
## Syria Situation Report: March 24-31, 2015



JN and Rebel Forces Seize Provincial Capital in Idlib, Militia Headquarters in Dera'a: JN and rebel forces made two crucial gains against regime forces that threaten the continued viability of the regime's Syria-wide war effort in 2015. In northern Syria, the seizure of Idlib City by JN-led forces is a considerable blow to the regime that represents the greatest anti-Assad victory since the fall of Raqqa City to JN and rebel forces in March 2013. The involvement of the moderate SNC in ruling the city is likely to facilitate the delivery of international aid to the city as JN and rebels move to consolidate their control and implement governance. The SNC's participation is unlikely, however, to define the conditions of governance or negate the ability of JN and Islamist forces to link Idlib City with Shari'a courts in Aleppo and Hama to integrate Shari'a governance across rebel-held terrain. Affecting the trajectory of the Syrian war, Assad must now defend remaining regime enclaves in Idlib from a weakened force posture, and is increasingly vulnerable to JN and rebel penetrating attacks into Latakia Province. In addition, the JN and rebel seizure of Busra al-Sham in southeastern Dera'a Province eliminated the remaining regime stronghold east of Dera'a City, pushing the front line eastward to the historically neutral, Druze-majority Suwayda Province. Busra al-Sham was an important training ground and staging area for irregular pro-regime forces such as Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi'a militias, and its fall to JN and opposition forces therefore disrupts this crucial support to the regime's southern campaign. In addition, the pro-regime withdrawal into Suwayda may exacerbate rising tensions between Druze populations and pro-regime forces in Suwayda that have emerged in recent weeks. This could create opportunities for JN and rebel groups to make inroads with the Druze community after a series of past attempts at outreach to this population.

**Regime Prepares for Moscow II Negotiations:** The release of hundreds of prisoners by the Assad regime in Damascus appears to be a goodwill gesture prior to the start of the Moscow II negotiations on April 6. The meeting of a number of opposition parties in Damascus to discuss a framework for the negotiations indicates that the talks will move forward, likely with a focus on the humanitarian crisis inside the country. The only opposition party with meaningful influence on the ground that attended the meeting, however, is the PKK-linked PYD, which is the political wing associated with the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia. The PYD may pursue a renegotiation of the party's relationship with the regime in northern Syria, where PYD-liked YPG fighters act in close proximity to pro-regime forces. The PYD could demand the regime recognize the de-facto autonomy of Syrian Kurdish areas in northern Syria in return for the continued detente between regime and YPG forces. However, due to the lack of participation from rebel power brokers in the Moscow negotiations, the outcome of the talks is unlikely to contribute to an eventual political solution to the war.