

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 6, 2023

Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Fredrick W. Kagan

June 6, 2023, 8:30 pm ET

Click [here](#) to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click [here](#) to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam in the early hours of June 6 caused massive flooding of the Dnipro River delta, river wetlands, estuaries, and shoreline settlements in Kherson Oblast.

Russian and Ukrainian sources began reporting loud noises resembling explosions emanating from the KHPP (across the Dnipro River in the Nova Kakhovka area about 55km northeast of Kherson City) between 0200 and 0230 local time on June 6, followed by reports of rushing water and an overall increase in the water level of the Dnipro.[1] Ukraine's Kherson Oblast Administration announced the evacuation of several raions (districts) of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast as of 0730 local time and reported that the Tyahinka, Odradokamianka, Beryslav, Ivanivka, Mykilske, Tokarivka, Ponyativka, Bilozerka, and Ostriv areas had been partially or completely flooded.[2] Russian Kherson Oblast occupation officials announced the evacuation of the Nova Kakhovka, Hola Prystan, and Oleshky raions.[3] Ukrainian officials noted that over 80 settlements are within the flood zone in Kherson Oblast.[4] General Director of Ukraine's hydroelectric power plant regulator Ukrhydroenergo Ihor Syrota said that water is draining from the Kakhovka Reservoir at a rate of 15-20cm an hour, which Syrota stated means that the reservoir will be entirely dry in the next four days.[5] A researcher at the Ukrainian Department of Water Bioresources at the Kherson Oblast Agrarian and Economic University, Yevhen Korzhov, noted that the rate of water discharge from the dam may lead to flooding as far downstream as Kizomys, about 120km southwest from the KHPP.[6] A Russian milblogger claimed that the water level in Nova Kakhovka, immediately adjacent to the KHPP, reached as high as 11m.[7] Various Russian sources additionally highlighted footage showing that several east (left) bank settlements, including Oleshky, Korsunka, and Dnipryany, are entirely or nearly entirely underwater.[8]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Ukrainian officials stated that the drop in the water level at the Kakhovka Reservoir should not

affect the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). IAEA Director Rafael Grossi reported that the drop in the water level at the Kakhovka Reservoir poses “no immediate risk to the safety of the plant” and that IAEA personnel at the ZNPP are closely monitoring the situation.[9] Grossi stated that the ZNPP is pumping water into its cooling channels and related systems, and that the large cooling pond next to the ZNPP will be “sufficient to provide water for cooling for some months.”[10] Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom’s President Petro Kotin stated that the fall in the water level at the Kakhovka Reservoir does not directly impact the water level in the ZNPP cooling pond and noted that the ZNPP pool basins are still at the same water level.[11] Ukrainian Chief Inspector for Nuclear and Radiation Safety Oleh Korikov stated that the decrease in water level at the Kakhovka Reservoir will not affect the condition of the ZNPP provided that ZNPP personnel implement established safety measures.[12]

Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces intentionally destroyed the KHPP dam and suggested that the Russian military did not prepare for subsequent flooding. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russian forces conducted an intentional premediated explosion at the dam but did so in a “chaotic” manner that allowed Russian military equipment to be flooded downstream.[13] Zelensky added that the only way to destroy the dam is through mining and emphasized that Russian forces have now occupied the dam for over a year.[14] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Russian forces mined the dam shortly after its capture early in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and later planted additional mines on the locks and supports of the dam in April 2022.[15] Ukhrhydroenergo stated that Russian forces destroyed the KHPP dam by detonating an explosive within the KHPP engine room.[16] The Ukrainian Resistance Center amplified reporting from the Crimean-based Ukrainian Atesh partisan movement alleging that the Russian 1st Battalion of the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) was responsible for the detonation at the KHPP dam.[17] Other Ukrainian officials accused Russia of intentionally destroying the dam out of concerns about potential Ukrainian advances and counterattacks.[18] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk stated that Russian forces are having to evacuate their forces on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River because subsequent flooding has disproportionately impacted the Russian-occupied bank of the river.[19] Footage published on June 6 purports to show Russian forces withdrawing from flooded positions, suggesting that these forces were not prepared for the flooding that resulted from the destruction of the KHPP dam.[20]

Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of destroying the KHPP dam and used the allegations to bolster ongoing efforts to portray Ukrainian assaults elsewhere in Ukraine as immediate failures. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Ukrainian forces conducted a sabotage attack at the KHPP dam because “Ukrainian armed forces are not achieving their goals” in large-scale offensive operations.[21] This explanation is implausible because Ukrainian forces have not yet conducted large-scale offensive operations. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that Ukrainian forces intend to send forces from the Kherson direction to

support "failing" offensive operations elsewhere and thus destroyed the dam to disrupt Russian forces' ability to take advantage of weakened Ukrainian defenses on the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[22] This explanation is also implausible because the limited Russian forces on the east (left) bank of the river pose no meaningful threat to the west (right) bank that would require extensive Ukrainian forces to defend against. Russian officials appear to be increasingly trying to immediately characterize Ukrainian offensive efforts as failures and have likely decided to use their accusations against Ukraine concerning the KHPP dam to bolster this informational effort. Shoigu also claimed on June 6 that Russian forces - specifically elements of the Eastern Military District's (EMD) 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army), the 37th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army), and the 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army) - repelled Ukrainian offensives in five different directions in the last three days.[23] Shoigu preposterously claimed that Russian forces have killed and wounded 3,175 Ukrainian servicemembers and destroyed 205 armored combat vehicles and 52 tanks in the previous three days of fighting in Ukraine.[24] Russian sources have previously attempted to paint Ukrainian counteroffensive actions as immediate failures and Russian sources are likely attempting to do the same with what they view as the start of the announced Ukrainian counteroffensive.[25]

ISW has not yet observed clear evidence of what transpired at the KHPP on June 6 and is therefore unable to offer an independent assessment of responsibility at the time of this publication. White House spokesperson John Kirby noted that the US still cannot say conclusively what caused the destruction of the dam but is assessing reports that "the blast was caused by Russia." [26] *NBC* additionally reported that the US has intelligence indicating Russia's responsibility for the dam's destruction but is currently working to declassify relevant information.[27] Various European officials made statements indicating that they believe Russia is involved and underlining the resulting humanitarian impacts of the flooding.[28]

Statements by US and European officials are generally consistent with ISW's October 2022 forecast that the Russians have a greater and clearer interest in flooding the lower Dnipro despite the damage to their own prepared defensive positions and forces than the Ukrainians.[29] ISW previously assessed on October 21, 2022, that Ukraine has no material interest in blowing the dam and pointed out that 80 settlements would risk flooding.[30] Ukrainian officials confirmed on June 6, 2023, that 80 settlements risk flooding as a result of the damage.[31] ISW further assessed that by contrast, Russia may use the flooding to widen the Dnipro River and complicate Ukrainian counteroffensive attempts across the already-challenging water feature.[32] Russian sources have expressed intense and explicit concern over the possibility that Ukraine has been preparing to cross the river and counterattack into east bank Kherson Oblast.[33] Available footage from June 6, corroborated by claims made by Russian milbloggers, suggests that the flooding washed away Ukrainian positions near the Dnipro shoreline and forced Ukrainian formations to evacuate while under Russian artillery fire.[34]

Ukrainian officials acknowledged that Russian formations and positions on the east bank may have been caught off guard and threatened by the flooding due to the topography of the area, some Ukrainian officials suggested that this was a result of the chaotic handling of the intentional detonation of the dam by Russian forces.[35] Some Russian sources indicated that the damage to the dam could threaten the water supply to occupied Crimea, but ISW previously noted that Crimea survived without water from the Dnipro River in the years between Russia’s initial illegal annexation in 2014 and when water access was restored following the 2022 full-scale invasion.[36] There is also the possibility, of course, that pre-existing structural damage to the dam eventually caused breakage and flooding, as some sources have additionally suggested, although reports of noises like explosions are not necessarily consistent with this notion.[37] ***ISW cannot offer a definitive assessment of responsibility for the June 6 incident at this time but finds that the balance of evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that the Russians deliberately damaged the dam.***

