Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates Page

This page collects ISW's Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Updates.

The Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update tracks Russian recruitment efforts, force generation, force reconstitution, and technological adaptations. This product line is intended to replace the coverage of Russian force generation and technological adaptations in the daily Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments.

Click here for the Ukraine Conflict Updates page.



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Kateryna Stepanenko with Tetiana Trach

April 29, 2025 7:30 pm

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 10pm ET on April 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the May 5 Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

Russian military recruitment officials are reportedly leveraging a new law extending the validity of conscription notices to detain military-aged men and meet Russia's record-high Spring 2025 conscription quota. Putin signed a law on April 21 that simplifies conscription procedures for military aged men who were called up in a semi-annual conscription but did not deploy for compulsory military service.[1] The law specifies that conscripts who underwent conscription processes such as medical commissions but were not assigned to military service could be called up to military service within a year without repeating conscription procedures. Russian opposition outlet Verska, citing Russian human rights activists, reported that Moscow City police began raiding public spaces to catch military-aged men and immediately commit them to compulsory military service in Russia without proper conscription processing.[2] Russian human rights activists told Verstka that Moscow City law enforcement is particularly targeting men ages 18 through 30 who were conscripted in Fall 2024 but were not called up or did not show up for military service.[3] Verstka reported that men who successfully appealed their conscription notices in Fall 2024 may also be subject to immediate conscription without additional due process. A Russian lawyer stated that the new conscription law excluded men who underwent conscription processes in Fall 2024 but did not report to military service, meaning that Russian law enforcement is illegally using this law to boost conscription numbers.[4]

Russian officials may be intensifying raids and detentions of military-age men in an effort to urgently satisfy the increased draft quota. Putin ordered the conscription of 160,000 Russian men aged 18 through 30 on March 31, the largest conscription call up since 2011.[5] Russian human rights activists told Radio Svoboda's northwestern Russia service Sever Realii that St. Petersburg law enforcement recently illegally detained at least 200 military-aged men and attempted to commit detainees with chronic illnesses and medical deferrals to compulsory military service within 24 hours.[6] Moscow City law enforcement also began raiding fitness clubs in an effort to find men who avoided compulsory military service or registration.[7]

Russian law enforcement raids of military aged men and the new conscription procedures indicate that the Russian military conscription apparatus may lack the administrative capacity to meet the Kremlin's increasing draft quotas in wartime. Independent Russian human rights project OVD-Info assessed that detentions of military-aged men are part of the military recruiters' effort to bypass the standard procedure that lasts a few days and illegally draft men into the military without due process.[8] OVD-Info remarked that the number of detained military-aged men in Fall 2024 increased nearly two-fold (170 detentions) over Fall 2023 (around 94 detentions) and that military recruitment centers intensified raids in December 2024 in a likely effort to urgently meet the conscription quota before the end of the draft period. OVD-Info reported that the largest number of raids during Fall 2024 conscription cycle occurred in Moscow City, and Russian human rights activists warned that Russian conscription methods for the Spring 2025 period will be even harsher.[9] Russian military recruiters may be struggling to meet Russia's conscription quotas due to Russia's growing demographic problems, active recruitment for combat operations in Ukraine, and draft evasion.[10]

The Kremlin has been increasingly reforming the Russian conscription apparatus since November 2022 likely in an effort to expand the Russian inactive reserve and enhance Russia's mobilization potential. The Kremlin has introduced various laws since at least November 2022 that expand the Russian conscription pool, introduce stricter punishments for draft evasion, and simplify draft procedures. Putin tasked the Russian Digital Development Ministry and the Federal Tax Service in November 2022 to create a joint database containing information on Russians liable for compulsory military service by April 2024.[11] Putin's order notably follows the Kremlin's systematic failures during the September 2022 partial mobilization.[12] The Kremlin began working on and rolling out a unified digital register for Russian citizens eligible for military service starting in April 2023, which allows Russian military recruitment centers to digitally distribute summonses and crack down on draft dodging.[13] The Kremlin also collated the unified digital register with other government agencies starting November 2024, which makes it challenging for military aged men to obtain government services if they dodge the draft.[14] The Kremlin also expanded the Russian conscription pool by increasing the maximum draft age from 27 to 30 starting January 1, 2024.[15] Putin signed a decree in July 2023 increasing fines for draft dodging, and the Russian State Duma Defense Committee had since proposed increasing penalties for people who fail to update their military registrations in February 2025.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) proposed in February 2025 to shorten the list of medical conditions that qualify for deferment from the draft.[17]

