Russian Occupation Updates Page

Russian Occupation Update, May 1, 2025  

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Authors: Karolina Hird and Nate Trotter

Data cut-off: 10 am ET, April 30

ISW's Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the Daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
 
To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here.  

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continues preparations to deport tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to summer camps across occupied Ukraine and Russia, including to areas of Crimea that are unsafe.
• Russia is systematically torturing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians held in Russian detention.
• Kremlin-linked and federally-funded youth organizations and educational initiatives continue to facilitate the indoctrination of Ukrainian children.
• Russia is installing Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in occupation administrations as part of a wider initiative to militarize occupied Ukraine and strengthen Russian governance over occupied areas.
• The wife of a deceased Kherson Oblast occupation deputy launched a youth program aimed at encouraging high birth rates and Russian family values in occupied Kherson Oblast.

Russia continues preparations to deport tens of thousands of Ukrainian children to summer camps across occupied Ukraine and Russia, including to areas of Crimea that are unsafe. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reported on April 28 that it plans to send 600 children from occupied Henichesk Raion to summer camps in the Adygea Republic throughout Summer 2025 for “recreation and rest.”[1] ISW previously observed reports of children from occupied Kherson Oblast, specifically from occupied Henichesk Raion, arriving at the Lan and Gornyi children’s camps in Kamennomostskii, Adygea Republic between 2022-2024, suggesting that these camps may have agreements with Kherson Oblast occupation authorities.[2] Kamennomostkskii is nearly 500km from occupied Henichesk. The Adygean Ministry of Labor previously claimed that Ukrainian children will experience “culture and the way of life of our Motherland” while at summer camps in Adygea—strongly emphasizing the fact that Russia uses such summer camps to indoctrinate Ukrainian children and propagate pro-Russian values.[3] Russian First Deputy Education Minister Alexander Bugayev stated on April 27 that about 53,000 Ukrainian children will “spend their summer holidays” at Russian summer camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation, likely including camps in Adygea Republic.[4] Summer camps on the coastline in occupied Crimea are likely to be physically unsafe for children, however, due to the lasting results of a December 2024 crash of Russian oil tankers in the Kerch Strait.[5] Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov recently claimed that over 23,000 children from occupied Ukraine and Russia will attend over 380 summer camps in occupied Crimea in Summer 2025, despite concerns from Russian activists about persistent fuel contamination of beaches, including those near children’s camps.[6] The deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of participation in summer camps, regardless of the duration of their stay, is likely a violation of international law.[7] Russia, as the occupying power, is furthermore required to safeguard the health of occupied populations (particularly vulnerable populations such as children) and will be in violation of this responsibility if it sends children to unsafe areas that could pose health risks to children.[8]

Russia is systematically torturing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians held in Russian detention. The Ukrainian Media Initiative for Human Rights (MIHR) published a report on April 29 detailing how Russia has used Soviet-era torture practices, including beatings, humiliation, electric shocks, and dog attacks, against Ukrainian POWs and civilian prisoners.[9] MIHR based the report on the testimonies of 138 freed Ukrainian POWs who the Russians detained in 2022-2025. The report notably coheres with a UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (UN OHCHR) assessment from October 2024 that assessed that Russian authorities have subjected Ukrainian POWs to torture, ill-treatment, and inhumane conditions “in a widespread and systematic manner.”[10] The UN OHCHR report also noted that it is highly likely that the Russian military command is aware of the treatment of Ukrainian POWs and that Russian state entities may be coordinating the use of torture. UN High Commissioner on Human Rights Volker Türk noted that there is significant coordination on the poor treatment of the POWs and prisoners among various Russian entities, specifically the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service (FSIN).[11] Russia’s abuse of Ukrainians in detention is notably not exclusive to POWs. The Ukrainian Ombudsman’s Office confirmed on April 28 that Russia is illegally detaining almost 16,000 civilians in occupied territories and at least 1,800 civilians in Russia, and it is likely that Russian agents are torturing many of these detainees.[12] Russia recently returned the body of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriya Roshchyna, whom Russia detained while she was investigating Russian detention centers in occupied Ukraine, with “extensive damage to the coronary arteries” and missing organs, a sign that Russian authorities were trying to obfuscate evidence of torture.[13]

Kremlin-linked and federally funded youth organizations and educational initiatives continue to facilitate the indoctrination of Ukrainian children. Teenage participants of the “Movement of the First” youth activism organization from Podove, occupied Kherson Oblast, visited Grozny, Chechyna on April 28 as part of the “More than a Journey” program.[14] The visit included memorial activities to commemorate the Chechen War and Akhmat Kadyrov, the father of the current Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov. The Russian “Youth and Children” project, which Russian President Vladimir Putin created in 2024, oversees and implements the “More than a Journey” program.[15] “Russian opposition outlet Mozhem Obyasnit published an investigation on April 22 that found that the “Youth and Children” project will provide Yunarmia (the Russian Young Cadets National Movement) with 800 million rubles in subsidies (nearly $10 million) in 2025, dispersed via the “Movement of the First” organization.[16] Mozhem Obyasnit also found that Yunarmia will receive 1 billion rubles ($12 million) in funding in 2025, the most it has received since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[17] The scale of Russian federal investment in militarization programs is noteworthy—all of these Russian organizations have active presences in Russia as well as in occupied Ukraine and militarize adolescents to prepare them for long-term service to the Russian state.[18] Russia uses these programs in occupied Ukraine to generate multi-generational buy-in for Russian rule via curated military-patriotic indoctrination projects.[19]