Ukrainian officials offered assurances that the damage to the dam and subsequent flooding will not impede Ukrainian counteroffensive preparations. Zelensky emphasized that the “detonation of the dam did not affect Ukraine’s ability to de-occupy its own territories.”[38] Ukrainian Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant General Serhiy Nayev noted that the Ukrainian command has already taken into account Russia’s propensity for “insidious actions” and that as a result any potential planned counteroffensive actions will not be impacted in areas where there is flooding.[39] It is additionally noteworthy that the areas of the theater that are impacted by the flooding (those within a 120km flood radius between Nova Kakhovka and Kizomys) are geographically very far removed from areas of the frontline where ISW has observed recent combat activity in the past few days.[40] The flooding of the lower Dnipro will not likely have any impact on the areas that have seen active fighting recently.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of June 5-6. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched 35 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from six Tu-95 bombers over the Caspian Sea and that Ukrainian air defense shot down all 35 missiles.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces targeted Kharkiv City with S-300 surface-to-air missiles.[42] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Natalia Humenyuk noted that the fact that Russia only launched Kh-101/555-type missiles and returned all sea-based Kalibr missile carriers to their base points before the strike may suggest that Russia is running out of Kalibrs to launch.[43] Humenyuk’s comments are consistent with periodic Ukrainian tallies of the numbers of Kalibrs remaining and Russia’s capacity to produce them. [44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian aerospace forces conducted the strike with long-range air-launched missiles against Ukrainian “decision-making centers” and struck all intended targets.[45] The UK MoD reported on June 5 that Russian forces have recently heavily relied on Iranian drones to try to attrit Ukrainian air defense missile capabilities, but the fact that Ukraine is still managing to employ air defense systems against cruise missiles to such high effect suggests that these Russian efforts have been largely unsuccessful.[46]

Russian sources claimed that the pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russian Legion (LSR) are gone from a border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 6. Russian sources published footage of Russian forces stating that they are in control of Novaya Tavolzhanka (a small village about 3km from the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast border) and that RDK and LSR elements are no longer present in the settlement.[47] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a senior Russian officer of the Belgorod Operational Group, Colonel Andrey Stesev, was killed in action in Novaya Tavolzhanka overnight on June 4-5.[48] The Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) claimed on June 6 that its forces killed Stesev.[49]

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to directly threaten the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command if they do not fulfill his demands for a larger independent army and political influence in Russia. Prigozhin threatened on June 5 that Wagner forces will “go to Belgorod” without explicit permission from the Russian MoD if the Russian military command does not “liberate” Belgorod Oblast border areas from various all-Russian pro-Ukrainian groups operating on Russian soil and improve the situation in Shebekino (a settlement 6km from the international border).[50] Prigozhin presented letters that he reportedly received from Shebekino residents who complained that the Russian military is neglecting their safety and called on Wagner to defend them. Prigozhin also sarcastically stated that the Russian MoD might be considering “using a nuclear weapon on their own territory” when discussing the Russian military command’s unwillingness to defend Belgorod Oblast as part of his attempt to exaggerate the Russian MoD’s disinterest in defending its own citizens. Prigozhin’s comments about such nuclear use, like much of his heavier sarcasm, were not meant to be taken literally. Prigozhin also reiterated that he had requested 200,000 troops and ammunition to seize Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and this demand may be reflective of his efforts to blackmail the Kremlin into giving Wagner forces additional resources and expanding its influence over the Russian MoD. Prigozhin also noted that Russia will not be able to fix its long-standing military incompetency at this time without executing Russian military officials responsible for military failures in Ukraine – and noted that failure to do so might upset Russian society.

Key Takeaways

- **Damage to the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam in the early hours of June 6 caused massive flooding of the Dnipro River delta, river wetlands, estuaries, and shoreline settlements in Kherson Oblast.**
- **The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Ukrainian officials stated that the drop in the water level at the Kakhovka Reservoir should not affect the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).**
- **Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces intentionally destroyed the KHPP dam and suggested that the Russian military did not prepare for subsequent flooding.**

- **Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of destroying the KHPP dam and used the allegations to bolster ongoing efforts to portray Ukrainian assaults elsewhere in Ukraine as immediate failures.**
- **ISW has not yet observed clear evidence of what transpired at the KHPP on June 6 and is therefore unable to offer an independent assessment of responsibility at the time of this publication.**
- **Russian forces conducted another large-scale missile strike across Ukraine on the night of June 5-6.**
- **Russian sources claimed that the pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russian Legion (LSR) are gone from a border settlement in Belgorod Oblast as of June 6.**
- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to directly threaten the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Russian military command if they do not fulfill his demands for a larger independent army and political influence in Russia.**
- **Ukrainian officials offered assurances that the damage to the dam and subsequent flooding will not impede Ukrainian counteroffensive preparations.**
- **Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.**
- **Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks north and southwest of Bakhmut, and Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk line.**
- **Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in southwestern Donetsk and in eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.**
- **Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade is part of the irregular 6th Division.**
- **Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to use infrastructure projects to integrate occupied territories into Russia.**

Assessed Control of Terrain in Ukraine and Main Russian Maneuver Axes as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian

military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.


- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on June 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Kreminna, Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that unspecified elements of the 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) repelled Ukrainian attacks in the Kupyansk direction.[52]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Luhansk Oblast as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Russian Ground Lines of Communication
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. While Ukrainian military official's report of a 200 to 1600 meter Ukrainian advance in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka on June 5 indicate a Ukrainian advance around Bakhmut, ISW cannot assess the exact shape of the Ukrainian advance based on their reports. While ISW does not have enough evidence to fully map the Ukrainian military official's directions, they are consistent with Yevgeny Prigozhin's reports about Berkshivka.


Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Click [here](#) to read ISW’s retrospective analysis on the Battle for Bakhmut.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks north and southwest of Bakhmut. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Southern Grouping of Forces (Southern Military District) repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Berkhivka (6km north of Bakhmut).[53] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces entered Berkhivka and that fighting was ongoing in the settlement as of the afternoon of June 6.[54] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin previously claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces had captured an unspecified part of Berkhivka.[55] Other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Berkhivka and that Ukrainian assaults occurred at least two kilometers away from the settlement.[56] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced from Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and captured elevated positions along the E-40 (Bakhmut to Slovyansk) highway.[57] Prigozhin also claimed that Russian forces lost unspecified positions near Rozdolivka (18km northeast of Bakhmut).[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that fierce fighting is ongoing on the southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of positions west of Klishchiivka.[59] A milblogger claimed that Russian Special Forces (Spetsnaz) units are attempting to prevent Ukrainian forces from making a breakthrough near Klishchiivka.[60] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults near Mayorsk (21km southwest of Bakhmut) and that fighting is ongoing near Ozaryanivka (16km southwest of Bakhmut).[61] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Klishchiivka and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[62]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front on June 6 amid continued claims of Ukrainian counterattacks in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Avdiivka, Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), Nevelske (13km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 12 Russian assaults in the Marinka area.[64] Ukrainian Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen reported that Chechen forces replaced "Storm Z" assault elements in the Marinka area roughly a week ago and have since lost their initial enthusiasm for offensive operations after encountering heavy Ukrainian resistance in the area.[65] Shershen reported that Chechen Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) forces are attacking one flank in the Marinka area while regular Russian forces attack another.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued probing Russian positions near Vodyane (8km southwest of Avdiivka) and advanced near Nevelske.[67]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Donetsk as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



Russian sources claimed on June 6 that Ukrainian forces advanced further in Berkhivka. A Ukrainian military official claimed on June 5 that Ukrainian forces advanced 200-1600m in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka.

A Russian source claimed Russian forces advanced into Krasnohorivka prior to June 4.

Russian sources claimed on June 5 that Russian forces recaptured Novodarivka and Neskuchne.


Russian sources claimed on June 6 that Russian forces recaptured Novodonetske.

- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives
- Major Railroads
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. While Ukrainian military official's report of a 200 to 1600 meter Ukrainian advance in the direction of Orikhovo-Vasylivka on June 5 indicate a Ukrainian advance around Bakhmut, ISW cannot assess the exact shape of the Ukrainian advance based on their reports. While ISW does not have enough evidence to fully map the Ukrainian military official's directions, they are consistent with Yevgeny Prigozhin's reports about Berkhivka.