The Kremlin's efforts to reform the Russian conscription apparatus suggest that the Kremlin is learning from its bureaucratic failures during the September 2022 mobilization. The Kremlin has yet to resolve persistent bureaucratic inefficiencies, draft dodging, and conscript retention, as it is increasingly relying on raids and coercion to fulfil its conscription and recruitment quotas. These reforms may enable Russia to effectively conduct partial or general involuntary reserve call-ups in the future, however, if the Kremlin properly adopts these measures.

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin is continuing to recruit foreigners to support its war effort in Ukraine, particularly from Southeast and Central Asia.
  • Russian federal subjects are continuing to incentivize military recruitment by increasing the one-time compensation for Russians who bring new recruits into regional military recruitment centers.
  • Kaliningrad Oblast formed a new reserve unit, possibly as part of the Kremlin's ongoing preparations for future aggression against NATO.
  • Putin is setting information conditions to lower eligibility requirements for veterans to join local government service, likely to expedite the formation of a country-wide, veteran-based elite loyal to the regime and Russia's war efforts.
  • The Kremlin is increasing the federal funding for military patriotic education of Russian youth in an effort to expand the Russian recruitment pool over the long term.
  • Putin acknowledged that Russia still faces drone shortages during the Military-Industrial Commission meeting on April 23.
  • Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD for failing to effectively integrate small drone development companies into the Russian DIB and rapidly adapt drones to battlefield realities.
  • Russia continues the development of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and multi-purpose drones to support logistics and remote mining efforts.
  • Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec launched an effort to improve communication between drones.
  • Russian forces conducted joint military and naval exercises with Bangladeshi and Laotian forces in late April.

Click here to read the full report.

Kateryna Stepanenko

April 22, 2025, 9pm ET

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on April 21, 2025. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 29, 2025, Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Report.

The Kremlin appears to be increasingly concerned with the Russian military's ability to retain forces in the event of demobilization following a ceasefire or a negotiated peace. Russian propagandist Anastasiya Kashevarova claimed on April 17 that the Kremlin assigned Russia’s military chiefs of staff in early April to survey contract servicemen and mobilized personnel about their intent to reenlist in the Russian military should Russia complete its war in Ukraine.[1] Kashevarova implied that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to retain active servicemen by offering them full social benefits, subsidized rent, a monthly salary of 100,000-to-200,000 rubles ($1,225 to $2,450), 60 days of paid leave annually, and other benefits. Kashevarova claimed that the Russian military chiefs of staff asked all Russian servicemen who had indicated that they intend to refuse to reenlist following Russia's war in Ukraine to write formal reports documenting their refusal. Kashevarova assessed that the survey may be part of the Russian MoD's effort to estimate potential reductions in force and forecast the strength of the Russian military in the event of the completion of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The Russian government signed a decree on April 19 that will increase the salaries for military and law enforcement personnel by 4.5 percent starting on October 1, 2025, and the Ukrainian Resistance Center assessed that this decree aims to incentivize recruitment and force retention.[2] ISW has recently observed reports of the Russian MoD intensifying efforts to coerce mobilized servicemen into signing military contracts, which could help Russia to retain contract personnel in the event of demobilization.[3]