Russia is installing Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine in occupation administrations as part of a wider initiative to militarize occupied Ukraine and strengthen Russian governance over occupied areas. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 30 that 680 Russian veterans of the war in Ukraine passed the first stage of testing for state and municipal service in the Kherson Oblast occupation administration via the “Heroes of Kherson” program.[20] The 680 candidates will undergo another round of testing, after which the top 10 scorers will receive jobs in the Kherson Oblast occupation administration, and the remaining portion will be placed in the personnel reserve. Saldo initially launched the “Heroes of Kherson” project in February 2025 as an oblast-level analogue to Putin’s “Time of Heroes” project, which aims to install veterans of the war in Ukraine in various Russian government positions.[21] Similar selection processes are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast through the “Heroes of Luhansk” program, as ISW recently reported.[22] The installation of Russian veterans who are loyal to the Kremlin into occupation administrations in Ukraine will further militarize occupied Ukraine and additionally strengthen the Kremlin’s control over local governance.

The wife of a deceased Kherson Oblast occupation deputy launched a youth program aimed at encouraging high birth rates and Russian family values in occupied Kherson Oblast. Oksana Stremousova, the wife of Kirill Stremousov, a Kherson Oblast occupation deputy who died in a reported car crash in November 2022, launched the “Family Traditions Workshop” program in occupied Kherson Oblast on April 29.[23] Stremousova’s project is “aimed at promoting family values and large families” by engaging with high school students in occupied Kherson Oblast.[24] Stremousova’s focus on encouraging Ukrainian teenagers to plan on having large families aligns with other efforts on the part of the Russian occupation administration to stimulate population growth in occupied Ukraine.[25] Stremousova’s program also seeks to teach Ukrainian teenagers about Russian traditions and norms for family life, thereby acting as another tool of Russification in occupied Ukraine. Stremousova appears to be advocating for the creation of a pro-Russian society in occupied Kherson Oblast in which Ukrainian girls grow up to be mothers who focus on raising several children to be loyal to Russia, and where boys grow up to serve the Russian state either militarily or politically.[26]

Russian Occupation Update, April 28, 2025  

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Authors: Jennie Olmsted and Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 11am EST, April 27

 
ISW's Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the Daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
 
To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here. 

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is once again preparing to escalate the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children during the upcoming summer months. A Russian official stated that about 53,000 children from occupied Ukraine will “spend their summer holidays” in children’s camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
• Russian preparations for Victory Day throughout occupied Ukraine emphasize Russia's continued weaponization of historical narratives to consolidate social control over occupied areas.
• Russia is further integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia’s wider governance system by re-distributing single-mandate constituencies.

Russia is once again preparing to escalate the forced removal and deportation of Ukrainian children during the upcoming summer months. Russian First Deputy Education Minister Alexander Bugayev stated on April 27 that about 53,000 children from occupied Ukraine will “spend their summer holidays” in children’s camps throughout occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation.[1] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin noted on April 22 that his administration will send 2,500 children to the “Artek” camp (occupied Crimea),  the “Orlyonok” camp (Krasnodar Krai), the “Krasnaya Gvozdika” camp (occupied Zaporizhia Oblast), the “Smena” camp (Krasnodar Krai) and the “Alyye Parusa” camp (occupied Crimea), and will also continue to send teenagers aged 14 to 17 to Russia via the “University Shifts” program.[2] Pushilin also claimed that 13,000 children will “rest” (likely meaning attend various summer camps) in various Russian federal subjects (regions). ISW previously reported that Russia intends to deport 2,000 Ukrainian teenagers to Russia through the “University Shifts” program in 2025 alone.[3] International law notably differentiates between “forcible transfer/removal” and “deportation,” with “forcible transfer/removal” referring to occasions when the occupying power (in this case Russia) forcibly moves people within internationally-recognized national boundaries (in this case internationally-recognized Ukrainian territory), whereas “deportation” refers to the forced removal of individuals from outside of national boundaries.[4] Russian occupation authorities are both removing and deporting Ukrainian children to these summer camps, as ISW has previously assessed.[5] Both of these actions can rise to the level of a violation of international law.[6]
Such summer camps, whether in occupied Ukraine or in Russia, are re-education camps that aim to indoctrinate Ukrainian children through academic instruction, military training, and military-patriotic education. ISW has historically noticed an increase in the number of reported removals and deportations to such camps in the summer months, as Russian occupation officials are able to increasingly use the guise of summer vacation programs to facilitate the removals and deportations.[7]  The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL) previously identified 43 such facilities, including 41 pre-existing summer camps in occupied Ukraine and Russia, which are involved in the removal/ deportation and re-education of Ukrainian children.[8] Occupation authorities are not only increasing the scale of these deportations but also institutionalizing them as part of a long-term strategy to separate Ukrainian children from their identity and more broadly Russify occupied Ukraine. These efforts are aligned with the Kremlin’s broader campaign to erase Ukrainian identity by assimilating the next generation of Ukrainians into a manufactured Russian national narrative that distorts Ukrainian historical memory, erases Ukrainian language, and conditions children to be loyal to the Russian state.

