko, Vesele on April 28 and 29.[82] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vesele.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue striking Ukrainian forces near Vilne Pole.[84]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Velyka Novosilka Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, Shcherbaky, and Lobkove on April 28 and 29.[85]


Assessed Control of Terrain in the Zaporizhia Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 80th Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and “FOBOS” drone group (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Kherson Oblast.[87]

Assessed Control of Terrain in the Kherson Direction April 29, 2025 at 1:30 PM EST



Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 100 Shahed and decoy drones from the direction of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Aktarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[88] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 37 drones over northern, eastern, southern, and central Ukraine and that 47 Russian decoy drones were "lost," likely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts.[89]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko discussed Belarusian support for Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) at an April 29 meeting in Volgograd City.[90] Putin and Lukashenko agreed to expand cooperation in aircraft construction. Putin stated that Russia is ready to lay the foundations for the drone production facility in Belarus that Russia announced first announced in March 2024.[91] Russia will likely use this drone production factory to support combat operations in Ukraine and long-term efforts to expand Russia's military production capability.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

POWERED BY:



BABEL STREET

[1] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173>

[2] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487>

[3] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025>; <https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/14/12/2023/657acd6a9a79477cbd43f7d5>

[4] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042225>; <https://understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar070524>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032225>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031625>

[5] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813173>

[6] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar040325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032825>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar030125>

[7] <https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/68108dd59a7947818ebfc843> ; <https://meduza dot io/news/2025/04/29/peskov-nazval-vopros-o-legitimnosti-zelenskogo-vtorichnym-a-pervichnym-mirnye-peregovory>

[8] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025>

- [9] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525> ; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar021725> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012925> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar012425>
- [10] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar060724> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052624> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar052024> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar072524>
- [11] <https://rm.coe dot int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b> ; <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025>
- [12] <https://www.interfax-russia dot ru/main/predlozhenie-o-peremirii-eto-nachalo-pryamyh-peregovorov-bez-predvaritelnyh-usloviy-lavrov>
- [13] https://t.me/tass_agency/312559; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23808087>
- [14] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042125> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525> ; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar0413>
- [15] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825>;
- [16] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825>
- [17] <https://moscow.er dot ru/activity/news/dmitrij-medvedev-na-zapade-lezhit-vina-chto-idealy-poslevoennogo-miroustrojstva-spravedlivogo-bezopasnogo-i-sbalansirovannogo-mira-ostalis-mechtami> ; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813001>; <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813001>
- [18] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813097>
- [19] <https://tass dot ru/politika/23813787>
- [20] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487>
- [21] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76824>
- [22] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-15-2025>
- [23] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76824>
- [24] <https://tass dot ru/interviews/23801487>
- [25] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024>
- [26] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar042825>
- [27] <https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin%27s%20Offset%20The%20Kremlin%27s%20Geopolitical%20Adaptations%20Since%202014.pdf>

[28] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>

[29] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26209>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34979>

[30] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/27712; <https://t.me/pentagonkh/233>;
<https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6021>

[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884

[32] https://t.me/dva_majors/70087; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13017

[33] <https://t.me/astrapress/80049>

[34] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/6636; https://t.me/tass_agency/312596

[35] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9020; <https://t.me/OMBr67/2630>

[36] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9020; <https://t.me/OMBr67/2630>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162906

[37] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63869>

[38] <https://deepstatemap dot live/#11/51.1703027/35.0595861>; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1005845-na-sumsini-zbilsilas-sira-zona-u-napramku-lokni/>;
https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/35301 ; <https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1006003-pro-okupaciu-naselenih-punktiv-na-sumsini-mova-ne-vedetsa-nacalnik-ova-grigorov/>

[39] <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90788>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162902;
https://t.me/dva_majors/70125; https://t.me/dva_majors/70139; https://t.me/dva_majors/70141;
https://t.me/rusich_army/23006

[40] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646> ;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976

[41] https://t.me/bella_Ciao44/7896; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26212>

[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/51930 ; <https://t.me/vrogov/20066>;
https://t.me/tass_agency/312655; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/90805>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/70122; https://t.me/tass_agency/312685;
https://t.me/tass_agency/312685; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63863>

[43] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63863>

[44] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;

[45] <https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1005793-voni-trisecki-zbrehali-v-osuv-hortica-prokomentovali-zahoplenna-kamanki-na-harkivsini/>;
<https://understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025>

- [46] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/vony-odrazu-ryyutsya-yak-kroty-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-hovayut-v-yihnih-norah/>
- [47] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;
- [48] https://t.me/z_arhiv/31423
- [49] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;
- [50] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27700>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884;
https://t.me/tass_agency/312602
- [51] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976
- [52] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993>
- [53] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/34969>; https://t.me/tass_agency/312611;
- [54] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34993>
- [55] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27707>
- [56] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247>; <https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024
- [57] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34983>
- [58] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976;
<https://t.me/motopatriot78/34971>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843
- [59] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865>
- [60] https://t.me/ombr_28/2105 ; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/zashyta-bronekolona-i-shvydkisni-motocykly-nashi-bijczy-vidbyly-kombinovanyj-shturm-rosiyan/>
- [61] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/04/29/na-sonczi-struny-tak-vidblyskuyut-na-toreczkomu-napryamku-dereva-vkryti-merezhyvom-optovolokna/>
- [62] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162905 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70096
- [63] <https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1917146365030781247>; <https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/167>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9024
- [64] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13733

- [65] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9028; <https://t.me/skala425/591>
- [66] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162884
- [67] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;
<https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63865>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867>;
https://t.me/dva_majors/70087; <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692>;
https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162843; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900
- [68] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63867>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63868>;
<https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692>; <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975>
- [69] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27692>
- [70] <https://t.me/milinfoLive/147124>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26206>; <https://t.me/wargonzo/26221>
- [71] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162900
- [72] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;
- [73] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34975>
- [74] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2025/04/29/vmiyt-vidmichaty-lyudski-syluety-na-novopavlivskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-atakuyut-pid-plashhamy-nevydymkamy/>
- [75] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9019;
<https://www.facebook.com/370brmp/videos/681331965053328/>;
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9018; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9027; <https://t.me/odshbr79/552>
- [76] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>;
<https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGV01qYmHffu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEBKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQl> ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/26209>; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870>;
- [77] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976
- [78] <https://t.me/wargonzo/26209> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14672
- [79] <https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/27697> ; https://t.me/dva_majors/70087
- [80] <https://t.me/motopatriot78/34965> ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14664
- [81] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9026;
<https://www.facebook.com/310mbr/videos/1045086750863680/>
- [82] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643> ; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646> ;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/8976 ; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63870>
- [83] https://t.me/voin_dv/14667

- [84] https://t.me/voin_dv/14660
- [85] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHffu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEBKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQL>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>
- [86] <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23675>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23646> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02XZGVo1qYmHffu4p5U5N1Nt1hYEBKmLYdr2GU6MXr5yebUUBLp9SLJNT4VgwXo4AQL>; <https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/23643>
- [87] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/162868; <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63862>
- [88] <https://t.me/kpszsus/33462>
- [89] <https://t.me/kpszsus/33462>; <https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/21196>; <https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1005615-cerez-masovanu-ataku-bpla-na-dnipropetrovsini-zaginula-ditina-so-vidbuvaetsa-na-misci-udaru/>; <https://t.me/bbcrussian/79619>; <https://t.me/synegubov/14051>; https://t.me/VA_Kyiv/11616; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4526; <https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1005519-rosia-bezpilotnikami-atakuvala-kiiv-e-travmovana/>
- [90] <http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76825>
- [91] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-6-2025>