Assessed Control of Terrain in Bakhmut as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in southwestern Donetsk and in eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 6. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the area of Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), Rivnopil (11km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Neskuchne

(2km south of Velyka Novosilka).[68] Russian “Vostok“ volunteer battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky claimed that Russian forces recaptured Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on June 6 after Ukrainian forces nearly liberated the entire settlement on June 5.[69] Russian milbloggers later claimed that Ukrainian forces regained positions on the northern outskirts of Novodonetske.[70] Some milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have not yet recaptured Neskuchne and that Ukrainian forces established a foothold in the area of Novodarivka.[71] A Russian source also claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to conduct offensive operations on the northern outskirts of Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[72] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the direction of Novosilka (10km west of Velyka Novosilka).[73] Ukrainian Defense Forces Tavriisk Direction Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen stated that Russian forces are continuing defensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Orikhiv operational directions in Zaporizhia and western Donetsk oblasts.[74]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushenko published footage on June 6 showing smoke plumes in Mariupol.[75]

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Zaporizhzhia as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET




- Significant Fighting in the past 24 Hours
- Assessed Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory
- Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare
- Russian-controlled Ukrainian Territory before February 24
- Claimed Russian Control over Ukrainian Territory
- Assessed Russian Advances in Ukraine*
- Claimed Ukrainian Counteroffensives

* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Assessed Control of Terrain Around Kherson and Mykolaiv as of June 6, 2023, 3:00 PM ET



* Assessed Russian advances are areas where ISW assesses Russian forces have operated in or launched attacks against but do not control.

Note: The Ukrainian counteroffensive layer displays areas previously assigned to the Russian control, Russian advances, or Russian claims layers where ISW now assesses that Ukrainian forces have established a presence beyond a short-term raid. Inclusion of an area on this layer does not imply that ISW assesses that the area is part of any upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive operation.

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Russian 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade is part of the irregular 6th Division. ISW previously reported

that the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Division is part of the 3rd Army Corps, which suggests that the 6th Division is part of the 3rd Army Corps.[76] Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces had helped conventional Russian personnel operating in the Lyman direction and blamed the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for abandoning Wagner forces' flanks.[77] Prigozhin did not specify what timeframe he was referring to, but likely referenced Ukraine's counteroffensive in Kharkiv in fall 2022 when Russian forces were routed. ISW previously reported that the Russian military is likely attempting to introduce doctrinal organization to improve command and control over irregular forces by using division-level organizations, such as the 6th Division.[78]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to use infrastructure projects to integrate occupied territories into Russia. Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak on June 5 to discuss the development of energy systems aimed at providing gas to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast since the energy flow comes from Russian-occupied Crimea instead of Ukrainian-controlled territory.[79] ISW has previously reported on Russian attempts to use infrastructure projects to integrate occupied territories into Russia.[80] This announcement, of course, predated the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam.

Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine is extraordinarily unlikely).

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 6 that representatives of the armed forces of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states as well as the CSTO Joint Staff and secretariat will meet in Brest Oblast from June 6 to June 8 to discuss organizing several joint CSTO military exercises in 2023.[81]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] <https://twitter.com/COUPSURE/status/1666031403471982592>; <https://gur.gov.ua/content/okupanty-v-panitsi-pidirvaly-hrebliu-kakhovskoho-vodoskhovyshcha-tse-ocheydnyi-terakt-ta-voiennyi-zlochyn-iakyi-stane-dokazom-v-mizhnarodnomu-trybunali.htm>; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11695 ; https://t.me/miroshnik_r/11705 ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/60207>; https://suspilne dot media/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686057348&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; <https://t.me/readovkanews/60196> ; <https://t.me/readovkanews/60198>; <https://t.me/RVvoenkor/46696>; <https://t.me/rybar/48082>; <https://t.me/rybar/48079>; <https://t.me/SolovievLive/184402>

[2] <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6439>; <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6462>

[3] https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9940; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9939; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9938 ; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9937; https://t.me/VGA_Kherson/9931; <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/06/rossiyskie-vlasti-anneksirovannoy-chasti-territorii-hersonskoy-oblasti-ob-yavili-chto-provedut-planovuyu-evakuatsiyu-iz-za-povysheniya-urovnya-vody>

[4] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/5316;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid031PLBY3dtX4xnBQXWzYvw4e7UTuKHqge29hFuDvRkyuwSZLn31T3hz5iQSPnveF37l>

[5] https://suspilne dot media/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686054066&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[6] https://suspilne dot media/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686047033&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[7] <https://t.me/rybar/48099>

[8] <https://t.me/rybar/48090>; <https://t.me/epoddubny/16271>;
<https://t.me/sashakots/40156>; <https://t.me/rybar/48127>;
<https://t.me/wargonzo/13002>