Russian preparations for Victory Day throughout occupied Ukraine emphasize Russia's continued weaponization of historical narratives to consolidate social control over occupied areas. Victory Day, celebrated on May 9, is Russia’s primary patriotic holiday and commemorates the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War, known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War. In preparation for Victory Day, Russian occupation governments are compelling Ukrainian residents of occupied areas to participate in events including the “Dictation of Victory,” a historical test on the Great Patriotic War comprised of 25 questions.[9] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on April 25 that occupation authorities administered the test to 9,400 participants at 208 locations in occupied Donetsk Oblast and additionally had Ukrainian children write letters to Russian frontline servicemembers.[10] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky stated on April 25 that 150 sites in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast took part in the test including  schools, universities, libraries, and various enterprises.[11] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 25 that upwards of 4,000 residents of occupied Kherson participated in “Dictation of Victory” at 126 locations across occupied Kherson Oblast (twice as many as in 2024) including in schools, museums, near monuments, at the former military airfield in Shotivka, and at the Askania-Nova nature reserve.[12] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration additionally announced on April 24 that occupied Kherson Oblast has joined the Russian “St. George Ribbon” campaign, held in the lead-up to Victory Day from April 24 to May 9, claiming that it unites “millions” of Russians.[13] The Kremlin has historically used Victory Day to present Russia as a protector against Nazism, a narrative the Kremlin has frequently invoked to justify its invasion of Ukraine and further militarize Russian society in the long term.[14] Russian occupation authorities use Victory Day and the narrative of the Great Patriotic War as a means of disseminating a Kremlin-approved and propagandized version of history to Ukrainians, part of a wider initiative to Russify and militarize occupied Ukraine.[15] Russian occupation authorities will use Victory Day programming in occupied Ukraine to disseminate pro-Russian histories and hyper militaristic ideals, while vilifying Ukrainian historical identity.

Russia is further integrating occupied Ukraine into Russia’s wider governance system by redistributing single-mandate constituencies. The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) approved a new scheme on April 25 that will re-distribute single-mandate constituencies throughout Russia and include them in occupied Ukraine.[16] The new scheme allocates seven of the existing 225 single-mandate constituencies to occupied Ukraine—three in Donetsk Oblast, two in Luhansk Oblast, and one each in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts.[17] The re-distributed single-mandate constituency scheme will first be employed in the September 2026 State Duma elections, where 7 total representatives will be “elected” to the Duma from occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russia created four single-mandate constituencies in Crimea during the 2016 and 2021 Duma “elections” following the 2014 occupation and annexation.[18] A prominent Russian insider source previously remarked on the redistricting plans for occupied Ukraine, claiming that they are “a logical continuation of [Ukraine’s] integration into the Russian system of governance.”[19] Russia will use this new constituency scheme in an attempt to legitimize its illegal occupation of Ukraine, much as it did with the introduction of single-mandate districts in Crimea in 2016 and 2021.[20] Residents of occupied areas will likely be forced or coerced into voting in 2026, and the Kremlin will then have the grounds to claim high voter turnout and popular local buy-in for Russian governance. Duma representatives are likely to be pro-Russian or Kremlin-sanctioned candidates, which will allow Russia even greater legislative control of occupied areas. ISW has reported at length on Russia’s pseudo-legal manipulations in occupied Ukraine, and assesses they are part of the Kremlin’s wider campaign to forcibly integrate Ukraine into Russia using Russian legislative levers.[21]

Russian Occupation Update, April 24, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 1 pm EST, April 23
 
ISW's Russian Occupation Update tracks the activities that occur in the Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine. The occupation updates will examine Russian efforts to consolidate administrative control of annexed areas and forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems. This product line replaces the section of the Daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment covering activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
 
To read ISW’s assessment of how Russian activities in occupied areas of Ukraine are part of a coerced Russification and ethnic cleansing campaign, click here.  

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks.
• Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk.
• Russia is actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program.

Russia is extracting economic benefits from occupied Ukraine by exploiting Ukrainian infrastructure and logistics networks. The Russian Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor) announced on April 21 that the first container train carrying unspecified cargo travelled along the Russian “Novorossiya Railways” network through occupied Ukraine and arrived in occupied Sevastopol.[1] The train’s cargo will be unloaded at Sevastopol and exported via ship through Russian-occupied Black Sea ports to unspecified final destinations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin signed an order in May 2023 creating “Novorossiya Railways” to unite rail lines in occupied Ukraine and Russia by merging them under the auspices of Roszheldor.[2] “Novorossiya Railways” currently operates three lines in occupied Ukraine: the Donetsk branch, the Luhansk branch, and the Kherson-Melitopol branch (linking occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts), all operated on the basis of railways that Ukraine controlled before the full-scale invasion in 2022.[3] Russia’s use of railways in occupied Ukraine supports two Russian objectives—first, to provide logistical support for Russian troops fighting in Ukraine via rail, which can be quicker and safer than logistical support by vehicles, and second, to transport various goods to Black Sea ports for maritime export.[4] Russia can use these railways to transport goods from Russia to ports in occupied Crimea without having to rely on the Kerch Strait Railway Bridge, which in recent years has been routinely non-operational due to Ukrainian long-range strikes, or to directly take resources from occupied Ukraine and export them to international markets. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Crimea service Krym Realii reported on April 21, for example, that Russia is using ports in occupied Kerch to export stolen Ukrainian liquified natural gas (LNG) and grain.[5] The Wall Street Journal found that Russia had sold nearly $1 billion in stolen Ukrainian grain as of September 2024, using railway lines and roads in occupied Ukraine to bring massive amounts of grain to occupied Black Sea ports for export.[6] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko similarly reported that Russia exported over 12,000 tons of coal via occupied Mariupol during the week of April 14-20 alone.[7]