Russian milbloggers expressed doubts that the Russian MoD will be able to retain the current size of the Russian military if the Russian MoD does not promise — and honor — increased financial benefits. One milblogger confirmed that Russian military leadership is surveying Russian forces, but claimed that Russian military leadership is not offering any special benefits to increase force retention rates.[4] The milblogger, citing unnamed sources within an unspecified Russian operational grouping of forces fighting in Ukraine, claimed that some field commanders independently imposed a new requirement for servicemen to document their refusal to reenlist after facing nagging from senior military commanders about the need to retain forces on the battlefield. The milblogger added that the Russian military’s persistent commitment to wounded personnel on the battlefield underscores Russia’s need to generate new recruits and retain existing forces. The milblogger implied that the Russian MoD is conducting this survey in an effort to assess which financial and social benefits are the most attractive and most likely to attract Russian servicemen to reenlist after a potential demobilization. The milblogger suggested that these efforts ultimately will be futile, as the Russian military continues to face widespread logistics problems, fails to provide servicemembers career advancement opportunities, and continues to lose credibility by providing exaggerated field reports. Another Russian milblogger observed that the Russian MoD would need to amend the Russian military’s official military pay scale and official budget to deliver on promised raises.[5] The milblogger added that the Russian military must conduct reforms that transform the average Russian’s perception of military service away from being a lucrative opportunity towards being an honorable responsibility.

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin and some Russian federal subjects are continuing to increase financial incentives and expand eligibility requirements for contract military service.
  • Some Russian federal subjects are failing to meet the Kremlin's recruitment targets as the Russian volunteer recruitment system continues to suffer from high recruitment costs and other inefficiencies.
  • Some Russian federal subjects may be failing to meet recruitment targets because they are unable to compete with financial incentives offered in other federal subjects.
  • Putin signed a decree on April 21 exempting select volunteers who fought in Ukraine in volunteer units or Kremlin proxy forces from being conscripted into the Russian military, likely as part of the Kremlin's effort to centralize control over informal volunteer units.
  • The Kremlin is continuing to expand the "Time of Heroes" Higher School of Public Administration Program across occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to raise a new class of loyal occupation officials.
  • Russian milbloggers criticized Russian state media after it published a video of Russian long-range drone operators conducting a drone strike from a high-rise in Moscow City.
  • Russia reportedly developed a new version of the "Kometa" navigation chip, enhancing the resistance of Russian satellite navigation signals against Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW).
  • On April 16, Putin awarded the honorific "Guards" titles to four Russian motorized rifle regiments, an aviation regiment, and an army corps that have fought in Donetsk and Kherson oblasts.

Kateryna Stepanenko

April 15, 2025, 6:30 pm

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1000pm ET on April 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the April 21, 2025, Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update. 

The Kremlin is using surge pricing for enlistment bonuses to recruit additional volunteers and attempt to sustain Russia's protracted war effort in Ukraine. Numerous Russian federal subjects dramatically increased the price of one-time enlistment bonuses in late 2024 and early 2025 and introduced additional short-term temporary sign-on bonuses to incentivize more Russians to volunteer to fight in Ukraine.[1] Samara, Omsk, Novosibirsk, and other oblasts introduced additional compensation in late 2024 and early 2025 for individuals who sign up during a defined short period – usually between three weeks and two months – to recruit additional volunteers. Russian federal subjects are simultaneously and rapidly increasing the fixed amounts for one-time bonuses. Primorsk Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako has increased the regional enlistment bonuses three time since the start of 2025 – the krai paid 800,000 rubles ($9,690) prior to January 1, 2025; one million rubles ($12,114) between January 1 and mid-February 2025; 1.6 million rubles ($19,383) between mid-February and April 1, 2025; and 2.5 million rubles ($30,284) starting April 1, 2025.[2] Irkutsk Oblast Governor increased one-time enlistment bonuses from around 600,000 rubles ($7,207) to 1.4 million rubles ($16,960) on March 19, 2025.[3] The average one-time enlistment bonus offered in Russian federal subjects and in occupied Ukraine as of April 14, 2025, is 1.51 million rubles ($18,292). This figure includes bonuses offered by both regional and federal authorities.[4]