[9] <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-stat...>

[10] <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-general-stat...>

[11] https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13442; https://t.me/energoatom_ua/13437

[12] <https://t.me/snriugovua/767>

[13] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6487 ; <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/cogorich-u-vilnyusi-nareshti-varto-viznachiti-sho-ukrayina-b-83421>

[14] <https://www.president.gov.ua/news/cogorich-u-vilnyusi-nareshti-varto-viznachiti-sho-ukrayina-b-83421>

[15] <https://gur.gov.ua/content/okupanty-v-panitsi-pidirvaly-hrebliu-kakhovskohovodoskhovyshcha-tse-ochevydneyi-terakt-ta-voiennyi-zlochyn-iakyi-stane-dokazom-v-mizhnarodnomu-trybunali.html>

[16] <https://t.me/ukrhydroenergo/3606>

[17] <https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/terakt-na-kahovskij-ges/>

[18] <https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/06/06/rosiyan-vykorystovuyut-kartu-tehnogennogo-shantazhu-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pidryv-na-kahovskij-ges/> ; <https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbidoXuX8MXw9KnjAyReRzASc4DjQvZ5Lwu68tLyaE5ZQnLLpuYmJvY8aKQnNWpocCbfVl> ; <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/06/06/oleksij-reznikov-pro-pidryv-kahovskoyi-ges-chergovyj-vijskovyj-zlochyn-skoyenyj-rosiyeyu/> ; https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1666081031697612801?ext=HHwWgoDS1d_3jZ8uAAAA ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/7662 ; https://suspilne.com/media/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686033007&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://suspilne.com/media/498220-zatoplenna-rosijskih-pozicij-ta-zagroza-dla-hersona-gumenuk-pro-naslidki-pidrivu-kahovskoi-ges/>

[19] <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/06/06/rosiyan-vykorystovuyut-kartu-tehnogennogo-shantazhu-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pidryv-na-kahovskij-ges/> ; https://suspilne.com/media/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686033007&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; <https://suspilne.com/media/498220-zatoplenna-rosijskih-pozicij-ta-zagroza-dla-hersona-gumenuk-pro-naslidki-pidrivu-kahovskoi-ges/>

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/17059 ;

[21] <https://tass.ru/politika/17939939>

[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/27145

[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/27145

[24] https://t.me/mod_russia/27145

[25] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-5-2023>

[26] <https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-us-cannot-conclusively-determi...>

[27] <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/live-blog/khakovka-dam-live-updates-ukraine-russia-blew-up-kherson-rcna87855#rcrd13603>

[28] <https://twitter.com/jensstoltenberg/status/1665997944850378752>;
<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/06/06/world/russia-ukraine-news?smid=url-share#58158bae-1d87-5638-8bf3-f166a26c249a>;
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-scholz-kakhovka-dam-breach...> ;
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/jun/06/russia-ukraine-war-live-dam-near-kherson-blown-up-by-russian-forces-ukrainian-military-says#top-of-blog>

[29] <https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1666071186462199808>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-19>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20>;
<https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[30] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[31] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/5316;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0zVZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid031PLBY3dtX4xnBQXWzYvw4e7UTuKHqge29hFuDvRkyuwSZLn31T3hz5iQSPnveF37l>

[32] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[33] https://t.me/dva_majors/16924; <https://t.me/rybar/48056>

[34] https://t.me/notes_veterans/9975; <https://t.me/rybar/48084>

[35] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6487; <https://armyinform.com> dot ua/2023/06/06/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-kartu-tehnogenogo-shantazhu-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pidryv-na-kahovskij-ges/; <https://suspilne> do tmedia/498100-sili-oboroni-podekudi-perehodat-do-nastupalnih-dij-rf-obstrilue-harkivsinu-468-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1686033007&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; <https://suspilne> dot media/498220-zatoplenna-rosijskih-pozicij-ta-zagroza-dla-hersona-gumenuk-pro-naslidki-pidrivu-kahovskoi-ges/

[36] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/russian-offensive-campaign...>