Despite Russia’s drive to exploit economic resources in occupied Ukraine, some Russian companies are struggling to properly manage coal mines in occupied Ukraine, likely putting residents of occupied areas near these mines at risk. Russian business-focused state outlet RBK reported on April 21 that Russian companies Impex-Don LLC and Donskie Ugli Trading House LLC are ending their leases on nine coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and returning them to the occupation administrations due to high operating costs and low profits.[8] Both these companies began their leases for the nine mines in 2024. The Russian Federal State Budgetary Institution for the Reorganization and Liquidation of Unprofitable Mines (GURSH) will now oversee liquidating (in effect, shutting down) the nine mines. Russia has gone to great lengths to exploit Ukraine’s coal industry and the coal-rich Donetsk Basin, and reportedly exported over $288 million worth of coal from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts between 2014 and 2022.[9] This number has likely significantly increased since 2022, as Russia now has access to additional mines in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Russia was in the process of liquidating 114 coal mines in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as of September 2023.[10] Russia is likely liquidating these mines in part due to the mismanagement of coal mine infrastructure, and also due to volatile international markets. If GURSH fails to close down these coal mines properly, they may degrade in a way that will pose health and environmental risks to nearby communities, namely the Ukrainian residents of these occupied areas.[11]

Russia is actively recruiting teachers from throughout the Russian Federation to teach in occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of the “Zemskyi Uchitel” (“Rural Teacher”) program. “Zemskyi Uchitel” is a Russian program that selects teachers through a competitive application process and sends them to teach in small towns and villages with populations of less than 50,000 residents for a five-year period in order to compensate for teacher shortages in rural areas.[12] The Luhansk People’s Republic announced in early March that teachers who move to occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of “Zemskyi Uchitel” will receive two million rubles (about $24,000) in compensation.[13] “Zemskyi Uchitel” serves two parallel purposes, both of which strengthen Russia’s control over occupied Ukraine. First, the program further Russifies schools by using Russian teachers to teach Russian curricula in Ukrainian schools.[14] These teachers are likely only using government-approved lesson plans, which include the Kremlin’s revisionist view of Ukrainian history and are centered around pro-Russian military-patriotic ideals.[15] “Zemskyi Uchitel” teachers are also likely to further cut off schoolchildren’s access to Ukrainian-language education, which Russia has essentially destroyed throughout all of occupied Ukraine.[16] Second, “Zemskyi Uchitel” and other professional relocation programs facilitate the repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens. Russia has similarly used the “Zemskyi Postalyon” (“Rural Postal Service”) and “Zemskyi Doktor” (“Rural Doctor”) programs to relocate Russian postal workers and doctors to occupied Ukraine.[17] ISW previously assessed that Russia is offering employment opportunities to Russian citizens to encourage them to move to occupied Ukraine as part of the Kremlin’s larger project of repopulating Ukraine with Russian citizens from Russia.[18]

Russian Occupation Update, April 21, 2025  

Click here to read the full report

Key Takeaways:

• A recent BBC Verify investigation highlights the scale of Russia’s property seizures in occupied Mariupol, supporting ISW’s assessment of how Russian occupation officials are using bureaucratic tools to exert control over occupied Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to surveil and securitize occupied Ukraine. The increased surveillance and securitization of occupied Ukraine are likely intended to encourage self-censorship and facilitate Russian occupation authorities' efforts to prosecute perceived anti-Russian sentiment.
• Russia continues to systemically violate the human rights of the residents in occupied Crimea.

A recent BBC Verify investigation highlights the scale of Russia’s property seizures in occupied Mariupol, supporting ISW’s assessment of how Russian occupation officials are using bureaucratic tools to exert control over occupied Ukraine.[1] The investigation, published on April 17, found that Russian occupation authorities have identified at least 5,700 Mariupol homes for seizure, most of which belong to individuals who either fled or died during Russia’s 2022 siege of the city. BBC Verify noted that Russian occupation authorities use a complicated bureaucratic process to seize properties they deem “ownerless,” which requires the owner to appear in occupied Mariupol within 10 days with a Russian passport and relevant ownership documents. If no owner appears before the occupation authorities within 30 days, the occupation administration begins the process of formally registering the property as “ownerless” and transferring it to city (occupation administration) ownership after three months. BBC Verify notably found that only residents of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) with Russian passports are eligible to take ownership of such seized homes under the current process in Mariupol, suggesting that this scheme is likely an effort to exert pressure specifically on residents of occupied Donetsk Oblast to obtain Russian citizenship. This policy may vary between occupation regimes, however. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated on April 7 that Russian occupation authorities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are transferring seized property to Russian officials and military personnel as part of a campaign to repopulate occupied Ukraine with Russian citizens from Russia.[2] BBC Verify noted that ongoing property seizures in Mariupol appear to be part of a wider Russian effort to Russify the city, and cited satellite images showing the recent construction of a new naval academy and war memorial.[3]