Russian recruitment rates seemingly increased in early 2025, likely as a result of the Kremlin's temporary increases in sign-up bonuses and some Russians' anticipation of a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on April 11 that statistics from the Unified Selection Point (Russia’s main volunteer recruitment agency) show that monthly contract recruitment rates in Moscow City almost doubled in late March and early April 2025 compared to January 2025.[5] Verstka observed that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has recruited over 6,300 people through voluntary military service contracts in Moscow City since the beginning of 2025. Verstka added that recruitment rates suddenly spiked starting on March 17, amidst reports of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia and Russian forces repelling Ukrainian forces from much of Kursk Oblast. An employee of a Russian military recruitment center in an unnamed town in Siberia told Radio Svoboda that the town's recruitment rates peaked in March 2025 after the regional government increased regional one-time enlistment bonuses to one million rubles ($12,114).[6] The employee added that many volunteers who are enlisting had waited for the regional government to increase the one-time payment and hope that the Ukraine-Russia peace talks will lead to a ceasefire that allows them to avoid combat.[7] An analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) extrapolated recruitment data for 37 Russian federal subjects and assessed on April 13 that Russia is currently recruiting around 1,300 volunteers per day, or about 39,000 per month.[8] Russia is unlikely to generate 39,000 volunteers per month indefinitely, however, as the increased enlistment bonuses that generated the previous recruitment bump are temporary, and Russia’s economic and demographic constraints do not likely support continued large-scale recruitment at such rates.[9]

Russian federal subjects appear to have been intensifying their recruitment efforts since March 2025 and are spending significant funds on advertising military service in Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding. Moscow City officials told Verstka in mid-March that Moscow is continuing to recruit volunteers and that the Russian MoD will continue to advertise military service.[10] Verstka also found that Moscow Oblast announced a tender worth 78 million rubles ($944,000) to organize an online recruitment campaign through at least the end of 2025. Verstka observed that the volume of Russian military recruitment ads on Telegram has increased since late March 2025, with recruiters publishing approximately 7,000 ads in the first week of April 2025 compared to 7,300 ads published in the entire month of January 2025.[11] An SWP analyst estimated that Russia likely spends around 1.5 billion rubles ($18 million) in regional enlistment bonuses and 500 million rubles ($6 million) in federal enlistment bonuses per day -- or two billion rubles per day ($24 million) in total. The SWP analyst also observed that average one-time enlistment bonuses are around 10 percent higher in March 2025 than they were in December 2024. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories) previously observed that the Russian federal budget expenditures for 2025 through 2027 allocated 90 billion rubles ($1.1 billion) to federal one-time enlistment bonuses, not including regional government bonuses.[12]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin is using surge pricing for enlistment bonuses to recruit additional volunteers and attempt to sustain Russia's protracted war effort in Ukraine.
  • Russian federal subjects appear to have been intensifying their recruitment efforts since March 2025 and are spending significant funds on advertising military service in Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin intends to sustain current force generation efforts for some time, peace talks notwithstanding.
  • PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officially denied PRC state involvement in the recruitment of Chinese nationals to fight with Russian forces in Ukraine after two captured Chinese nationals participated in a Ukrainian press conference on April 14.
  • The Russian government censored Telegram posts in a continued effort to conceal North Korean involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
  • Kremlin pronatalist policies introduced during the 2024 "Year of the Family" are reportedly so far failing to improve Russia’s low birth rates.
  • Russian federal subjects are increasingly offering Russian veterans employment and education opportunities as part of the Kremlin's effort to address labor shortages in Russia.
  • The Kremlin is continuing to offer hand-selected veterans high-ranking government positions in support of the permanent militarization of Russian youth.
  • Russian State Duma officials registered an amendment on April 7 that would extend combat veteran statuses and state benefits to some Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) clergy who participated in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in apparent violation of world Orthodox canons.
  • Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 14 that Russian forces are using chemical agents against Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast in an apparent violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which Russia is a party.
  • The Kremlin is actively reorienting and expanding its unmanned aerial systems (UAS) production to support its war effort in Ukraine and possibly to prepare for future aggression against NATO states.
  • Russian forces completed joint military exercises with India and Tajikistan on April 11.

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