Syria Situation Report: April 1-8, 2015

1 April 7: ISIS detonated two SVBIEDs against JN and rebel positions north of Aleppo City. The first 5 April 4: Jaysh al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham (HASI), and other local rebel targeted a joint Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and Islamic Front (IF) headquarters in the town of Mare'a north of groups launched the battle of "Fatah al-Mabeen" to fight ISIS in the Aleppo, killing 18 rebels including a rebel military commander and a JN Emir. The second targeted the eastern Qalamoun region of Damascus, ambushing ISIS forces in the headquarters of a Jabhat al-Shamiya affiliate in the town of Hawar Kilis north of Mare'a on the village of Beir al-Mahroutha amidst ongoing clashes in the area. Syrian-Turkish border, killing over 40. Rebels reportedly instituted curfews between Mare'a and the border town of Azaz in expectation of a third VBIED that did not materialize. 6 April 4-6: Jaysh al-Islam announced the 2 April 2-4: The JN-led Jaysh al-Fatah Qamishli formation of "The Victory Operations Room announced the start of Ras al-Ayn for the People of the Camp" the battle for al-Mastouma Camp located south of Idlib City. JN claimed to advance operations room with a *** within the military camp on April 3, and number of other Damascus-based JN and other Jaysh al-Fatah forces made groups to defend southern Damascus gains in Mastouma village north of the against further ISIS advances. Jaysh camp. A supporting effort led by the rebel al-Islam and other Islamist rebel groups "Rad al-A'atibar" Operations Room in attacked ISIS positions in the Hajar ar-Raqqa Hama targeted a regime checkpoint in al-Aswad neighborhood south of Yarmouk northern Hama in order to prevent the but do not appear to have made advances. regime from deploying reinforcements to Mastouma. Hama Deir ez-Zour 7 April 6: JN, the First Army, and other Southern Front-affiliated rebels seized check-3 April 3: JN and the Abu Amara points on the southern and eastern outskirts of Brigades organized a demonstration the town of Kafr Shams in northern Dera'a throughout Aleppo City, providing Homs Province in a supporting effort for the ongoing armed escorts for demonstrators that rebel offensive on the regime-held Jadiya airbase, called for the establishment of an Islamic Palmyra Caliphate and the "toppling" of "secularism." directly south of Kafr Shams. Clashes near the During the event, demonstrators reportedly Abu Kamal airbase and neighboring Jadiya village are assaulted activists and burned Syrian ongoing, with participation from the Revolutionindependence flags, prompting Jabhat ary Command Council. Western-backed groups al-Shamiya to intervene. In a are also participating, with a western-backed meeting between HASI, the Abu group named Seif al-Sham Brigades using Amara Brigades, Aleppo Shari'a MANPADS and the western-backed First Army Damascus officials, activists, and civil using TOW missiles to target regime positions administrators after the during clashes in the area. incident, all parties agreed that the Syrian independence flag is a symbol of 8 April 1-4: JN, a Southern Front-affiliated Operations Room, HASI and other rebel as-Suwayda "secularism" that should groups seized the Nasib border crossing in southern Dera'a province in the "Battle in not be raised. HASI and Revenge of the Prisoners." JN raised its flag on the border crossing and over a dozen truck the Abu Amara brigades drivers that appear to have been present at the crossing at the time of its seizure were taken also agreed not to allow fighters to into custody. An agreement was reached at JN's Dar al-Adel courthouse to hand the truck participate in or escort protests in the drivers captured at the Nasib border crossing over to the court and to subject the crossing city. to direct civil management with Southern Front policing. The crossing remains closed for the transport of goods. 4 April 1-8: ISIS forces advanced northward into the Yarmouk Refugee Camp in southern Damascus from the Hajar al-Aswad neighborhood south of the camp, seizing control of a majority the camp after 9 April 6: The regime commissioned retired Brigadier General Navef Sapiens to clashes with Islamist rebels and the Palestinian group Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis. ISIS beheaded more than six form a new pro-regime popular mobilization militia in Suwayda Province, with the Palestinian fighters during the clashes. JN intervened to prevent Islamist rebel groups from sending aim of defending the borders of the province against "terrorist attacks." reinforcements into the camp, prompting activists to accuse JN of collusion with ISIS. JN issued a statement denying affiliation with ISIS and asserting its impartiality in the Yarmouk conflict, claiming to be working toward a solution "at the request of the notables of al-Yarmouk Camp and with cooperation with 10 April 5: JN handed two of its members over to the Idlib Shari'a court to be relief bodies in the camp." JN stated that it prevented Jaysh al-Islam from entering Yarmouk because of the group's association with Islamist group Liwa Sham al-Rasoul, which tried for their treatment of Christians in Idlib City. ousted JN from the southern Damascus neighborhood of Beit Sahem in early March 2015. The Syrian regime reportedly helped to evacuate 2,000 civilians from the camp, however has conducted considerable aerial bombardment including the use of barrel bombs against the **Background Kinetic Activity** camp. Major Regime Airstrikes Anti-ISIS Coalition Airstrikes New Operations Room Low-level Clashes by Jennifer Cafarella **Opposition Forces Declared Offensive** W Unknown Explosion 100km **Pro-Regime Forces** April 6: An unknown explosion destroyed the Sayda al-Azra church **SVBIED** \odot 2015 by the Institute for the Study of War Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) in Tel Nasri south of Tel Tamir. Activists accused ISIS of the attack. Major Clash ISIS Pushes to Reclaim Former Territory in Western Syria: The ISIS push into the Yarmouk refugee camp signifies ISIS intent to reclaim areas of southern Damascus with a history of ISIS control. Unconfirmed reports that ISIS called for Palestinian fighters to turn themselves into JN may indicate that ISIS seeks to coerce JN into supporting ISIS in the capital, where their relationship has been characterized by coexistence and de-confliction rather than hostility. ISIS may also seek to leverage apparent seams in the relationship between JN forces in the eastern and southern outskirts of the capital to fragment JN's overall level of influence, possibly to allow ISIS to attract groups of fighters away from JN. Meanwhile, the dual ISIS SVBIED attack against JN and rebel front line positions north of Aleppo City likely indicates the start of an ISIS offensive to seize the border town of Azaz, also with a history of ISIS control. The attack follows a recent increase in ISIS messaging condemning the Aleppo-based Jabhat Shamiya coalition and the increasing partnership between rebels and the YPG in the province. ISIS may therefore be designating a main effort against Aleppo-based rebels supportive of the YPG in order to preempt joint rebel and YPG forces from attacking ISIS territory northeast of Aleppo City.