The scale on which Russian authorities are seizing Ukrainian property is staggering. Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Oleksiy Kharchenko stated on April 19 that Russia has seized and nationalized over 114,000 properties in occupied Luhansk Oblast (likely since 2022).[4] Russian authorities transferred over 17,000 of these properties to the regional occupation administration, 46,000 properties to municipal-level occupation administrations, and 51,000 properties to the Russian federal government. ISW recently assessed that Russian property seizures throughout occupied Ukraine are part of the wider campaign to collect personal information on residents of occupied areas, forcibly passportize Ukrainian citizens, generate profit from the occupation of Ukraine, and facilitate the relocation of Russian citizens to occupied Ukraine from Russia.[5]

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to surveil and securitize occupied Ukraine. Crimea occupation governor Sergei Aksyonov reported on April 17 that his administration will begin implementing an “intelligent video surveillance system” to “increase the level of public safety, law and order, and anti-terrorist activity” in occupied Crimea.[6] Aksyonov noted that the surveillance system will collect videos and use artificial intelligence (AI) to process them before sending data to Russian law enforcement agents. Russia has employed similar systems to track domestic dissent and has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on installing surveillance cameras in occupied Crimea to track pro-Ukrainian partisan activity.[7] Physical video surveillance is just one layer of a more complex Russian system meant to surveil the activities of residents of the occupied areas—Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor issued a decree on March 31 that will require telecommunications operators to continuously collect and send information about users’ internet activities to Russian federal control bodies, including IP addresses and geolocation data.[8] The March 31 Roskomnadzor decree may be linked to the recent arrest of a resident of occupied Simferopol, whom the Russian State Security Service (FSB) accused on April 18 of posting anti-Russian content on an online chat room.[9]

Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on April 18 that the Russian “AN-SECURITY” private security company has “monopolized” the provision of security services in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[10] Andryushchenko noted that “AN-SECURITY” has personal links to Rosgvardia Head Viktor Zolotov and former DNR Science and Education Minister Olga Koludarova, suggesting that Koludarova used her connections to Zolotov to import this private security firm to occupied Donetsk Oblast. “AN-SECURITY” has several active job listings on its website advertising work at schools and other educational institutions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russia has already militarized most schools in occupied Ukraine, and the presence of private security personnel will only add to that dynamic and increase pressure on residents to act supportively towards the occupation regime. The increased surveillance and securitization of occupied Ukraine is likely intended to encourage self-censorship and facilitate Russian occupation authorities' efforts to prosecute perceived anti-Russian sentiment.

Russia continues to systemically violate the human rights of the residents in occupied Crimea. The Crimean Human Rights Group (CHRG), a Crimean-based human rights monitoring group, released a report on April 18 documenting Russian human rights violations in occupied Crimea between January and March 2025.[12] The report detailed Russia’s enforced disappearances of Ukrainian citizens, politically motivated persecution of minority groups such as Crimean Tatars and Jehovah’s Witnesses, and violations of freedom of speech and expression. CHRG noted that Russian occupation officials persistently prosecute residents of occupied Crimea for perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian stances and reported that it has documented at least 1,152 administrative proceedings against Ukrainians for “discrediting the Russian army” since 2022, including 159 such cases in 2025.[13] CHRG also found that Russian occupation authorities continue to coerce Ukrainians to serve in the Russian military and documented at least 23 cases of Crimean residents facing criminal cases for “evading military service.”[14] Crimean Tatars continue to bear the brunt of Russian oppressions in occupied Crimea—the Crimean Tatar Resource Center (CTR) reported on April 17 that in the first three months of 2025, Russian law enforcement authorities conducted 13 forcible searches of personal homes in occupied Crimea, seven of which were against Crimean Tatar homes.[15] CTR also found that Russian authorities illegally detained 38 individuals in Crimea between January and March 2025, 12 of whom were Crimean Tatars.[16]

Russian Occupation Update, April 17, 2025  

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 12:30 pm EST, April 16

Key takeaways:  

• Russian officials continue to advertise programs that deport and Russify Ukrainian children and teenagers.
• The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) formally lodged a complaint against the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the issue of Russia’s forced passportization and adoption of Ukrainian children.
• Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities appear to be cracking down against Ukrainian employees of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), using fabricated criminal cases to punish them for pro-Ukrainian sentiment.
• Russia is using an administrative “road safety” law to force residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship.

Russian officials continue to advertise programs that deport and Russify Ukrainian children and teenagers. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin held a meeting with Russian deputy prime ministers on April 14 and discussed the “University Shifts” program—a program that takes children aged 14–17 from occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson to Russian university campuses and summer camps for “educational” experiences.[1] Mishustin noted that over 2,000 Ukrainian children will participate in “University Shifts” in Summer 2025 and reported that the Russian government has allocated 150 million rubles ($1.8 million) to funding this program. Mishustin also emphasized that Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the “University Shifts” program his blessing with the acknowledgement that it exposes Ukrainian children to Russian values, traditions, and culture—suggesting that this is one of many programs that the Russian government is using to Russify Ukrainian youth. The Russian Ministry of Education and Science and the “Movement of the First” military-patriotic youth organization jointly founded the “University Shifts” program in 2022 and has since facilitated the deportation and Russification of tens of thousands of Ukrainian children—10.6 thousand in 2022, 10.7 thousand in 2023, and over 12 thousand in 2023.[2] “University Shifts” also likely prepares Ukrainian teenagers for eventual admission into Russian universities, which further separates them from their Ukrainian identities, families, and homes and further integrates them into the Russian Federation.

Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Chairperson Larisa Tolstykina also advertised the “Cultural Map 4+85” program on April 11, noting that this program will take over 3,000 Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov-on-Don, and Kazan between April and October 2025 to participate in “cultural exchanges.”[3] “Cultural Map 4+85” brands itself as a “cultural and educational” program for Ukrainian children, but emphasizes that its goal is to “become an effective mechanism for the socio-cultural rehabilitation and integration of children into a single Russian society.”[4] ISW previously assessed that Russia is deporting Ukrainian children and exposing them to pro-Russian indoctrination using multiple schemes, including educational programs such as “Cultural Map 4+85” and “University Shifts.”[5]

The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) formally lodged a complaint against the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) over the issue of Russia’s forced passportization and adoption of Ukrainian children.[6] The UHHRU complaint, initially lodged in 2023 and then published on April 14, 2025, is written on behalf 10 Ukrainian children aged 12 to 16 years old, all of whom are orphans from Crimea.  The complaint notes that the children were wards of the Ukrainian state at the time of Russia’s illegal occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, and that the Russian government refused Ukraine’s requests to return the children to territory controlled by Ukraine and instead began the process of issuing them Russian citizenship. Crimean occupation authorities notably put the children up for adoption, and their whereabouts are currently unknown since the children disappeared from publicly-available adoption sites—which the UHHRU noted could mean that they have been adopted by Russian families. The ECHR previously agreed with allegations that Russia was violating international law by imposing Russian citizenship on residents of occupied Crimea, and UHHRU is seeking to apply this principle to the case of these 10 Ukrainian children.[7] The UHHRU complaint highlights a trend that ISW has observed for several years—Russia is placing vulnerable Ukrainian children up for adoption into Russian families and forcibly granting them Russian citizenship, which makes it much harder for Ukrainian authorities to identify these children and advocate for their return.[8]

Zaporizhia Oblast occupation authorities appear to be cracking down against Ukrainian employees of the Russian-controlled Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), using fabricated criminal cases to punish them for pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor Dmytro Orlov reported on April 15 that the Russian-controlled Zaporizhia Oblast Court sentenced Liliya Kachkareva, a civilian ZNPP employee, to 14 years in prison for “high treason” for allegedly sending money to the Ukrainian armed forces in 2024.[9] Orlov noted that Russian occupation officials have increasingly been prosecuting female employees of the ZNPP and other Russian-occupied energy facilities under similar charges. Russian law enforcement authorities were holding at least 13 ZNPP employees in arbitrary detention on dubious charges as of April 1, 2025.[10] The locations and conditions of many of these employees remains unknown. Russian occupation courts frequently fabricate “terrorism,” “espionage,” or “treason” charges against Ukrainian residents of occupied areas in order to punish them for the expression of perceived pro-Ukrainian or anti-Russian views.[11] Russian occupation officials may be pushing for increased sentences against ZNPP employees in order to replace Ukrainian employees with Russian employees—thereby consolidating Russia’s control over the occupied ZNPP.

Russia is using an administrative road safety law to force residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian citizenship. The Russian federal law “On Road Safety,” which the Russian government initially amended in July 2023, began requiring Russian drivers’ licenses to drive in occupied Ukraine and the Russian Federation as of April 1, 2025.[12] Residents of occupied Crimea and Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts who do not have Russian drivers’ licenses and maintain either Ukrainian licenses or licenses issued by the Donetsk and Luhansk peoples’ republics (DNR and LNR) must now apply for a Russian license by January 1, 2026 using a simplified procedure that the Russian government codified in December 2022. This simplified procedure requires residents of occupied Ukraine to obtain Russian drivers’ licenses by submitting a Russian passport or residence documents, but without taking a driving exam.[13] The Ukrainian Resistance Center responded to this development by calling it “passportization on wheels” and noted that it is another Russian occupation scheme intended to pressure residents of occupied areas into receiving Russian documentation.[14] Russian occupation officials are likely to use this road safety law to further coerce passportization, as residents will need to obtain Russian citizenship in order to maintain their ability to drive by getting Russian passports. The road safety law will also allow Russian occupation officials to collect personal data on residents of occupied areas, which they can later use against residents in the case of dissent or non-compliance with the occupation regime.

Russian Occupation Update, April 14, 2025  

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird 

Data cut-off: 11:15am EST, April 13

Key takeaways:  

• Russia is using occupied Ukraine to support its domestic drone development and production industry.
• Russia is also integrating Ukrainian children into its wider drone operator training and drone production ecosystem.
• Russian occupation administrators are implementing projects to increase the birth rate in occupied Ukraine and further Russia’s illegitimate claims to the territories it illegally occupies.
• Russia is deporting Ukrainian prisoners from prisons in occupied Ukraine to penal colonies throughout the Russian Federation.