[37] <https://meduza dot io/news/2023/06/06/analitiki-kotorye-izuchayut-otkrytye-dannye-dopustili-chno-plotina-kahovskoy-ges-razrushilas-iz-za-poluchennyh-ranee-povrezhdeniy>; <https://twitter.com/ChristopherJM/status/1665956006717800454>; <https://twitter.com/RuslanLeviev/status/1665953657458769922>; <https://twitter.com/evanhill/status/1665933276647772160>

[38] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/6487

[39]

<https://www.facebook.com/JointForcesCommandAFU/posts/pfbidoyU3hvkThwifQr8SiYEsQJCu1ytntZLTT8NPPsxUNvGGQqHE3cRNyaVFHYthFDJ59l>

[40] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...>

[41]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoh4HGnVwqCkYcuJafus3AtLD4qzKwufcH9Fp9vnCgfbclZd3KvxPyT4wQVAhEcYGWl>; <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/06/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-kartu-tehnogennogo-shantazhu-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pidryv-na-kahovskij-ges/>

[42]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoG3yH954nTGvwpRAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwVdVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl>

[43] <https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/06/06/rosiyany-vykorystovuyut-kartu-tehnogennogo-shantazhu-nataliya-gumenyuk-pro-pidryv-na-kahovskij-ges/>

[44] <https://isw.pub/UkrWar010723>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar051923>;
<https://isw.pub/UkrWar040723>; <https://isw.pub/UkrWar032323>

[45] https://t.me/mod_russia/27150

[46] <https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1665595205309833219>

[47] <https://t.me/readovkanews/60244> ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12993> ;
https://t.me/notes_veterans/9986; https://t.me/z_arhiv/21843

[48] <https://gur.gov dot ua/content/vbyto-starsheho-operatyvnoho-uhropovannia-bielhorod-andriia-stesieva.html>;
<https://twitter.com/AiratGI/status/1666021067045961730>;
<https://t.me/legionoffreedom/870>;
https://twitter.com/legion_svoboda/status/1666002516109148160

[49] <https://t.me/legionoffreedom/870>

[50] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1167

[51]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl>;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoG3yH954nTGvwpRAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwVdVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl>

[52] <https://t.me/RVvoenkora/46761>; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88162

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/27150

[54] <https://t.me/rybar/48094>

[55] https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3595

[56] <https://t.me/readovkanews/60248> ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88089

[57] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12980>

[58] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1167

[59] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12980> ; <https://t.me/rybar/48094>

[60] <https://t.me/rybar/48094>

[61] https://t.me/rusich_army/9209

[62]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoG3yH954nTGvwpRAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwVdVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl>

[63]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoG3yH954nTGvwpRAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwVdVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl> ;
<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbidoG3yH954nTGvwpRAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwVdVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl>

[64]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbido2vZs2NeuifG6Z2g48YuwzjmbQqDKTBeZEJs5eJSDsUpQt6dK223MfNyhXdxuHCEnUl>

[65] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/06/06/maryinka-stala-dlya-planiv-voroga-sakralnym-mistom-valerij-shershen/

[66] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/06/06/maryinka-stala-dlya-planiv-voroga-sakralnym-mistom-valerij-shershen/

[67] <https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/48224>

[68] <https://t.me/wargonzo/12980>

[69] https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2720 ; <https://t.me/wargonzo/12979> ;
<https://t.me/epoddubny/16256>; <https://t.me/rybar/48120>;
<https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2023/06/06/20230606182531-95146717.jpg>

[70] <https://t.me/rybar/48120>; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7834

[71] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7834;
https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7834; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/88138

[72] https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/7834

[73]

<https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0G3yH954nTGvwpRAAtACZ75PfVzVbL2ULPwDVe5uSjhr9rPNne7HCGSLHFdkMGEzUGl>

[74] https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/06/06/70-vbytyh-198-poranyeh-ta-7-polonyeh-taku-czinu-vorog-zaplatyv-za-dobu-v-boyah-bilya-maryinky/;
https://armyinform.com_dot_ua/2023/06/06/na-zaporizhzi-okupanty-oboronyayutsya-na-donechchyni-namagayutsya-vesty-shturmovi-diyi-valerij-shershen/

[75] <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10494>; <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10489>

[76] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-ass...>

[77] https://t.me/concordgroup_official/1165

[78] <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2023>; <https://t.me/astrapress/28166>

[79] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/846

[80] <https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-1-2023>; <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2023>

[81] <https://t.me/modmilby/28532>