Tailors Behavior to Local Dynamics: The distinct character of JN's behavior in Damascus and Idlib indicates JN's ability to adapt to its local environment in order tailor the pursuit of its interests to the realities of local dynamics. In Damascus, JN's nuanced role navigating the ISIS advance into Yarmouk reflects careful JN calculation regarding its own position within rebel ranks in the southern outskirts of the capital. Rather than joining a rebel counteroffensive against ISIS, JN leveraged its own position in Yarmouk to prevent an expansion of influence by a rebel group that has resisted JN presence in the area. This effectively allowed ISIS to seize the camp, yet provided JN leverage over Islamist rebels that may allow JN to acquire influence over rebel activities in southern Damascus. In Idlib city, JN's decision to try JN members for the mistreatment of Christians indicates JN's strict adherence to behavioral requirements established by rebel members of the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room, which has prioritized the protection of civilians and minorities in the "liberated" provincial capital. JN leader Abu Mohammed al-Joulani highlighted JN's commitment to continued partnership in Idlib in a speech on April 1 commemorating the JN and rebel victory the city. Joulani furthermore highlighted JN's commitment to reestablishing functional services in the city, positioning JN as a benefactor of Idlib civilians in accordance with the framework for governance established by the Jaysh al-Fatah operations room. Yet Joulani also indicated JN intent to establish a joint Shari'a court to oversee the implementation of governance in the city, which JN is likely to heavily influence. These two instances demonstrate that JN carefully scales its strategy for achieving influence over rebel behavior according to the local dynamics within which JN operates.

Syrian Regime Continues Brutality despite Moscow Negotiations: Assad continues to capitalize on opportunities to utilize brutality to force the submission of rebels and rebel-supportive populations despite the ongoing Moscow II negotiations, which focus in part on humanitarian issues. The regime launched a considerable aerial bombardment of the Yarmouk camp after the ISIS advance, including the use of indiscriminate barrel bombs against the civilian population. Assad has also launched heavy bombardments against Idlib City and the Nasib border crossing, resulting in dozens of civilian deaths. The regime furthermore continues to use jihadist presence in liberated areas to put forth the narrative that all armed opposition groups are actually radical Islamist terrorists and to justify the wholesale punishment of civilians in these areas. The Syrian Foreign Ministry declared that all "armed opposition" groups in Syria are terrorists in an open letter sent to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and the president of the U.N. Security Council on April 6. These trends indicate continued belligerence on the part of the Assad regime despite its declared willing to engage in negotiations for peace, and highlight Assad's duplicitous strategy to foment radicalization in order to justify his continued brutality.