Russia is using occupied Ukraine to support its domestic drone development and production industry. The Ukrainian Eastern Human Rights Group (EHRG) and Institute for Strategic Research and Security (ISRS) released a report on April 3 detailing how Russia is using land, infrastructure, and people in occupied Ukraine to expand drone development, production, and operator training.[1] EHRG and ISRS reported that Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec has seized the Luhansk Aircraft Repair Plant (occupied Luhansk City, Luhansk Oblast) and the Snizhne Machine-Building Plant (occupied Snizhne, Donetsk Oblast) and is producing drones at both enterprises.[2] The report noted that Russia is also using the Donbas Development Corporation, Vladimir Zhoga Republican Center for Unmanned Systems, LLC 3D-Techno, LLC NPO Front, LLC NPO Utesov, GC Almaz, and IP Grigoriadiadis (all in occupied Donetsk City) and the JSC Pervomaiske Mechanical Plant (occupied Pervomaiske, Luhansk Oblast) to produce components and assemble drone models for the Russian army. Russia is also using occupied Ukrainian land to build new drone training grounds, start technological preparatory courses in schools and colleges to train drone operators, and create new research and development centers. The Kremlin has routinely signaled its commitment to increasing Russian drone production capabilities and improving drone operations on the battlefield in Ukraine and appears to have plans to integrate Ukrainian infrastructure and production capabilities into its wider drone production campaign.[3]

Russia is also integrating Ukrainian children into its wider drone operator training and drone production ecosystem. The EHRG and ISRS report emphasized that Russia has instituted drone training curricula for over 10,000 teenagers in secondary schools throughout occupied Ukraine.[4] Primary school-aged children are also subjected to drone training in schools and extracurricular programs.[5] Russia incentivizes children’s participation in drone training in part by “gamifying” the process and holding drone racing competitions throughout occupied Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation Sports Ministry, for example, hosted its first drone racing tournament for children aged eight to 14 in occupied Skadovsk in May 2024.[6] The Ukrainian Resistance Center also previously reported that Russian officials began a “special engineering class” in occupied Mariupol’s School 47 to teach students how to design and manufacture drones for the Russian army.[7] Russian efforts to integrate Ukrainian children into drone production and operator training programs serve three main purposes: first to militarize Ukrainian children by exposing them to hyper-militarized ideals from a young age; second, to prepare Ukrainian children for potential future service in the Russian armed forces; and third, to support Russia’s domestic defense industrial base (DIB) output.

Russian occupation administrators are implementing projects to increase the birth rate in occupied Ukraine in order to stimulate population growth and further Russia’s illegitimate claims to the territories it illegally occupies. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky reported on April 11 that he issued draft orders for a regional program to increase the birth rate in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] The specifics of the proposed regional program are unclear, but Balitsky’s proposal is consistent with other projects that Russian occupation officials have undertaken to encourage population growth in occupied areas.[9] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on April 11 that Russia plans to reopen all kindergartens in occupied Kherson Oblast by 2030 and build 55 new preschools for 6,700 children by 2044.[10] Saldo noted that the planned new preschools “are designed for [to accommodate] population growth.”

Russia has been reckoning with a demographic crisis at home for several decades, caused by declining birthrates, relatively lower life expectancies, high emigration levels, and an aging population.[11] The war in Ukraine has exacerbated many of these factors, but Russia continues efforts to stimulate population growth to overcome pre-existing and new demographic challenges.[12] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s occupation of Ukraine is intended in part to offset Russia’s demographic decline, as Russia sees Ukrainian citizens as a demographic asset that can be forcibly integrated into the Russian Federation.[13] Russian occupation authorities have historically used methods such as the provision of social services like maternity capital (one-time payments made to women for the birth or adoption of a child beyond their first) to encourage higher birth rates in occupied Ukraine.[14] Higher birthrates in occupied areas mean that Russian occupation authorities will grant more Russian citizenships and raise a generation of children under Russian rule—ultimately creating the false impression that Russia has a right to these illegally occupied areas due to the prevalence of Russian citizens living there.

Russia is deporting Ukrainian prisoners from prisons in occupied Ukraine to penal colonies throughout the Russian Federation. Russian independent investigative outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) published a story on April 11 examining how Russia has deported over 1,800 prisoners from Ukraine to penal colonies in Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion.[15] Mozhem Obyasnit found that Russian forces deported the prisoners from Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts in the early days of the invasion and interned them in at least 11 penal colonies in Krasnodar Krai, Rostov Oblast, the Mordovia Republic, and occupied Crimea. Deported prisoners reported that Russian guards beat and tortured them for being Ukrainian. Russian guards also reportedly attempt to bribe Ukrainian prisoners with shorter and more lenient sentences if they take Russian passports — suggesting that Russian efforts to deport Ukrainian prisoners are part of Russia’s larger passportization campaign. Ukrainian human rights groups have previously raised concerns about Russia’s treatment of deported prisoners and noted that Russia has purposefully made it very difficult for Ukraine to repatriate these individuals.[16] All of the prisoners that Russia has deported are Ukrainian citizens whom Ukrainian courts convicted of crimes under Ukrainian criminal law, so Russia has no legal basis on which to deport or re-convict these individuals, much less to forcibly change their citizenship.[17]

Russian Occupation Update, April 10, 2025

Click here to read the full report

Author: Karolina Hird

Data cut-off: 1pm EST April 9

Key takeaways:  

• Russian occupation administrations are seizing property throughout occupied Ukraine.
• Russia continues to crack down against the Crimean Tatar community in occupied Crimea, often using dubious legal charges to prosecute and detain Crimean Tatars.
• Children throughout occupied Ukraine are taking part in the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic game—a revived Soviet-era war game aimed at training youth in basic military skills in eventual preparation for service in the Russian military. 

Russian occupation administrations are seizing property throughout occupied Ukraine in order to collect personal information on residents of occupied areas, conduct coerced passportization, and facilitate the relocation of Russian citizens to occupied areas of Ukraine. The Mariupol City occupation administration published updated lists on April 4 and 7 of residential and non-residential properties in Mariupol classified as “ownerless.”[1] The administration instructs residents of Mariupol to submit an application to the occupation Housing and Utilities Department within 30 days of the lists’ publication in order to have ownership restored. The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration similarly reported in late March that it is checking properties throughout occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to determine ownership status.[2] The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration directed residents of occupied areas to present a Russian passport and other documentation to claim ownership of any property classified as “ownerless.”

Ukrainian officials immediately voiced concerns about the Russian property inventory process. Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Administration Head Ivan Fedorov noted that Russian officials “nationalize” property that they have determined to be “ownerless,” and then auction off property to make a profit.[3] Fedorov also noted that, in some cases, Russian occupation administrators will sell the "stolen" property to Russian soldiers, occupation officials, and other Russian citizens, regardless of whether a Ukrainian resident legally owns the property or not. The Ukrainian Resistance Center suggested that this issue is particularly acute in Mariupol, reporting that the number of properties registered as “ownerless” and nationalized by the occupation administration in 2024 was 5.5 times higher than in 2023.[4] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko also suggested that Russian officials often falsify ownership documents and property titles in order to deprive  Ukrainians of their homes.[5]

Russian occupation officials are likely seizing and nationalizing property in occupied Ukraine to accomplish three objectives. First, the mass nationalization of Ukrainian property lets the Russian government directly profit from the occupation of Ukraine’s towns and cities. The Russian occupation administration in Crimea made an estimated 4.8 billion rubles ($56 million) from nationalizing Ukrainian property in Crimea between 2022 and 2024 alone, for example.[6] Russia can benefit greatly from extracting economic value from occupied Ukraine to support its struggling domestic economy, as ISW has previously observed.[7] Second, the process of registering properties as “ownerless” facilitates personal data collection and supports passportization efforts. Residents of properties that the occupation administration has classified as “ownerless” must present personal information and documentation to occupation authorities to restore their ownership. The registration process also requires people to present Russian passports, meaning that residents may feel pressured to obtain Russian citizenship out of fear of losing their homes.[8] Finally, the seizure of property from Ukrainian residents allows Russian occupation administrations to give that property to Russian citizens, facilitating the illegal relocation of Russian citizens to occupied areas of Ukraine from Russia.[9]

Russia continues to crack down against the Crimean Tatar community in occupied Crimea, often using dubious legal charges to prosecute and detain Crimean Tatars. The Russian Southern District Court in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast, requested 17 years imprisonment in a maximum-security penal colony for a group of six Crimean Tatar men from occupied Dzhankoi on April 8.[10] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and other law enforcement agents detained the men during a raid in January 2023 on “terrorist” charges due to their alleged involvement with Hizb ut-Tahrir—an international pan-Islamic fundamentalist organization that has historically been active in Central Asia and Crimea and that is banned in Russia. Crimean human rights organizations that reviewed the case materials of the “Dzhankoi Six” noted that there was no evidence that the men were planning for or preparing to commit any sort of terror attack and that the Russian occupation administration is prosecuting them because of their Crimean Tatar identities and their involvement in Muslim community organizations.[11]

The Crimean occupation administration has frequently targeted Crimean Tatar communities on tenuous “terrorism” charges, promoting the claim that Crimean Tatar identity is inherently dangerous by affiliating it with Hizb ut-Tahrir.[12] The Russian occupation Supreme Court of Crimea additionally sentenced another Crimean Tatar man to five years in prison on April 4 on the charge of communicating with the Ukrainian military.[13] Chairman of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis Refat Chubarov warned on April 1 that the FSB launched a new wave of mass searches and repressive actions against Crimean Tatars, breaking into homes and seizing personal documents from various Crimean Tatar households.[14]

Children throughout occupied Ukraine are taking part in the “Zarnitsa 2.0” military-patriotic game—a revived Soviet-era war game aimed at training youth in basic military skills in eventual preparation for service in the Russian military. “Zarnitsa 2.0” brands itself as an “all-Russian military-patriotic game in a qualitatively new, modern format using digital technologies,” intended to teach children aged seven to 17 “traditional values” and “modern challenges” such as cyber warfare and drone operations.[15] Children and youth registered in “Zarnitsa 2.0” create squad-sized “detachments” that compete against other “detachments” for points and ranking on a national leaderboard, which notably includes teams from occupied Ukraine. “Zarnitsa 2.0” is a creation of the Russian Movement of the First and Yunarmia (Young Army Cadets National Movement) youth military-patriotic movements, both of which have active presences in occupied Ukraine and strive to militarize Ukrainian youth via various military-patriotic education and training courses.[16] The municipal (city-level) stage of “Zarnitsa 2.0” competitions is currently underway in Russia and occupied Ukraine until April 16.[17] “Zarnitsa 2.0” competitions concluded in some towns in occupied Luhansk Oblast on April 9, including in occupied Bilovodsk and Sverdlovsk.[18] Over 12,000 youth from occupied Luhansk Oblast alone reportedly registered for “Zarnitsa 2.0” in February and March 2025.[19] “Zarnitsa 2.0” is part of a wider Russian ecosystem operating throughout occupied Ukraine with the explicit purpose of militarizing Ukrainian children, indoctrinating them against their Ukrainian identities, and training them to fight for the Russian military against their fellow Ukrainians.[20]